Lonergan and Oedipus by Frost, Michael Curry
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:107976
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2018
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
Lonergan and Oedipus
Author: Michael Curry Frost
















A dissertation for PhD 
 
submitted to the Faculty of  
 
the department of The Philosophy Department 
 
in partial fulfillment 
 
of the requirements for the degree of 
 








































































Lonergan and Oedipus 
 
Michael Curry Frost, PhD 
 
Advisor: Patrick H. Byrne, PhD 
2nd Reader: Marina Berzins McCoy, PhD 




My first aim in this dissertation is to elucidate Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus 
through the writings of Bernard Lonergan, SJ.  My second aim is to elucidate 
Lonergan’s thought by adducing it, in action, in Oedipus Tyrannus.  Instead of 
analyzing what a classical text means to its own time and place, I undertake a 
philosophy of classics, exploring various philosophical problems by using Sophoclean 
texts.  The paper incidentally discloses an interpretation of Oedipus Tyrannus that is 
at odds with some of the leading authors in the secondary literature while remaining 
consonant with others.  I use Woodruff and Meineck’s 2003 translation of Theban 
Plays throughout because I find the translation refreshing.   It is my hope that this 
paper, like all good papers, raises more questions than answers.   
In Chapter 1, I recruit Lonergan’s three basic observations about human 
knowing to explain Oedipus’ cognitive journey over the course of the play.  First, 
Lonergan notes that underpinning all human knowing is the spirit of inquiry; the 
pure, unrestricted desire to know, which Lonergan calls “the supreme heuristic 
notion.”1 Second, he observes that the structure of human knowing is invariant.  No 
matter who you are – mathematician, scientist, commonsense knower, etc. – all 
human knowing follows a dynamic but invariant structure Lonergan calls the “self-
correcting cycle of learning.”  This cycle moves from inquiry to insight to judgment to 
decision.  Third, this invariant, self-correcting cycle, underpinned by the pure 
unrestricted desire to know, operates within dynamically shifting patterns of 
consciousness, modes of human knowing, that are circumscribed by our concerns, 
expressed by the kinds of questions we ask.  Human consciousness is “polymorphic.” 
Using these three points as touchstones, I elucidate the dynamism of Oedipus’ 
cognitional structure by tracing the self-correcting sequence of his 132 questions 
until he arrives at his famous insight, which is simultaneously a virtually 
unconditioned judgment, expressed by his cry: 
 
Oh! Oh! It all comes clear! 
Light, let me look at you one last time. 
I am exposed – born to forbidden parents, joined 
                                                        
1  Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (Toronto: 






In forbidden marriage, I brought forbidden death (Lines 1181-1185). 2 
 
With the concrete situation known and understood with clarity (σαφής), 
Oedipus’ consciousness should now become sublated into the structure of ethical 
intentionality.  This sublation occurs the moment an agent says, “Okay.  I understand 
and know the situation.  Now, what should I do?”  Typically, an agent begins to ask 
questions of value, questions which, in Patrick H. Byrne’s words, intend “practical 
insights into possible courses of action.”3   The goal of questions for intelligence and 
questions for judgment is to grasp, respectively, understanding and a virtually 
unconditioned judgment of fact.  Likewise, the goal of questions of value is to “grasp 
of virtually unconditioned value” until, ultimately, a judgment can be made about that 
value in a decision which implements the value in action. 
Instead of “ascending” into an “ethics of discernment,” however, Oedipus’ 
development remains arrested, in a static state of undistorted affectivity that makes 
moral conversion impossible.  The play ends with Oedipus hovering in a liminal state, 
somewhere between Lonergan’s rational consciousness and rational self-
consciousness.  This liminal position of distorted affectivity lends credence to Marina 
McCoy’s claim that, “Sophocles does not reject the rational in favor of a tragic vision 
that is anti-rational or non-rational; rather, the rational itself includes an affective 
element.”4   
In Chapter 2, I point out the various “interferences” in the dynamic, self-
correcting sequence which I argue imbues Oedipus’ journey with its especially tragic 
and ironic dimension.  I argue that the tragedy (and irony) of the play pivot on the 
“polymorphism” of Oedipus’ consciousness.  A corollary to this argument is that we 
may understand some of the muddled thinking and the bitter intersubjective quarrels 
in the play – including but not limited to Oedipus v. Tiresias, Oedipus v. Creon and 
Oedipus v. Jocasta – through the prism of Lonergan’s discussion of “bias.”  My 
discussion of bias naturally leads to an interpretation of the play that finds Sophocles 
indicting, not wisdom per se, as Nietzsche argued, but those who fail to understand 
                                                        
2 Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus.  In Theban Plays, ed. Peter Meineck and Paul 
Woodruff.  (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2003), lines 1181-1185.  
Hereafter referred to as “O.T.” The Greek is below: 
 
ἰοὺ ἰού: τὰ πάντ᾽ ἂν ἐξήκοι σαφῆ.  
ὦ φῶς, τελευταῖόν σε προσβλέψαιμι νῦν,  
ὅστις πέφασμαι φύς τ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὧν οὐ χρῆν, ξὺν οἷς τ᾽  
οὐ χρῆν ὁμιλῶν, οὕς τέ μ᾽ οὐκ ἔδει κτανών.  
 
3 P. H. Byrne, The Ethics of Discernment. (Toronto: The University of Toronto 
Press, 2016), 169.  Hereafter referred to as Ethics of Discernment.  
 
4 Marina McCoy.  Wounded Heroes: Vulnerability as a Virtue in Ancient Greek 
Literature and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford Unveristy Press, 2013), 57.  Hereafter 





what it means to correctly understand; those, in other words, who would deign to 
reduce understanding to a simple matter of “taking a look,” to use Lonergan’s phrase.5  
I argue that the symbolism in the drama staunchly affirms Lonergan’s well-known 
claim that, “What is obvious in knowing is, indeed, looking.  Compared to looking, 
insight is obscure, and the grasp of the unconditioned is doubly obscure.  But 
empiricism amounts to the assumption that what is obvious in knowing is what 
knowing obviously is.”6   
In Chapter 3, I enlarge the focus of my analysis from Oedipus’ single 
consciousness to the milieu in which that consciousness operates – Corinth, Thebes 
and, finally, Colonus. Viewed through a prism of Lonergan’s social theory, Thebes, and 
to a lesser extent Corinth, become exempla of “cities in decline,” symbolized generally 
by their hostility to questioning which, specifically, allows various biases to reign.   I 
discuss the Greek concept of pollution, beginning with the familiar distinction 
between agos and miasma, and suggest that we may treat the idea of pollution in 
Oedipus Tyrannus as a metaphor for what Lonergan’s called the “long cycle of decline” 
and its root cause, “general bias,” the unprincipled privileging of the immediate and 
concrete over that which is non-present.  The byproduct of this bias is “the social 
surd.”   
 In an essay entitled, “The Absence of God in Modern Culture,” Lonergan notes, 
in cultures exists the “disastrous possibility of a conflict between human living as it 
can be lived and human living as a cultural superstructure dictates it should be lived.”7  
I argue that there many junctures in the play in which the failure of insight and the 
triumph of oversight is compounded by if not caused by the dictates of Theban and 
Corinthian cultures, starting with Laius and Jocasta’s decision to murder their child, 
a choice which is then echoed by Polybus and Merope’s choice to suppress the truth 
of their son’s origin.  I then point out that the most obvious operative bias here is 
group bias, symbolized by various characters’ commitment to violent patriarchy 
which neglects female voices of reason.  I show, following McCoy and Christopher 
Long, that Colonus, courtesy of Theseus’ leadership, represents a possible antidote to 
this group bias through healing love.  As Oedipus says of the space of Colonus in 1125, 
“In all my wanderings, this is the only place/Where I have found truth, honor and 
                                                        
5 Nietzsche writes, “Wisdom, the myth seems to whisper to us, is an unnatural 
abomination: whoever plunges nature into the abyss of destruction by what he knows 
must in turn experience the dissolution of nature in his own person. The sharp point 
of wisdom turns against the wise man; wisdom is an offence against nature” 
(Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999, pg. 48.)  Yet it seems absurd to label Oedipus as somehow an exemplar of 
“wisdom” once wisdom (sophia) is properly understood.   
 
6 Lonergan, Insight, 44. 
 
7  Bernard Lonergan.  A Second Collection. (Toronto: University of Toronto 





justice./I am well aware of how much I stand in your debt,/Without your help I would 
have nothing at all.”8   
 For Lonergan, if the mischief of bias is to be conquered, the ultimate ground 
for that conquering will come from a liberation outside the agent’s own native 
resources.  Colonus gives us a glimpse of this third mode of self-transcendence, 
religious conversion, which, for Lonergan, is an unrestricted being in love with a 
“mysterious, uncomprehended God.”9   On the one hand, this viewpoint would seem 
to represent a juncture at which Lonergan’s thought simply does not and cannot apply 
to a classical text, such as Oedipus Tyrannus or Oedipus at Colonus.  Lonergan’s notion 
of unrestricted being in love (with God) and his further distinctions of operative and 
cooperative grace would seem to be anachronistic.  And yet, Lonergan claims that 
unrestricted being in love is “interpreted differently in the context of different 
religious traditions.” 10  I argue that there is a sense in which Theseus’ almost 
otherworldly commitment to reverence (aidos) for the sacred space of Colonus, and 
his compassionate commitment to care for the stranger (xenia), more closely 
approximates or, at the very least, anticipates the almost supernatural dynamism of 
the authentic moral conversion Lonergan seems to have in mind.  There are moments, 
in other words, in which Theseus relies on the dynamism of his own native 
intelligence and others in which something beyond him seems to be at work, as if a 
precursor to the supernatural moral disposition of the father in Luke’s “Parable of the 
Prodigal Son.” 
 I conclude this chapter by noting that implicit in my argument is the premise 
that Oedipus Tyrannus cannot be read without adverting to Oedipus Colonus, without 
which the full sweep of the conquering of bias cannot be appreciated.  From this 
premise I then deduce that the pessimistic Nietzschean reading of Oedipus Tyrannus, 
at the very least, requires more context.  And while it is certainly possible to read 
Tyrannus separately from Colonus, insofar as they are not part of a traditional cycle, 
including Colonus in an analysis of Tyrannus discloses a further development in 
Sophocles’ thought that we may use to retroactively assess Tyrannus philosophically, 
especially vis-à-vis nihilism.   
Chapter 4 is devoted to a discussion of Lonergan’s metaphysics of human 
freedom and its relation to willingness, moral impotence and liberation.  Here I apply 
Lonergan’s rich and complicated discussion of human freedom in Insight to offer a 
viewpoint that is contrary to deterministic readings of the play.  In Oedipus Tyrannus: 
Tragic Heroism and the Limits of Knowledge, Charles Segal advises us that to offer any 
fresh approach to Oedipus Tyrannus one must “remove a few layers of 
                                                        
8 Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus.  In Theban Plays, ed. Peter Meineck and Paul 
Woodruff.  (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2003), line 1125.  
Hereafter referred to as “O.C.”  
 
 9  Bernard Lonergan. Method in Theology. (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2007), pg. 102.  Hereafter referred to as Method in Theology. 
 






misconception.”11  Segal’s first misconception is this: “This is not a play about free will 
versus determinism.”  He adds that “the issues of destiny, predetermination, and 
foreknowledge are raised as problems, not as dogma.”12  I will suggest here that if this 
assessment is accurate, the unintended irony of the play is that it nevertheless affirms 
a principle (dogma?) in spite of itself: that human freedom is enlarged by human 
intelligence, insofar as intelligence specifies, via practical insights and practical 
judgments of facts and values, a range of choices for the will to select.  It follows that 
ignorance, bias and moral impotence, in blocking or shrinking this range of choices, 
limit our effective freedom to the point at which we are incapable of fully actualizing 
our essential freedom. Here I recruit Lonergan’s provocative image of the 
“surrounding penumbra” to describe “moral impotence,” in which he says, “Further, 
these areas are not fixed; as he develops, the penumbra penetrates into the shadow 
and the luminous area into the penumbra while, inversely, moral decline is a 
contraction of the luminous area and of the penumbra.”13  This image is particularly 
apt in describing the ways in which Oedipus enlarges the “luminous area” when he is 
authentically questioning, only to watch it contract into darkness when he is not – an 
equation symbolized by the Sophoclean trope of blindness.   
 Finally, in an “Epilogue,” I conclude with some observations about the way in 
which Sophocles is often presented in undergraduate philosophy classes.  I concur 
with Yoram Hazony who writes, in The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture, “I do not 
believe the dichotomy between faith and reason is very helpful in understanding the 
diversity of human intellectual orientations.”14  Likewise, it is unclear to me as to 
whether couching Athens as somehow opposed to Jerusalem is good pedagogical 
practice.  In a similar mode, equally unclear to me is whether couching Sophocles as 
somehow opposed to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle is good practice.  Yes, 
contradistinction has its pedagogical merits, but it can also wash away nuance.   
 I then suggest, by way of a conclusion, that if we must have a dichotomy, a 
better alternative, even pedagogically speaking, may be to use Lonergan’s dichotomy 
of the friendly or unfriendly universe. For ultimately, we are faced with one 
existential question: is our universe a friendly one?  In Method in Theology, Lonergan 
asks, poignantly: 
 
Is moral enterprise consonant with this world?...is the universe on our 
side, or are we just gamblers and, if we are gamblers, are we not 
perhaps fools, individually struggling for authenticity and collectively 
endeavoring to snatch progress from the ever mounting welter of 
                                                        
11  Charles Segal.  Oedipus Tyrannus: Tragic Heroism and the Limits of 
Knowledge. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 53.  Hereafter referred to as 
Tragic Heroism. 
 
12 Ibid., 54. 
13 Lonergan, Insight, 650. 
 





decline?  The questions arise and, clearly, our attitudes and our 
resoluteness may be profoundly affected by the answers.  Does there 
or does there not necessarily exists a transcendent, intelligent ground 
of the universe?  Is that ground or are we the primary instance of moral 
consciousness?  Are cosmogenesis, biological evolution, historical 
process basically cognate to us as moral beings or are they different and 
so alien to us?15  
 
 The phrase “friendly universe” comes a bit later in the text, when Lonergan 
adds, “Faith places human efforts in a friendly universe; it reveals an ultimate 
significance in human achievement; it strengthens new undertakings with 
confidence” (117, my italics).  Notice the connection Lonergan adduces between 
religious conversion, or the unrestricted being in love with God, as the ground of the 
friendly universe.  And yet, as I mentioned earlier, this unrestricted being in love is, 
as Lonergan points out, “interpreted differently in the context of different religious 
traditions.”  After all, Socrates was no Christian; but he did believe the universe was 
friendly.   
 In this context, I argue that Sophocles ought to be aligned with Socrates, Plato 
and Aristotle, not to mention most Biblical texts, against the truly opposed counter-
position, “nihilism.”  While it is certainly true that, in Oedipus, Sophocles heard that 
“eternal note of sadness on the Aegean,” as Matthew Arnold once wrote, Sophocles 
also seems to have heard in Colonus a note of compassion and wisdom and love and 
the hope for a construction of a community in which human striving is not in vain.16  
As Oedipus tells his daughters,  
 
But there is one small word that can soothe –  
And that is ‘love.’  I loved you more than 
Anyone else could ever love, but now 
Your lives must go on without me. (1610-1619)17
                                                        
 15 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 102. 
 
 16 Mathew Arnold.  “Dover Beach.” Representative Poetry Online.   
<https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/html/1807/4350/poem89.html> 
 
 17 The Greek is below:  
 
τὰ πάντα λύει ταῦτ᾽ ἔπος μοχθήματα.  
τὸ γὰρ φιλεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξ ὅτου πλέον  
ἢ τοῦδε τἀνδρὸς ἔσχεθ᾽, οὗ τητώμεναι  
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This paper arises from the ashes of a previous project.  I had written at length 
on Lonergan and contemporary problems in philosophy of mind when I began to feel 
that my paper had soured.  What was painfully esoteric had become, what seemed to 
me, useless, with little practical import.  
Meanwhile, I was teaching Oedipus and Antigone to my Perspectives I course 
at Boston College using Lonergan terminology and recruiting in my lectures some of 
my research on Lonergan and mind.  Why not transform the lectures into a formal 
paper, I reasoned?  At least that paper might be relevant to Sophocles and Lonergan 
scholars alike, as either literary criticism or Lonergan commentary.  It would be 
useful, simple and clear. 








My first aim in this book is to elucidate Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus through 
the writings of Bernard Lonergan, SJ.  My second aim is to elucidate Lonergan’s 
thought by adducing it, in action, in Oedipus Tyrannus.  Instead of analyzing what a 
classical text means to its own time and place, I undertake a philosophy of classics, 
exploring various philosophical problems by using Sophoclean texts.  The paper 
incidentally discloses an interpretation of Oedipus Tyrannus that is at odds with some 
of the leading authors in the secondary literature while remaining consonant with 
others.  I use Woodruff and Meineck’s 2003 translation of Theban Plays throughout 
because I find the translation refreshing.   It is my hope that this paper, like all good 
papers, raises more questions than answers.   
In Chapter 1, I recruit Lonergan’s three basic observations about human 
knowing to explain Oedipus’ cognitive journey over the course of the play.  First, 
Lonergan notes that underpinning all human knowing is the spirit of inquiry; the 
pure, unrestricted desire to know, which Lonergan calls “the supreme heuristic 
notion.”
1 Second, he observes that the structure of human knowing is invariant.  No 
matter who you are – mathematician, scientist, commonsense knower, etc. – all 
human knowing follows a dynamic but invariant structure Lonergan calls the “self-
correcting cycle of learning.”  This cycle moves from inquiry to insight to judgment to 
decision.  Third, this invariant, self-correcting cycle, underpinned by the pure 
                                                        
1 Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (Toronto: 






unrestricted desire to know, operates within dynamically shifting patterns of 
consciousness, modes of human knowing, that are circumscribed by our concerns, 
expressed by the kinds of questions we ask.  Human consciousness is “polymorphic.” 
Using these three points as touchstones, I elucidate the dynamism of Oedipus’ 
cognitional structure by tracing the self-correcting sequence of his 132 questions 
until he arrives at his famous insight, which is simultaneously a virtually 
unconditioned judgment, expressed by his cry: 
Oh! Oh! It all comes clear! 
Light, let me look at you one last time. 
I am exposed – born to forbidden parents, joined 
In forbidden marriage, I brought forbidden death (Lines 1181-1185). 2 
 
With the concrete situation known and understood with clarity (σαφής), 
Oedipus’ consciousness should now become sublated into the structure of ethical 
intentionality.  This sublation occurs the moment an agent says, “Okay.  I understand 
and know the situation.  Now, what should I do?”  Typically, an agent begins to ask 
questions of value, questions which, in Patrick H. Byrne’s words, intend “practical 
insights into possible courses of action.”3   The goal of questions for intelligence and 
questions for judgment is to grasp, respectively, understanding and a virtually 
                                                        
2 Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus.  In Theban Plays, ed. Peter Meineck and Paul 
Woodruff.  (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2003), lines 1181-1185.  
Hereafter referred to as “O.T.” The Greek is below: 
 
ἰοὺ ἰού: τὰ πάντ᾽ ἂν ἐξήκοι σαφῆ.  
ὦ φῶς, τελευταῖόν σε προσβλέψαιμι νῦν,  
ὅστις πέφασμαι φύς τ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὧν οὐ χρῆν, ξὺν οἷς τ᾽  
οὐ χρῆν ὁμιλῶν, οὕς τέ μ᾽ οὐκ ἔδει κτανών.  
 
3 P. H. Byrne, The Ethics of Discernment. (Toronto: The University of Toronto 





unconditioned judgment of fact.  Likewise, the goal of questions of value is to “grasp 
of virtually unconditioned value” until, ultimately, a judgment can be made about that 
value in a decision which implements the value in action. 
Instead of “ascending” into an “ethics of discernment,” however, Oedipus’ 
development remains arrested, in a static state of undistorted affectivity that makes 
moral conversion impossible.  The play ends with Oedipus hovering in a liminal state, 
somewhere between Lonergan’s rational consciousness and rational self-
consciousness.  This liminal position of distorted affectivity lends credence to Marina 
McCoy’s claim that, “Sophocles does not reject the rational in favor of a tragic vision 
that is anti-rational or non-rational; rather, the rational itself includes an affective 
element.”4   
In Chapter 2, I point out the various “interferences” in the dynamic, self-
correcting sequence which I argue imbues Oedipus’ journey with its especially tragic 
and ironic dimension.  I argue that the tragedy (and irony) of the play pivot on the 
“polymorphism” of Oedipus’ consciousness.  A corollary to this argument is that we 
may understand some of the muddled thinking and the bitter intersubjective quarrels 
in the play – including but not limited to Oedipus v. Tiresias, Oedipus v. Creon and 
Oedipus v. Jocasta – through the prism of Lonergan’s discussion of “bias.”  My 
discussion of bias naturally leads to an interpretation of the play that finds Sophocles 
indicting, not wisdom per se, as Nietzsche argued, but those who fail to understand 
what it means to correctly understand; those, in other words, who would deign to 
                                                        
4 Marina McCoy.  Wounded Heroes: Vulnerability as a Virtue in Ancient Greek 
Literature and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford Unveristy Press, 2013), 57.  Hereafter 





reduce understanding to a simple matter of “taking a look,” to use Lonergan’s phrase.5  
I argue that the symbolism in the drama staunchly affirms Lonergan’s well-known 
claim that, “What is obvious in knowing is, indeed, looking.  Compared to looking, 
insight is obscure, and the grasp of the unconditioned is doubly obscure.  But 
empiricism amounts to the assumption that what is obvious in knowing is what 
knowing obviously is.”6   
In Chapter 3, I enlarge the focus of my analysis from Oedipus’ single 
consciousness to the milieu in which that consciousness operates – Corinth, Thebes 
and, finally, Colonus. Viewed through a prism of Lonergan’s social theory, Thebes, and 
to a lesser extent Corinth, become exempla of “cities in decline,” symbolized generally 
by their hostility to questioning which, specifically, allows various biases to reign.   I 
discuss the Greek concept of pollution, beginning with the familiar distinction 
between agos and miasma, and suggest that we may treat the idea of pollution in 
Oedipus Tyrannus as a metaphor for what Lonergan’s called the “long cycle of decline” 
and its root cause, “general bias,” the unprincipled privileging of the immediate and 
concrete over that which is non-present.  The byproduct of this bias is “the social 
surd.”   
                                                        
5 Nietzsche writes, “Wisdom, the myth seems to whisper to us, is an unnatural 
abomination: whoever plunges nature into the abyss of destruction by what he knows 
must in turn experience the dissolution of nature in his own person. The sharp point 
of wisdom turns against the wise man; wisdom is an offence against nature” 
(Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999, pg. 48.)  Yet it seems absurd to label Oedipus as somehow an exemplar of 
“wisdom” once wisdom (sophia) is properly understood.   
 





 In an essay entitled, “The Absence of God in Modern Culture,” Lonergan notes, 
in cultures exists the “disastrous possibility of a conflict between human living as it 
can be lived and human living as a cultural superstructure dictates it should be lived.”7  
I argue that there many junctures in the play in which the failure of insight and the 
triumph of oversight is compounded by if not caused by the dictates of Theban and 
Corinthian cultures, starting with Laius and Jocasta’s decision to murder their child, 
a choice which is then echoed by Polybus and Merope’s choice to suppress the truth 
of their son’s origin.  I then point out that the most obvious operative bias here is 
group bias, symbolized by various characters’ commitment to violent patriarchy 
which neglects female voices of reason.  I show, following McCoy and Christopher 
Long, that Colonus, courtesy of Theseus’ leadership, represents a possible antidote to 
this group bias through healing love.  As Oedipus says of the space of Colonus in 1125, 
“In all my wanderings, this is the only place/Where I have found truth, honor and 
justice./I am well aware of how much I stand in your debt,/Without your help I would 
have nothing at all.”8   
 For Lonergan, if the mischief of bias is to be conquered, the ultimate ground 
for that conquering will come from a liberation outside the agent’s own native 
resources.  Colonus gives us a glimpse of this third mode of self-transcendence, 
religious conversion, which, for Lonergan, is an unrestricted being in love with a 
                                                        
7  Bernard Lonergan.  A Second Collection. (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1974), 103.  Hereafter reffered to as A Second Collection. 
8 Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus.  In Theban Plays, ed. Peter Meineck and Paul 
Woodruff.  (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2003), line 1125.  






“mysterious, uncomprehended God.”9   On the one hand, this viewpoint would seem 
to represent a juncture at which Lonergan’s thought simply does not and cannot apply 
to a classical text, such as Oedipus Tyrannus or Oedipus at Colonus.  Lonergan’s notion 
of unrestricted being in love (with God) and his further distinctions of operative and 
cooperative grace would seem to be anachronistic.  And yet, Lonergan claims that 
unrestricted being in love is “interpreted differently in the context of different 
religious traditions.” 10  I argue that there is a sense in which Theseus’ almost 
otherworldly commitment to reverence (aidos) for the sacred space of Colonus, and 
his compassionate commitment to care for the stranger (xenia), more closely 
approximates or, at the very least, anticipates the almost supernatural dynamism of 
the authentic moral conversion Lonergan seems to have in mind.  There are moments, 
in other words, in which Theseus relies on the dynamism of his own native 
intelligence and others in which something beyond him seems to be at work, as if a 
precursor to the supernatural moral disposition of the father in Luke’s “Parable of the 
Prodigal Son.” 
 I conclude this chapter by noting that implicit in my argument is the premise 
that Oedipus Tyrannus cannot be read without adverting to Oedipus Colonus, without 
which the full sweep of the conquering of bias cannot be appreciated.  From this 
premise I then deduce that the pessimistic Nietzschean reading of Oedipus Tyrannus, 
at the very least, requires more context.  And while it is certainly possible to read 
                                                        
 9  Bernard Lonergan. Method in Theology. (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2007), pg. 102.  Hereafter referred to as Method in Theology 
  






Tyrannus separately from Colonus, insofar as they are not part of a traditional cycle, 
including Colonus in an analysis of Tyrannus discloses a further development in 
Sophocles’ thought that we may use to retroactively assess Tyrannus philosophically, 
especially vis-à-vis nihilism.   
Chapter 4 is devoted to a discussion of Lonergan’s metaphysics of human 
freedom and its relation to willingness, moral impotence and liberation.  Here I apply 
Lonergan’s rich and complicated discussion of human freedom in Insight to offer a 
viewpoint that is contrary to deterministic readings of the play.  In Oedipus Tyrannus: 
Tragic Heroism and the Limits of Knowledge, Charles Segal advises us that to offer any 
fresh approach to Oedipus Tyrannus one must “remove a few layers of 
misconception.”11  Segal’s first misconception is this: “This is not a play about free will 
versus determinism.”  He adds that “the issues of destiny, predetermination, and 
foreknowledge are raised as problems, not as dogma.”12  I will suggest here that if this 
assessment is accurate, the unintended irony of the play is that it nevertheless affirms 
a principle (dogma?) in spite of itself: that human freedom is enlarged by human 
intelligence, insofar as intelligence specifies, via practical insights and practical 
judgments of facts and values, a range of choices for the will to select.  It follows that 
ignorance, bias and moral impotence, in blocking or shrinking this range of choices, 
limit our effective freedom to the point at which we are incapable of fully actualizing 
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Knowledge. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 53.  Hereafter referred to as 
Tragic Heroism. 
 





our essential freedom. Here I recruit Lonergan’s provocative image of the 
“surrounding penumbra” to describe “moral impotence,” in which he says, “Further, 
these areas are not fixed; as he develops, the penumbra penetrates into the shadow 
and the luminous area into the penumbra while, inversely, moral decline is a 
contraction of the luminous area and of the penumbra.”13  This image is particularly 
apt in describing the ways in which Oedipus enlarges the “luminous area” when he is 
authentically questioning, only to watch it contract into darkness when he is not – an 
equation symbolized by the Sophoclean trope of blindness.   
 Finally, in an “Epilogue,” I conclude with some observations about the way in 
which Sophocles is often presented in undergraduate philosophy classes.  I concur 
with Yoram Hazony who writes, in The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture, “I do not 
believe the dichotomy between faith and reason is very helpful in understanding the 
diversity of human intellectual orientations.”14  Likewise, it is unclear to me as to 
whether couching Athens as somehow opposed to Jerusalem is good pedagogical 
practice.  In a similar mode, equally unclear to me is whether couching Sophocles as 
somehow opposed to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle is good practice.  Yes, 
contradistinction has its pedagogical merits, but it can also wash away nuance.   
 I then suggest, by way of a conclusion, that if we must have a dichotomy, a 
better alternative, even pedagogically speaking, may be to use Lonergan’s dichotomy 
of the friendly or unfriendly universe. For ultimately, we are faced with one 
                                                        
13 Lonergan, Insight, 650. 
 





existential question: is our universe a friendly one?  In Method in Theology, Lonergan 
asks, poignantly: 
Is moral enterprise consonant with this world?...is the universe on our 
side, or are we just gamblers and, if we are gamblers, are we not 
perhaps fools, individually struggling for authenticity and collectively 
endeavoring to snatch progress from the ever mounting welter of 
decline?  The questions arise and, clearly, our attitudes and our 
resoluteness may be profoundly affected by the answers.  Does there 
or does there not necessarily exists a transcendent, intelligent ground 
of the universe?  Is that ground or are we the primary instance of moral 
consciousness?  Are cosmogenesis, biological evolution, historical 
process basically cognate to us as moral beings or are they different and 
so alien to us?15  
 
 The phrase “friendly universe” comes a bit later in the text, when Lonergan 
adds, “Faith places human efforts in a friendly universe; it reveals an ultimate 
significance in human achievement; it strengthens new undertakings with 
confidence” (117, my italics).  Notice the connection Lonergan adduces between 
religious conversion, or the unrestricted being in love with God, as the ground of the 
friendly universe.  And yet, as I mentioned earlier, this unrestricted being in love is, 
as Lonergan points out, “interpreted differently in the context of different religious 
traditions.”  After all, Socrates was no Christian; but he did believe the universe was 
friendly.   
 In this context, I argue that Sophocles ought to be aligned with Socrates, Plato 
and Aristotle, not to mention most Biblical texts, against the truly opposed counter-
position, “nihilism.”  While it is certainly true that, in Oedipus, Sophocles heard that 
“eternal note of sadness on the Aegean,” as Matthew Arnold once wrote, Sophocles 
also seems to have heard in Colonus a note of compassion and wisdom and love and 
                                                        





the hope for a construction of a community in which human striving is not in vain.16  
As Oedipus tells his daughters,  
But there is one small word that can soothe –  
And that is ‘love.’  I loved you more than 
Anyone else could ever love, but now 
Your lives must go on without me. (1610-1619)17  
  
                                                        
 16 Mathew Arnold.  “Dover Beach.” Representative Poetry Online. 
<https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/html/1807/4350/poem89.html> 
 
 17 The Greek is below:  
 
τὰ πάντα λύει ταῦτ᾽ ἔπος μοχθήματα.  
τὸ γὰρ φιλεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξ ὅτου πλέον  
ἢ τοῦδε τἀνδρὸς ἔσχεθ᾽, οὗ τητώμεναι  





Chapter One: Oedipus’ Quest for Self-Knowledge 
 
Introduction 
Among his many insights, Bernard Lonergan makes three basic observations 
about human knowing that will be foundational to my elucidation of Oedipus’ 
cognitive journey throughout Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus and Oedipus at Colonus.  
First, Lonergan notes that underpinning all human knowing is the spirit of inquiry; 
the pure, unrestricted desire to know, which Lonergan calls “the supreme heuristic 
notion.”34 Second, he observes that the structure of human knowing is invariant.  No 
matter who you are – mathematician, scientist, commonsense knower, etc. – all 
human knowing follows a dynamic but invariant structure Lonergan calls the “self-
correcting cycle of learning.”  This cycle moves from inquiry to insight to judgment 
and then, ultimately, to decision and action.  Third, this invariant, self-correcting 
cycle, underpinned by the pure unrestricted desire to know, operates within 
dynamically shifting patterns of consciousness, modes of human knowing, that are 
circumscribed by our concerns, expressed by the kinds questions we ask.  Human 
consciousness is therefore “polymorphic,” to use Lonergan’s phrase.  
In the following section, I explain these three points in a bit more detail before 
applying them to the play.  I then elucidate the dynamism of Oedipus’ cognitional 
structure by tracing the self-correcting sequence of his questions and answers until 
the pivotal moment at which cognitional structure is sublated into the “higher” 
structure of ethical intentionality.   At this point Oedipus makes two decisions: 1.) he 
                                                        





chooses to blinds himself and 2.) he chooses to remain in fidelity to his earlier fiat to 
“punish the killers by force.”  Despite this “enlargement of conscious” to the realm of 
decision, I argue here that Oedipus fails to achieve self-transcendence and remains 
enslaved by his bias. 
 
The Pure, Unrestricted Desire to Know  
In the opening of Metaphysics, Aristotle famously says, “all men desire to 
know.”35 This desire is by nature.  It is not, for example, acquired, like learning to play 
the guitar.  This desire differentiates the human species from others insofar as 
animals do not question sensible presentations which confront them.  They do not 
reduce a potentially intelligible landscape of sense data into intelligible experience.  
Animals are, to use the Lonergan terminology I will introduce shortly, “empirically 
conscious” but not “intelligently conscious” or, even more robustly, “rationally self-
conscious.” They lack the uniquely human desire from which all genuine learning 
flows. 36  It is a desire we must have in order to start any cognitive journey.  “If a child 
                                                        
35 Joe Sachs has translated this portion as, “All human beings by nature stretch 
themselves out toward knowing.”  (Aristotle.  Metaphysics.  Trans. Joe Sachs.  Santa 
Fe: Green Lion Press, 2002.)   Whether the verb is rendered as “desire” or “stretching,” 
the important point is that it is a feeling “by nature.”  It is a part of what we are, 
preceding what we can say about what we are.  It is, to borrow from Heidegger, ontic, 
not ontological. 
 
36 Obviously, animal consciousness is clearly beyond the scope of this essay.  
One might object here that animals do mediate their sensible worlds into intelligible 
ones.  The behaviors of birds and dolphins and monkeys, for example, indicate 
intraspecies communication about danger and the behaviors of predators, etc.  They 





never asks questions,” Lonergan reminds us, “you cannot teach him.”37  Our questions 
point beyond us, into the unknown territory of Being, the “objective of the pure desire 
to know.” 38   Lonergan uses the phrase the “pure question” to denote the pre-
linguistic, pre-conceptual, pre-judicial experience of inquiry.  He writes that the pure 
question “is prior to any insights, any concepts, any words; for insights, concepts, 
words have to do with answers, and before we look for answers we want them; such 
wanting is the pure question.”39  
But why does Lonergan call this desire unrestricted?  Why is it not a restricted 
desire?  The reason is because unlike other desires which can be satiated by specific 
objects, the desire for knowledge will not rest until, at least theoretically, one knows 
all there is to know about everything there is to know.  As Patrick H. Byrne notes, “the 
least inadequate way in which we can ‘know’ the unrestricted desire is by 
participating in its sweep, by giving ourselves over to its throe.  We can experience 
the desire as drawing us ever beyond ourselves by letting ourselves be drawn.”40  Our 
questions therefore set the conditions for our judgments which then set the 
conditions for an intentional self-transcendence because, ontologically, a human 
                                                        
37 Bernard Lonergan, Understanding and Being. (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1980), 6.  Hereafter referred to as Understanding and Being. 
 
38 Lonergan, Insight, 372. 
 
39 Ibid., 34. 
 
40 P. H. Byrne, The Ethics of Discernment. (Toronto: The University of Toronto 





being is capable of “going beyond what he feels, what he imagines, what he thinks, 
what seems to him, to something utterly different, to what is so.”41 
In contrast to many thinkers, Lonergan identifies human knowledge with this 
spirit of inquiry, our remarkable “criticizing activity,” as opposed to the objects 
criticized, i.e., the “criticized materials.” Yet, as Lonergan notes, the histories of both 
philosophy and science have been punctuated by different attempts to make the ideal 
of knowledge explicit by identifying knowledge not with the objective of the  desire 
to know but with objects known – in statements resembling, “you have knowledge 
when you know X,” or, “you have knowledge when you know Y.”42   As Lonergan 
points out, however, this misdirected identification of knowledge with criticized 
materials (as opposed to criticizing activity) has been a source of misunderstanding, 
leading to what Lonergan calls “the dialectical of position and counterposition.” The 
field of physics, for example, has been recently elevated in some circles to the status 
of “real” knowledge as other types of knowing are devalued, wrongly.  Opposed to this 
view, Lonergan writes, 
There does not exist naturally, spontaneously, through the whole of 
history, a set of propositions, conceptions, and definitions that define 
the ideal of knowledge…While the conception of the ideal is not by 
nature, still there is something by nature.  The ideal of knowledge is 
myself as intelligent, as asking questions, as requiring intelligible 
answers…The trick is to “move into the subject as intelligent” – as 
asking questions; as having insights – being able to form concepts, as 
weighing the evidence – being able to judge.  We want to move in there 
where the ideal is functionally operative prior to its being made explicit 
                                                        
41 Lonergan, A Second Collection, 70. 
42  For a more detailed account of Lonergan’s analysis of the history of 





in judgments, concepts, and words.  Moving in there is reaching what is 
prepredicative, preconceptual, prejudicial.43 
 
The Self-Correcting Process of Learning 
So, while the objects of human knowing may vary within determinate fields, 
the dynamic cognitional structure of human knowing itself is invariant.  The human 
knower, as she questions given sense data, “ascends” through various levels of 
consciousness, in which each successive level subsumes and enlarges the previous.  
Human knowing always begins, says Lonergan, on the “level of presentations, by 
advancing through inquiry, insights, and formulation, by culminating in the critical 
inquiry of reflective understanding, the grasp of the unconditioned, and the rationally 
compelled pronouncement of judgment.”44 
 
 
                                                        
43 Lonergan, Understanding and Being, 14. 





 The self-correcting process of learning, indicated in the diagram above, is not 
only immanent and operative in human consciousness; it can also be affirmed by the 
rationally self-conscious subject.  If the skeptic asks, for example, “but is that really 
what I am doing when I am knowing?,” he is already engaged in the self-correcting 
process.  Before he even attends to objects, therefore, the subject needs merely to 
affirm that, “Yes.  It is the case that I have questions and that I require intelligible 
answers to those questions.”  He is a knower, and knows he is a knower because, as 
Lonergan says, “we have defined the knower, not by saying that he knows something, 
but solely by saying that he performs certain acts.”45   
As the vertical arrow on the left side of the above diagram indicates, the self-
correcting process of learning leads the human knower on an “ascent” through 
metaphorical “levels” of human consciousness: empirical consciousness (the level of 
presentations, sense data) is the sensible awareness immanent in cognitional acts, 
intelligent consciousness (the level of inquiry and insight) is manifested in the asking 
of what Lonergan calls questions for intelligence, “who, what, where, why, how?” and, 
finally, rational self-consciousness (the level of judgments) manifests in the asking of 
what Lonergan calls questions for judgment, “is it so?”, which culminate in the 
rationally compelled affirmation or denial of what Lonergan calls “a virtually 
unconditioned judgment.”46  When a knower can say, “yes, it is so,” or “yes, it is the 
                                                        
45 Ibid., 344. 
46 The word “levels” is obviously figurative and a good example of the way we 
often try to describe our consciousness (what it’s like to be conscious) via our 
descriptive knowing.  Lonergan uses the word “levels” in many places but also 
discourages, in general, picture-thinking in reference to consciousness.  He says, 





case,” he knows a portion of Being, which is the correlative “objective of the pure 
desire to know.”47  Most importantly, a human knower prizes what he knows because 
it is correct:  
But as pure desire, as cool, disinterested, detached, it is not for 
cognitional acts and the satisfaction they give their subject, but for 
cognitional contents, for what is to be known.  The satisfaction of 
mistaken understanding, provided one does not know it was mistaken, 
can equal the satisfaction of correct understanding.  Yet the pure desire 
scorns the former and prizes the latter; it prizes it, then, as dissimilar 
to the former; it prizes it not because it yields satisfaction because its 
content is correct.48  
 
The taxonomy above will be particularly important in my forthcoming discussion of 
Oedipus’ famous, final insight that he is the incestuous parricide and source of Thebes’ 
miasma.  His insight is, in Lonergan’s terms, simultaneously a virtually unconditioned 
judgment.  He knows that the content of his insight (which now is cast in the form of 
a judgment) is correct.49  It is the point at which there are, as the saying goes, “no 
                                                        
think of knowing by imagining a man taking a look at something, and further, they are 
apt to think of consciousness by imagining themselves looking into themselves.  Not 
merely do they indulge in such imaginative opinions but also they are likely to justify 
them by argument…Hence, while some of our readers may possess the rather 
remarkable power of looking into themselves and intuiting things quite clearly and 
distinctly, we shall not base our case upon their success.  For after all, there may well 
exist other readers like that, like the writer, find looking into themselves rather 
unrewarding” (Insight 344).   
 
47 Ibid., 372. 
48 Ibid., 373. 
49 I should point out here that throughout “Oedipus” Sophocles stresses the 
difficulty of making correct judgments without complete information.  In fact, 
Oedipus’ judgments about his own fate at the end of Oedipus Tyrannus appear to need 
revision when considered in the light of Oedipus at Colonus.  In that play, we wonder 
whether, in the end, Oedipus’ fate was a “good thing” for Athens in spite of the 






further questions.”  Instead, new questions emerge about what Oedipus ought to do 
on the heels of this correct understanding of the facts.  It is no surprise, therefore, that 
after this point in the drama, the nature of Oedipus’ inquiry changes dramatically.  His 
questions shift because his interests shift.  Instead of attempting to solve a mystery 
for his “children,” the Theban citizenry, he grows concerned about his immediate 
sphere: his biological children.  He questions his own future and what will become of 
his daughters in light of his affirmed judgment that he is the source of miasmas, 
suspecting, as Jocasta has said, his “fate is dismal.”50 
Lonergan’s claim that the structure of human knowing is invariant has 
important implications: just as it makes impossible any hierarchy among the 
mathematician, the physicist or the man of commonsense vis-à-vis stronger claims to 
the term “knowledge,” so too does it make any hierarchy between the scientist and 
the layperson impossible.  In this respect, the layperson – that is to say, men and 
women of commonsense – varies from the scientist only in virtue of the varying 
determinate fields of the objects of knowing, as well as the scientist’s public or 
communal formulation of his insights into words in the form of a hypothesis.  Figure 
2 below indicates the way in which the scientific method adds the formulation of 
hypotheses and experiments to the self-correcting cycle. 
 
                                                        







If, then, the structure of human knowing, underpinned by the spirit of inquiry, is 
invariant and always follows this self-correcting process of learning, what then is the 
“accidental” difference between the mathematician, scientist and the layperson?   
 
The Polymorphism of Human Consciousness 
The answer to this question brings us to Lonergan’s third key observation 
about human knowing: human consciousness as polymorphic.  “The pattern in which 
[consciousness] flows,” Lonergan reminds us, “may be biological, aesthetic, artistic, 
dramatic, practical, intellectual, or mystical. These patterns alternate; they blend or 
mix; they can interfere, conflict, lose their way, break down.”51  These patterns, or 
“heuristic contexts,” disclose the determinate fields for questioning and, as such, lead 
to differentiated discoveries via specific types of insights.52  The polymorphism of my 
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52 Lonergan points out the etymological relation between the word “heuristic” 






consciousness, like the self-correcting process of my learning, can be affirmed in the 
pronouncement that, “Yes, it is so that I alternate among in these patterns.”53   
Recall your high school experience, for example.  You neither dissected frogs 
nor did you attempt to perform soliloquies in physics class, nor did you bother 
yourself with projectiles in biology or drama class, but the exclusion of these objects 
of understanding in one field from the field of the other in no way indicated that one 
field had more of a right to the mantle “knowledge” than the other.  The physicist, the 
biologist and the aspiring thespian therefore engage their varying, determinate fields 
in and through the invariant structure of “the self-correcting process of learning” but 
they do so in different patterns.  The physicist wonders about questions with which 
the thespian is unconcerned and vice versa. In light of this distinction, it is easy to 
grasp a corollary that flows from it: the pattern of our questions significantly 
determine the trajectory of our lives.   
Further, just as the biologist and the physicist and the actor differ with regard 
to the objects into which they inquire, practical, commonsense knowing differs from 
scientific knowing.  Practical knowing relies on what Lonergan calls “descriptive” 
knowing while scientific knowing relies on what Lonergan calls “explanatory 
knowing.”  The former relates things to our senses, interests and concerns, the latter 
“relates things to other things.”  The contexts differ only in virtue of the criterion of 
relevance; only insofar as further questions take the empirical investigator beyond 
                                                        
53 The recognition of the alternating patterns and the ways in which they break 
down requires practice paying attention to “what you’re doing when you’re doing 
knowing.”  This is the essence of what Lonergan calls “Self-Appropriation,” and the 





the pragmatic interests and concerns of daily life.  Further questions move the 
empirical investigator “beyond” the descriptive context wherein questions have 
ceased, since “further inquiry would lead to no immediate appreciable difference in 
the daily life of man.”54  As Lonergan reminds us, both laypeople and scientists “reach 
their conclusions through the self-correcting process of learning … they reach very 
different conclusions because, though they use essentially the same process, they 
operate with different standards and criteria.”55  Just as the biologist, the physicist 
and the aspiring actor are not “made of different clay,” neither are scientist and 
layperson.  Most importantly, as Byrne notes, “even though descriptive inquiry is 
more limited than explanatory inquiry, Lonergan does not believe explanation is 
somehow more important than description.” 56   In fact, Lonergan insists on the 
complimentarity of both, saying “the rational choice is not between science and 
common sense; it is a choice of both.”57 
This last point will become increasingly important in reference to Oedipus.  As 
I will point out, in spite of his best efforts to solve the mystery of Laius’ murder, a 
pursuit which would be more effective if conducted with the dispassionate air of a 
scientist, Oedipus cannot help but fall into a dramatic pattern of descriptive knowing 
– relating things to his senses and his affective self, a costly mistake in the end.   And 
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55 Ibid., 320. 
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while it is true that the person operating in a dramatic pattern could be dispassionate 
(one needn’t be in a scientific pattern to do that), Oedipus’ affective self is distorted 
in a way that those questions relevant to himself are proportionally distorted.  This 
distortion is the evidence of a failure of what Lonergan calls “self-appropriation,” or 
the taking ownership of one’s cognitive activities.  In contrast, his encounter with the 
Sphinx, the very source of his fame, involves a purely intellectual puzzle and requires 
no such relations.  Oedipus’ error (and the error of his fellow Thebans) is a mistaken 
judgment: the assumption that his intellectual skills with the Sphinx would transfer 
to the practical, political, civic and therefore interpersonal domain.  
And yet, instead of indicting himself for a failure of understanding, he opts to 
scapegoat his senses as faulty, ultimately gouging out his own eyes, crying out, “Now 
you may not see the evil,/Not the evil I have done – or suffered./From now on, you 
must gaze in darkness/On forbidden faces, while the ones you should have 
seen/You’ll never know.”58  The choice to gouge out his eyes becomes ironic insofar 
as it only further discloses that Oedipus has learned little and does not yet know what 
understanding really is.  Further, if we add that Oedipus’ choice to gouge out his eyes, 
if we may even call it a choice, represents his attempt to unknow what can’t be 
unknown and yet, the decision seems even more misdirected – given that his eyes are 
not the culprit.   Oedipus’ eyes have worked fine throughout the play; they have 
performed their function admirably. Oedipus scapegoats them because he still 
equates knowing with looking.  Oedipus essentially makes the mistake Lonergan 
believes all empiricists make: “What is obvious in knowing is, indeed, looking.  
                                                        





Compared to looking, insight is obscure, and the grasp of the unconditioned is doubly 
obscure.  But empiricism amounts to the assumption that what is obvious in knowing 
is what knowing obviously is.”59  I should add here that Oedipus mistake is not that 
he fails to be “scientific” about his situation.  This mistake is not unique to the 
scientific pattern either.  Sensing, including but not limited to seeing, is relevant to 
commonsense patterns of experience as well and neither is immune to bias when 
knowledge is equated to seeing alone as opposed to recognizing seeing as one limited 
contributor to knowledge.     
Over the next chapter I construct a comprehensive list of Oedipus’ questions, 
as the spirit of inquiry overtakes him and his unrestricted desire leads him to his 
famous insight and judgment.  I point out Lonergan’s key cognitive plateaus, each of 
which represents a successive expansion of Oedipus’ conscious operations into 
higher and higher patterns.  Broadly speaking, he moves from mere empirical 
consciousness to intelligent consciousness to rational consciousness and, finally, to 
rational self-consciousness which sets the conditions for self-transcendence, when 
Oedipus understands, in an act of judgment, who he “really” is.  At this point in the 
play Oedipus finds himself the most free; and he faces questions of value in which he 
must choose how he wants to proceed.  Prior to this moment, Oedipus seems far more 
like a leaf caught in the shifting winds of fate. 
Further, I call attention to the shifting patterns of Oedipus’ consciousness 
which, to borrow again from Lonergan, “interfere, conflict, lose their way, break 
                                                        






down.”60   I contend that many scholars have failed to recognize that in his attempt to 
solve Laius’ mystery, Oedipus operates in a “descriptive pattern,” relating things to 
himself.  As such, he fails to understand himself in an explanatory context, as part of 
an interconnected network, a whole, which, I will argue, is symbolized in Greek 
culture by the art of prophecy and the “Divine Order.” 61   The mouthpiece for 
“understanding the whole” could only be someone who understands things in an 
explanatory context.  On my reading, therefore, Tiresias’ blindness is symbolic of the 
need to “go beyond” the senses if a richer (explanatory) understanding is sought.    
 
Oedipus the Intelligent Inquirer 
Oedipus begins, as we all do, on the level of sensible presentations but, through 
his pure, unrestricted desire to know, begins to question these presentations, 
mediating them through intelligent inquiry.  When we meet him in the dramatic 
opening scene, for example, he is already “intelligently conscious.” Lonergan tells us 
that the tell-tale sign of “intelligent consciousness” is asking “questions for 
intelligence”: who, what, where, why.  In fact, the opening line of the play is the first 
of Oedipus’ many “why” questions, as he attempts to discern why his “children,” 
fellow Thebans, have come to him “wearing wreaths and clutching boughs.”62 Here, 
Oedipus immediately expands his empirical consciousness – merely visually 
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61 For more on the ancient Greek worldview as of nature as “organism,” see 
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apprehending the suppliants at his palace gate – to an intelligent consciousness, as he 
attempts, through inquiry, to make a putatively unintelligible scene intelligible.  This 
initial question will set the horizon of his dramatic journey toward “the truth,” an 
intentional self-transcendence, a grasp of the intelligibility of his own identity, i.e., 
self-knowledge. 
1.) Why have you come here pleading, 
Wearing wreaths and clutching boughs?” (Lines 2-3). 
From this scene onward, Sophocles depicts Oedipus as an insatiable 
questioner before he is anything else.  In fact, Sophocles will rely on the question as a 
powerful rhetorical tool.  The primary mechanism of the dramatic irony is the way in 
which each question leads to further questions, pushing both Oedipus and the 
audience forward in the plot, closer and closer to a truth, which we know (and he does 
not) is a potential disaster waiting to be discovered.  The play’s plot, as a function of 
Oedipus’ questions, also illustrates well one of Lonergan’s central points: the 
trajectory of our lives is very often a function of the questions we ask.  Inversely, a 
lack of questions, or an inability to question, precludes us from actualizing potential 
trajectories and we are therefore effectively less free.63  As Oedipus’ questions come 
more rapidly, we cannot help but wonder ourselves whether his “fate” might have 
been less “dismal” had he asked more questions (or the right questions) earlier.64  In 
                                                        
63 I will withhold the question of freedom and determinism – which might 
imply that we do not have any power in actualizing trajectories – for a later section 
on Lonergan’s metaphysics of freedom. 63 See Insight, 642. 
 
64 In a later section, I will point specifically to the scene in which a drunken 
dinner guest points out that Oedipus is not his parents’ biological son.  Oedipus 





fact, Oedipus even tells us that he came himself rather than sending a messenger, 
saying, “To have heard such news from others/Would not have been right” (6-7).  This 
claim further illustrates Oedipus desire to know for himself, and not in some 
mediated (and possibly less accurate) way. 
After questioning the suppliants, Oedipus next attempts to clarify the sensible 
presentations by asking three more specific questions for intelligence (why, what, 
what) of the elder suppliant, spokesman for the ailing Thebans:  
2.) Why are you kneeling in supplication –  
3.) What do you fear,  
4.) what do you want?” (Lines 10-11). 
Next, when considering whether to aid the suppliants, Oedipus asks a “how” question 
which is, on its surface, quasi-rhetorical but beneath which lurks an implied ethical 
obligation.  This is important when compared to Oedipus’ solving of the riddle of the 
Sphinx.  There, he does not need to ask questions – the given riddle is the question – 
and, further, seems to be under no such obligation to help Thebes.  Now, he is their 
leader, and so he asks: 
5.)  “How could I not?” (Line 58). 
The import of this “how” question is, linguistically, closer to: “Should I help?  Yes.  I 
am obligated to.”  The import here is that good leaders are obliged to aid their 
struggling citizens and opting not to help is “out of the question.”  Of course, Oedipus 
                                                        
way that would have led him to the correct answers earlier.  Worse, his adoptive 
parents, Polybus and Merope, attempt to amputate Oedipus’ desire to know.  To me, 
this desire foreshadows later attempts by characters attempting to shield Oedipus 
from the truth which may be Sophocles’ attempt to chastise communities which are 





is, in fact, effectively free to refuse aiding his people but the nature of his question and 
its tone implies he does not even consider that a legitimate avenue to actualize. 
We next learn, surprisingly, given Oedipus’ apparent ignorance about the 
scene before him, that he has already taken action and sent Creon to consult the 
oracle.  Yet Oedipus is already growing impatient, foreshadowing the future 
impatience so famously highlighted in much of the commentary on Oedipus.  Of 
Creon’s return, Oedipus asks a “where” question,  
6.) “Where can he be?” (Line 75). 
Next, to Creon, regarding the visit to Delphi he asks two more questions for 
intelligence in succession, the second of which is a clarification of the first: 
7.) What word have you brought from the god? (86) 
8.) But what of the oracle? (89) 
Oedipus’ next two questions move beyond mere intelligent inquiry and 
therefore mark, in Lonergan’s terms, a transition from intelligent consciousness to 
rational consciousness.  These questions are broader, more philosophical and 
oriented toward the future.  They are easy to spot because, in Lonergan’s terms, they 
are actually questions for judgment: they are “yes or no” questions that can only be 
affirmed or denied. 
9.) Is there any hope? (90) 
10.) Have we anything to fear? (90)65 
                                                        
65 Semantically, the question “Have we anything to fear?” is equivalent to “Is 





In the next three questions for intelligence (how, what, who), Oedipus returns 
to the practical exigencies of Thebes and the real-world implications the new Delphic 
pronouncement has for him and his “children.”   
11.)  How should we purge this curse?  (99) 
12.)  What is the cause? (99) 
13.)  Who is this man whose fate has been revealed? (102) 
It is here that we learn the back story surrounding Laius’ fate and the Theban 
response to that fate. It is obviously strange, one of Sophocles’ few plot contrivances 
perhaps,66 that this exchange marks the first time Oedipus is hearing of the murder 
of his predecessor (as king and husband).  But we suspend our disbelief, accepting 
that when Oedipus arrived in the city, Laius’ fate was kept from him out of national 
interest.67  In spite of this reasoning, Oedipus is distressed by the lack of the spirit of 
inquiry in his Theban children, and what may be the greatest error in the play: willed 
ignorance.  It is now our turn, as audience, to ask nagging questions: Did any of his 
children pursue the nagging questions about their dead king?  How could they be so 
                                                        
66  Bernard Knox notes that Aristotle admired Oedipus Tyrannus because 
“recognition and reversal ‘arise from the internal structure of the plot itself’ in such a 
way that what follows is ‘necessary or probable result of the preceding action.’  The 
subsequent events are due to the preceding ones, not merely after them – dia tade not 
meta tade. (There is only one exception to this, the arrival of the Corinthian 
messenger.)” (Bernard Knox, Oedipus at Thebes: Sophocles' Tragic Hero and His Time. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998, 13.) 
67  This may be yet another moment in which Sophocles implies that the 
Theban effort to shield Oedipus from the truth backfires.  Sophocles seems to be 
asking us, his readers, to question for ourselves whether this rational response was 
the prudent course of action.  Had Oedipus not been shielded from his predecessor’s 
fate, he might have discerned the truth far earlier, having just killed a man at the 





complacent?  How could they suppress or repress their desire to know the truth?  
Does any national interest justify this sort of suppression?   Creon tells Oedipus that 
the Thebans were preoccupied with more immediate concerns: the terrorizing 
Sphinx.  We cannot help but delight in the irony that Theban inquiry, which we infer 
involved questions about how to defeat the Sphinx, comes as a tradeoff in a line of 
inquiry that would have involved questions regarding the murder of Laius.68 
And so, regarding the unsolved crime and the murderer, Oedipus begins to 
probe like a seasoned detective, asking “where” questions in rapid succession: 
14.) And where on this earth are they?  (108) 
15.) Where can the faint 
Track of this old blood crime be found? (109) 
16.) But where was Laius murdered?   
17.) In the palace?  (112) 
18.) Out in the country?  (113) 
19.) Or did it happen abroad? (113) 
20.) Did anyone see it happen? (114) 
21.) Someone on the same journey? (114) 
22.) A messenger? (115) 
23.) A clue to solve this crime? (115) 
Next, we receive the key “clue”: Creon’s claims that the survivor of the ambush upon 
Laius saw only one thing.  Oedipus intelligently latches on to this data, suspecting its 
                                                        
 68 This irony reminds us of the opportunity cost of questioning.  The “concern” 
of one line of inquiry may come at the expense of another.  In this case, it is an 





monumental importance, furthering his anger over the complacency of his fellow 
Thebans in pursuing it: 
24.) What was that?  (120) 
25.) How would a thief dare to do such a thing 
Unless he had been paid off by someone here? (124-125) 
 We should note here that the question above is laced with a negative moral 
judgment that, as I will point out later, seems to lack the sufficient evidence that 
would be required to utter it.  In a point to which I will return, Oedipus often “rushes 
to judgment” without first “marshaling the evidence” (to use Lonergan’s phrase) and 
this may be yet another sign of an intellectual deficiency which, as I argue in chapter 
3 against Dodds, is a moral deficiency.   The next question, which completes the scene 
is this: 
26.) What crisis 
Could have kept you from a complete investigation? (128-129). 
At this juncture in the play, Oedipus has asked enough questions to make the situation 
intelligible enough to offer a bold, existential vow about what course of action he will 
choose: “Then I will start again.  I will see it exposed” (132-133).  This speech 
essentially completes the first scene of the play, as the Elder replies, “Up, children; he 
has given his word/That he will do all that we asked” (152-153).   
After 153 total lines before the first choral parados, Oedipus alone has asked 
approximately 26 questions, the bulk of which are questions for intelligence.  He has 
made the scene before him (the sensible presentations) intelligible; he has exposed 





intelligently, marching onward toward the next level of consciousness, “rational” 
consciousness, in which he will be forced to make judgments of yes or no.   
The next scene in the play focuses primarily on Oedipus’ heated exchange with 
Tiresias.  Prior to the exchange, however, Oedipus offers one of his boldest speeches, 
loaded with irony, in which he prophesizes that the killer of Laius will suffer.  Of note 
here is that in his boldest and ostensibly least authentic moments, Oedipus asks zero 
questions (Lines 216-275).  To use a more colloquial phrase, he begins to “run his 
mouth,” positioning himself on the right side of justice and, as he says, “fighting for 
the rights” of the victim.   
And yet, for a man who has peppered us with good questions to this point, he 
seems to be utterly questionless in these cocksure proclamations, to the point where 
he almost resembles the unyielding truculence of Creon in Antigone.  Oedipus boldly 
says: 
So I stand, side by side with the god, 
Fighting for the rights of the murdered man. 
I damn the killer, whoever he may be, 
An unknown man, or one of many. 
May he suffer and die, pain beyond pain. 
I damn myself, if I should come to know 
That he shares my hearth and home –  
Then I call this curse to fall on me (244-251). 
 
Oedipus then adds to this invective the following harsh (and, not coincidentally, 
questionless) speech to those who may refuse to heed his proclamations: 
Those who disobey me be damned by the gods: 
Your barren land will know no harvest, 
Nurture no children.  This curse or something 
Far, far worse will doom you to destruction. 
Those faithful Thebans who accept my words 





May the good grace of the gods be with you forever (269-275). 
 
We must note that these proclamations extend far beyond where his 26 
questions for intelligence have led him.  His heretofore critical, intelligent way of 
proceeding now smashes against his uncritical and dogmatic fiats.  Why, in the spirit 
of prudence and consistency, would his questioning spirit not extend to these 
decisions about justice and punishment?  Why, for example, don’t we read more 
questions within the sphere of ethical intentionality: What shall we do to the man if 
we discover him?  Will it behoove us to make him suffer?  What if he has erred in 
ignorance?  What then will we do?  What if justice is more complex than we may 
think?  These, of course, are questions Oedipus does not ask in spite of ample evidence 
that he is a creature (a human being) capable of asking them. 
An obvious objection to this line of argument is that, up to this point, Oedipus 
has no good evidence to suspect anything but brutal regicide.  He is therefore not 
justified by the evidence in inferring that the issue could be more complex than it 
seems.  And yet, in a purely philosophical sense, the implicit (dogmatic) assumption 
that he could never be the very source of the city’s miasma is equally unjustified.  As 
McCoy notes, Oedipus’ “mistake is to believe in absolute oppositions between the just 
and unjust when a more nuanced answer is possible…[]…Oedipus thinks of justice 
and injustice as morally absolute categories in a world in which such categories do 
not always neatly apply.”69  
                                                        





McCoy’s point is well-taken.  Clearly, Oedipus could have been more 
empathetic here, achieving a better symbiosis between reason and his affective self.  
For example, if he had asked more questions for intelligence in an effort to understand 
the concrete situation, the greatest of which might have been the basic counterfactual, 
“But what if I were the killer and I did it unknowingly?,” he might have been in a less 
vulnerable (and embarrassing) position at the play’s dramatic close.  To use McCoy’s 
terms, had Oedipus been more vulnerable here, he might have found himself less 
vulnerable later. 
Instead, Oedipus moves on, and only returns from this questioning hiatus with 
the arrival of the blind prophet Tiresias.  Ironically, it is his affective self (his 
impatience) that spurs on the desire to know. This scene parallels the impatience in 
inquiry Oedipus displays when waiting for Creon’s arrival.  Waiting for Tiresias, 
Oedipus says: 
27.) Where is he? (287). 
28.) Rumors? (291). 
29.) We questioned Apollo – did the heralds tell you? (305-306). 
 When Tiresias finally arrives, the prophet becomes a foil to Oedipus, 
immediately expressing a reluctance to answer Oedipus’ questions, crying, “Oh, oh.  It 
is a hateful thing to know, when nothing/Can be gained from knowledge.  I saw it 
clearly/But forced it from my thoughts!” (316-318).  Here, Sophocles exposes the 
tension between ignorance and wisdom, between the sighted questioner and the 
blinded one who has “seen” (understands) the answer already – and, given its 





questioning process of the ignorant one.  Here, Tiresias’ blindness seems to 
immunizes him from the bias that knowing is taking a look.  One would think that 
Oedipus’ blindness in Oedipus at Colonus would perhaps absolve Oedipus too of this 
bias and yet, as I point out in Chapter 3, it does not, further emphasizing my claim that 
Oedipus understands little by the end.   
This moment raises a fascinating question: despite the desire to know and our 
insatiable questioning, are there moments in which we have insights that lead to 
judgments to stop questioning particular domains, i.e. the Frankenstein problem?  Or, 
in other words, is there an implicit tension between the unrestricted desire to know 
and the judgment to quell that desire?70  
Consider, for example, recent debates on human cloning: there, our 
unrestricted desire to know all there is to know confronts an ethical judgment that 
some things are better left unknown in a community too irresponsible to respect that 
kind of power.  In a later section of the paper I will discuss why it is the case that such 
a growing contingent of characters (Tiresias, Jocasta, the Messenger, etc.) advocate 
                                                        
70 There is an important distinction to be drawn here between, on the one 
hand, the unrestricted desire to know and, on the other, the actions that might spring 
from the insights and judgments that the unrestricted desire to know discloses.   If a 
father, for example, knew that his truthful response to his son’s question might be 
psychologically damaging to the son, insofar as his son was, say, too fragile to hear 
the response, the father might make the judgment to defer the answer to a more 
appropriate time.  But this would not be “quelling the unrestricted desire to know.”  
In fact, the father would be immersed in the unrestricted desire, having asked further 
pertinent questions about the value of giving a response.   But, since the desire to 
know cannot be quelled permanently, the willful attempt to suppress it (willed 
ignorance) is always an unwise approach, especially when considering the 
unrestricted desire, if unleashed, could lead to further questions and insights that 






for “willed ignorance,” just as Polybus and Merope desired for their son back in 
Corinth.  This issue may be the fulcrum upon which the play pivots.  It may be the case 
that contrary to Nietzsche’s view, Sophocles is not anti-rational but critical of 
communities that would attempt to silence questions.  From this viewpoint, the play 
is an indictment of those who would attempt to silence questions in the name of 
various ulterior motives.  In Colonus, Athens emerges as the new home for the 
wandering questioner and the location of Oedipus’ death becomes hallowed ground.  
One wonders why Nietzsche neglected to discuss Colonus when citing Oedipus as an 
indictment of wisdom. 
Unwilling to respect what is either Tiresias’ wisdom or Tiresias’ exhortation 
to willed ignorance, Oedipus presses on, refusing to accept the prophet’s wishes: 
30.) What is it? (319) 
31.) Why this despair? (319) 
32.) What?  So you do know but refuse to speak? (330) 
33.) Is there anything that moves you? (335) 
34.) Will you never speak? (336) 
35.) Could anyone not be angry after hearing 
  How you hold our city in such contempt? (339-340). 
On Tiresias’ saying “what will be will be,” Oedipus replies with a clarifying 
question: 
36.)  What will be? (342) 
Oedipus then offers another bold claim indicting Tiresias as a conspirator, a 





for intelligence. Angered, Tiresias bluntly replies with a statement of the truth: “You 
are this land’s defiler!”  In a crucial moment, instead of pausing to “marshal the 
evidence” that would be required to affirm such a claim, Oedipus shoots the 
proverbial messenger: 
37.)  How dare you stir up such a story? (354) 
38.)  Do you think you’ll escape the consequences? (355) 
39.)  Who put you up to this? 357) 
40.)  Tell me what? (358) 
41.)  Do you believe you can say these things with impunity? (368) 
42.)  Did you plot all this, or could it be Creon? (378) 
Tiresias then indicts Oedipus for “plaguing himself.”  Here, Oedipus launches into a 
barrage of claims about Thebes and his special and privileged role as tyrannos, which, 
in this context, merely means that he is a king who has come to the throne by an 
avenue other than genealogy.71  Most importantly, he arrogantly and unjustifiably 
invokes his past success with the Sphinx as a mark of present credibility while 
simultaneously infusing his language with new “me/them” rhetoric, an example of 
what I will later call “individual bias.” Oedipus’ fellow Thebans (in this case, the 
prophet community) morph before our eyes from being “his children,” a phrase of 
inclusion, to “you people,” an indictment of their “otherness.” 
43.) What jealous craving eats away at you people? (382) 
44.) Is it because of my tyranny? (383) 
                                                        






45.) Tell me, when have your prophecies been proved? (390) 
46.) When the Sphinx sounded her deadly song 
    Did you speak to save our people then? (391-392) 
47.) Where were you? (394) 
48.) Did you really think you could just cast me out  
          And align yourself with the throne of Creon? (399-400) 
Upon hearing this self-congratulatory and elitist rhetoric, Tiresias then 
launches into a counter-speech, reminiscent of Antigone’s speech to Creon, in which 
he claims allegiance to Apollo only, implying that the civic law and its purveyors hold 
no sway over him and that, lest Oedipus forget amidst his new divisive rhetoric, we 
are all equals: “I am still your equal/In at least having the right to reply./I am not one 
of your minions; I answer to Apollo” (411-412).  He then offers clues and linguistic 
hints, which indict Oedipus as the source of miasma, unnecessary given his previous 
definitive statement.  Instead of questioning the content of the speech and again, 
marshaling the evidence required to affirm or deny it, Oedipus’ next question is one 
for judgment but in the wrong domain, essentially, “should I tolerate this 
insubordination from such an underling, yes or no?” 
49.)  Must I tolerate this, from him? (429)  
Tiresias, perhaps equally as compelled by anger as Oedipus now, then 
provides the crucial statement which becomes the key clue for the next litany of 
questions: “I am what I am; a fool, if that is what you think,/But those that bore you 
thought me wise enough?” (435-436). Oedipus replies to this cryptic proclamation 





is) that suddenly reorient his trajectory back on the path of valuable inquiry, the effect 
of which are to retroactively mark the previous two exchanges (with Creon and 
Tiresias) as superfluous detours full of egotistical grandstanding and ad hominem 
attacks.  In this exchange we see the problem of self-knowledge emerging, and the 
Sophoclean trope that claims to know oneself with certainty are themselves evidence 
of a form of ignorance. 
50.) What did you say? (437) 
51.) Who gave birth to me? (437) 
52.) Is everything you say shrouded in dark riddles? (439) 
Appropriately, this final question brings us to the Second Chorus.  Charles Segal notes 
that this exchange brings out the dramatic contrast between the divine seer and 
human rationality: “the horror of the prophet’s uncanny knowledge stands in an even 
more powerful contrast to Oedipus’ rationality, as Tiresias’ closing two lines suggest: 
‘Go inside and reckon these things up; and if you catch me as one who’s false, then say 
that my intelligence in prophecy is nil’ …the scene is a powerful visual enactment of 
the clash between human and divine knowledge.”72   
But is this really what this heated exchange accomplishes?  Or does it instead 
imbue us with the impression that in spite of his auspicious start, full of excellent 
questions, nearly 53 of them in fact, Oedipus has been waylaid on the journey by what 
appears to be a disharmonious relation between Oedipus’ rational and affective 
aspects?  Or, further, that Tiresias “uncanny” knowledge is not “uncanny” at all.  The 
prophet merely boasts an explanatory understanding of the interconnected network 
                                                        





of human beings, and the cosmos at large, of which human agents are a small but 
important part.   
After returning back to the correct path of interrogation, Sophocles depicts 
Oedipus becoming sidetracked again, as he interrogates Creon in similar fashion to 
his interrogation of Tiresias.  But note, the nature of the questioning in this exchange 
has changed.  It no longer seems as dispassionate and authentic as it was once.  
Oedipus’ questions are tinged with even more anger and feeling, not the sangfroid of 
a scientist or, even, a seasoned detective: 
53.) You? (532) 
54.) You dare to come here, to my house? (532) 
55.) What was it that you saw in me – 
Weakness, stupidity? (536-537) 
56.) Did you really think that  
That I’d never see through your scheme  
And take steps against your creeping conspiracy? (537-539) 
57.) Do you really think  
you can harm you’re your own family with impunity? (551-552) 
58.) Did you, or did you not, persuade me 
To send for that self-righteous soothsayer? (555-556) 
59.) And this old prophet, was he in business back then? (562) 
60.) And at that time did he ever mention me? (564) 
61.) Was there no murder investigation? (566) 





63.) Why did he not speak then? (568) 
64.) How can I believe a man like you? (626a) 
65.) Like yours? (630) 
This string of questions is particularly telling in light of the first batch of 
questions.  Here, instead of probing the issue, Oedipus’ questions intimate a suspected 
conspiracy that lacks evidence, another indication of Oedipus’ failure to understand 
understanding.  Thankfully, the exchange with Creon is brought to an end by Jocasta’s 
entrance.  Her peacemaking attempts seem to win the chorus’ allegiance and the 
chorus exhorts Oedipus to be a bit more malleable.  Yet, instead of authentically 
considering their point of view, he remains truculent: 
66.) And why should I yield? (649) 
67.) Do you know what you’re asking of me? (652) 
Here Creon departs and Jocasta and the Chorus begin a dialogue.  When Jocasta asks 
the chorus for a recap, they resist and Oedipus indicts them (wrongly) for presenting 
an obstacle to his pointed inquiry. 
68.) Can you see what you have done, trying 
to blunt my edge with your good intentions? (687-688) 
The scene that follows is pivotal; it is Sophocles at the height of his dramatic 
powers.  It depicts Jocasta’s reaction to Oedipus after she finally gets a sense of why 
Oedipus suspected Creon.  The clue comes on line 715, when Jocasta, casually states, 
“But Laius was killed by strangers/At a place where three roads meet.”  It is in the 
following string of questions that Oedipus begins to piece together the first of the 





he killed Laius and is therefore the source of miasma.  Second, that Laius was his 
father.  Third, by extension of the second, that Jocasta is his mother.  
69.) Where exactly did this happen? (732) 
70.) When was this? (735) 
71.) Zeus! What are you conspiring against me? (738) 
72.) How old was he? (741) 
73.) What if the blind prophet can see? (747) 
Note that at this juncture of the play, on the 73rd question, which is quasi-rhetorical, 
the seed of truth has been conceived in Oedipus’ consciousness and will now begin to 
gestate.  Only now, as the improbable possibility that he could be the killer glimmers, 
albeit faintly, does prudence return to him.  His rash temperament gives way to a 
demand to ask still more questions in an effort to “marshal the evidence,” to 
eventually make what Lonergan will call a “virtually unconditioned judgment.” 
74.) Was he traveling with a small entourage 
Or in force at the head of a large column? (750-751) 
When Jocasta replies that Laius “had five men, including his herald; There was 
one carriage, and Laius rode in that” (752-753).  Oedipus replies “Oh, now I start to 
see!” (754). Obviously, this cry is not meant to describe the act of visually seeing but 
an act insight, in the linguistic sense of “I see [understand] what you mean.”  This line 
is also an ironic juxtaposition between Oedipus and Tiresias and establishes the 
fitness between inquiry and insight, as opposed to the commonly held viewpoint 
which defines knowing as “taking a look.”  Yet Oedipus still wonders if growing 





again becomes an exemplar of a man who, as Lonergan says, prizes the truth “not 
because it yields satisfaction but because its content is correct.”73  And so Oedipus 
pushes on: 
75.) Jocasta, who told you about this? (755) 
76.) Is he still here, among our household? (757) 
77.) Could he brought back as soon as possible? (765) 
Here, between lines 771-833, Oedipus digresses into a key speech about his 
past as he attempts to reconstruct it in the hope it will be newly intelligible in light of 
recent events.  Not coincidentally, Oedipus’ consciousness recruits the memory of 
drunken dinner guest who claims that Oedipus is not his parents’ son.  I will devote 
more attention to this scene in the next chapter on “bias.”  Needless to say, this long 
speech proceeds without questions until, after Oedipus admits to killing the royal 
party at the place where the three roads converge, he deploys a barrage of rhetorical 
questions from which we infer the deep dissatisfaction and contempt he is beginning 
to feel for himself. 
78.) Who could be as contemptible as I?  (815) 
79.) What man could be more heaven-hated? (816) 
80.) Am I so foul? (823) 
81.) So hopelessly unholy? (824) 
82.) What man in his right mind could say otherwise? (829) 
Attempting to marshal more evidence, Oedipus now places his fleeting hopes 
in the “herdsman”; the member of Laius’ house who survived and retreated to the 
                                                        





countryside.  This juncture marks the most profound “ascension” from intelligent 
consciousness to rational consciousness, as Oedipus tries not merely to question but 
to arrange his accumulating insights into a narrative of data from which to make 
judgments.  In fact, this moment marks the first time in the play Oedipus actually 
“reasons,” at least as Lonergan understands the term.  The key question that serves 
as the springboard for reasoning is rooted, not surprisingly, in the concept of 
contradiction, as Oedipus asks, 
83.) How can one be the same as many? (845)74 
The 3rd chorus now appears upon the stage as Oedipus marshals the evidence.  
He is hopeful that the “several thieves” narrative will be the corroborated story.  In 
the interim, Jocasta launches into an attack on soothsayers to which Oedipus blithely 
replies, “You are right, of course, but I still want the herdsman here” (860-861).  The 
desire to summon the herdsman, the desire to speak with him in person, despite 
Jocasta’s attempt to demean the source of the information, only further showcases 
Oedipus’ unrestricted desire to know and its ultimate unquenchablity.  Here, Oedipus 
seems to desire a virtually unconditioned judgment about his innocence.  Hearsay, 
therefore, is not enough.  What seems to be the case is not enough.    
In the next brief section before Oedipus returns, Jocasta dialogues with an 
elderly Corinthian – the shepherd to whom Oedipus was handed, as a baby, by the 
Theban herdsman.  The appearance of the Corinthian on the stage is not, logically 
                                                        
74 In a point to which I will devote some attention later, the parallel here to the 
content of the riddle of the sphinx is undeniable.  Note that, linguistically, the 
question, “How can one be the same as many?” is equivalent to the question, “How 





speaking, necessary.  In fact, it may be the only plot point in the play that is a function 
of chance.75  Polybus has died and the Corinthian just happens to arrive to announce 
the news of his death at what is ostensibly the most crucial time, for both Oedipus and 
for the sake of the drama.  This arrival creates the delightful irony that what all 
perceive to be bad news – Polybus’ death – turns quickly into its opposite, good news, 
when Oedipus assumes he could not have killed his father, but then back to bad news, 
as the Corinthian happily attempts to allay Oedipus’ fears by informing him Polybus 
was not, in fact, his father.    
Nevertheless, prior to this moment, Jocasta is hopeful and summons Oedipus 
from his house, to which Oedipus inquires: 
84.) Why call me from our house? (951) 
85.) Well, who is he?  What is he saying? (954) 
86.) What’s your message? (957) 
The Corinthian informs Oedipus that Old Polybus is dead, a claim which, not 
surprisingly, Oedipus immediately questions.  He even offers a question from which 
we infer a tremendous, if not hasty, skepticism regarding prophecy and the “Divine 
Order.”  Meanwhile, we are aware that if Oedipus only had the understanding of the 
whole, the ability to grasp himself in an explanatory context, he would recognize the 
brutal irony which now confronts him. 
                                                        
75 See footnote 42. (Bernard Knox. 1998. Oedipus at Thebes: Sophocles' Tragic 
Hero and His Time. New Haven: Yale University Press. 13).  Hereafter referred to as 






87.) Was there foul play, or did he die of natural causes? (960) 
88.) Why?  Why, dear wife, should we observe the oracle 
At Delphi, or strain to see signs from birds screeching 
In the sky? (964-966) 
At this, Jocasta replies, “Exactly what I said in the beginning” (973).  Oedipus replies, 
“You did, but fear misguided me” (974).  In a moment of tremendous irony, given the 
way in Oedipus’ affective self has indeed led him astray when interrogating Tiresias 
and Creon, we grasp that here, the opposite is true: Oedipus’ fears are indeed 
accurate.  In this instance, Oedipus’ unrestricted desire to know guided him toward 
the truth despite the distortion of his affective fears.  Oedipus does not yet understand 
his affective responses.  
Hopeful that he may not, in fact, be Laius’ killer now, Oedipus still harbors fears 
the second aspect of the prophecy may still be true, that he “should still shun” his 
“mother…her bed” (976).  After expressing this fear, Jocasta launches into one of the 
more provocative speeches about “chance governing human life,” an expression of a 
worldview to which we will return in a later section on what Lonergan calls “position 
and counterposition.”  The Corinthian messenger then innocently inquires about why 
they still worry about these things and is informed of the oracle.  He retorts, in line 
1008, “My boy, it’s quite clear you don’t know what you’re doing” and then, on 1014, 
“Really, you had no cause for fear,” to which Oedipus naturally replies with what 
Lonergan calls a “question for intelligence”: 





The Corinthian then drops a bombshell which, for most, would be the tipping 
point to render judgment, “Because Polybus is no relation of yours” (1016).  This 
statement, to Oedipus, is unintelligible insofar as it is (but shouldn’t be) 
unfathomable.  As such, the questions for intelligence (what, how, why, why, when, 
etc) regarding this claim come fast and furious, as Oedipus (and Jocasta) finally begin 
to suspect the worst is yet to come. 
90.) What are you talking about?  (1017) 
91.) How could you equal my father? (1019) 
92.) Then why did he call me his son? (1021) 
93.) From another’s hands? (1023) 
94.) Was I bought? (1025) 
95.) Did you find me somewhere? (1026) 
96.) Why were you traveling in that region? (1028) 
97.) So you were a wandering shepherd, a hired hand? (1029) 
98.) And when you first held me, was I hurt? (1031) 
In one of the most provocative moments of the play, the Corinthian replies to 
these questions by suddenly recruiting Oedipus’ physical body as prima facie 
evidence.  Oedipus’ physical body is an aspect of his person that has been forgotten in 
this extended retreat into the mind.  Now his body returns to him in a newly 
intelligible way as the messenger encourages Oedipus to examine himself, “Your own 
feet can testify to that!” (1032).  The scene reminds us of the psychosomatic 
integration we often forget as we engage in intellectual pursuits and serves as a 





infamous choice of self-blinding.  Yet Oedipus attempts to dismiss the invitation to 
reclaim his ankle wounds as newly intelligible in the light of insight: 
99.) An old affliction; why speak of it now? (1033) 
The scars upon Oedipus’ ankles require a special attention in terms of Lonergan’s 
thought. 76   Oedipus, though, dismisses them, returning to his questions for 
intelligence: 
100.) Gods! Who did this – my mother? (1037) 
101.) My father? (1037) 
102.) You took me from someone else? (1039) 
103.) You didn’t find me? (1039) 
104.) Who was it? (1041) 
105.) Do you know? (1041) 
106.) Can you tell me? (1041) 
107.) The Tyrannus who used to rule this country? 
At this point, the Corinthian informs Oedipus of Laius’ herdsman, which 
prompts another litany of pointed questions for judgment. 
108.) Does he still live?  (1045) 
109.) Can I see him? (1045) 
110.) Do any of you gathered here know 
Who this herdsman could be? (1047-1048) 
111.) Is he somewhere out in the country? (1049) 
                                                        
76 See Patrick H. Byrne’s essay, “Edith Stein & Bernard Lonergan: Empathy, 






112.) Is he here? (1049) 
In what ought to be, perhaps, the final dagger, the Corinthian tells Oedipus that 
his wife Jocasta would know the answers to these questions. 
113.) My wife? (1054) 
114.) Could the man he means be the one we summoned? (1055) 
115.) Do you know? (1055) 
Here, with this data, Jocasta experiences the insight that will take her husband 
a few more questions to achieve.  It is worth noting here the significance of the fact 
that the insight and the virtually unconditioned grasp of the “truth” occur in two 
different characters at two different times, one requiring less data than the other to 
“get it.”  This phenomenon seems to support Lonergan’s basic premise that truth 
resides within the consciousness of the pursuer.  And so, in a speech that parallels 
Tiresias’ earlier injunction that “nothing/Can be gained from knowledge,” Jocasta 
instinctively attempts to restrict the unrestricted desire to know shouting: “No! By all 
the gods, if you have care for your life/Stop these questions.  Have I not suffered 
enough?” (1060-1061). 77  When Oedipus refuses, she attempts again, to which 
Oedipus replies, “You’ll never persuade me to give up the truth” (1065), to which 
Jocasta responds, “I pray you never know the man you are” (1068).  Like the earlier 
exchange with Tiresias, this moment invites us to evaluate the famous Aristotelian 
                                                        
77 It is interesting to consider whether this instinct to restrict the unrestricted 
desire to know is a function of Jocasta’s protective instinct as Oedipus’ mother, 
shielding him from harm or as a wife.  Essentially, it seems to be both: her son and 





aphorism that “piety requires us to honor truth above our friends.”78 Likewise, for 
Lonergan, there are no questions the answers to which we should not, at least, desire.   
Next, the Chorus intervenes on behalf Jocasta, saying, “Her silence frightens 
me; evil will break from it” (1075).  Oedipus replies to them with a beautiful 
encomium to truth and yet the encomium may be pathetically misguided.  We begin 
to suspect that Oedipus’ refusal to shy away from the truth is merely because he 
assumes the truth is tolerable.  In other moments of bias, which will be developed 
further in Chapter 2, he further attributes Jocasta’s fear to her “feminine conceit,” 
believing that she fears a low birth, shouting, 
Then it will break!  I have to know 
Who I am, however low my birth 
That woman, with her feminine conceit, 
Is ashamed of my humble origins, 
But I see myself as a child of good-giving 
Fortune, and I will not be demeaned. 
She is my mother, the seasons my kin, 
And I rise and fall like the phases of the moon. 
That is my nature, and I will never play the part 
Of someone else, nor fail to learn what I was born to be (1076-1085).79 
 
Aside from the obvious punning (“she is my mother”), we cannot help but 
notice the emergence of what may be the most beautiful aspect of Oedipus’ character: 
his commitment to avoiding a kind of Sartrean bad faith.  Oedipus refuses to “play the 
part/of someone else.”  Perhaps his dignity lies in his authenticity; his unwillingness 
                                                        
78 Aristotle.  Nicomachean Ethics. (trans. Joe Sachs, Newburyport, MA: Focus 
Philosophical Library, 2002).  1096a 17-18. 
 
79 In an existential sense, this passage is a testament to Oedipus refusal to 
practice what Jean-Paul Sartre called “bad faith.”  Oedipus will not wear the mask of 
another, fascinating given that masked persona on stage.  In this sense, the play is 





to play false.  Nevertheless, with the arrival of the Theban herdsman, and in spite of 
Jocasta’s entreaties and retreat, Oedipus’ questions again come fast and furious.  First, 
he asks the chorus: 
116.) Have you ever seen this shepherd? (1115) 
117.) First of all, tell me, Corinthian, is this the man? (1119) 
Oedipus turns to the Theban herdsman and asks basic grounding questions for 
intelligence: 
118.) Did you once belong to Laius? (1122) 
119.) What was your job, your livelihood? (1124) 
120.) Where did you usually work? (1126) 
121.) Was this man ever there – did you know him? (1128) 
122.) Have you met him before? (1130) 
The next few lines depict a fascinating exchange between two older men, 
roughly the same age, as one questions while the other simultaneously demurs, 
fearful of exposing the truth they both suspect will be deleterious to their hearers. 
The scene culminates with the hersdsman refusing, prompting Oedipus to resort to 
the aggression that characterized his detours with Tiresias and Creon. 
123.) Did you give him a child as he said? (1156) 
124.) Where did you get it – your home, or from someone else? (1162) 
125.) Which citizen was it? (1164) 
126.) Whose house? (1164) 
Here the herdsman too joins the growing contingent of characters (Tiresias 





succinctly sums up this worldview, the Herdsman shouts, “No more questions!” 
(1165).  Sophocles will now deftly and ironically balance the phrase, “No more 
questions,” 80  against Oedipus’ forthcoming virtually unconditioned judgment in 
which there are “no more questions” because there are, literally, “no further 
questions.” 
127.) A slave child, or one of his own? (1168) 
128.) She gave it to you? (1172) 
129.) For what reason? (1174) 
130.) Her own baby? (1175) 
The herdsman tells Oedipus that Jocasta feared an oracle: 
131.) That said what? (1176) 
132.) Then why did you give him to this old man? (1177) 
In response to this question, the herdsman delivers the final piece of data that serves 
as a sort of cognitive tipping point.  It is, as I will point out in the next section, the final 
condition in a network of conditions and their fulfillments.  The appearance of this 
data satiates Oedipus’ questioning to the point that he has also made a virtually 
unconditioned judgment about his terrifying insight, which is unsurprisingly 
expressed verbally with an allusion to eyesight, “It all comes clear.” 
 
Oedipus’ Reflective Understanding: Insight and the Virtually Unconditioned 
Judgment  
                                                        





In The Merchant of Venice, Launcelot says to Gobbo, “Truth will come to light.  
Murder cannot be hid long – a man’s son may, but in the end truth will out” (my 
italics).81 Colloquially, the expression “truth will out” suggests that “the truth” – or, to 
use Lonergan’s phrases, what is so, what is real, what is actually the case (as opposed 
to what seems to be the case), and what we may “only gainsay by falsity” – has an 
inertial tendency to rise to the surface of things, given an adequate timeframe.  
In Oedipus Tyrannus, that timeframe is 1181 lines.  Oedipus’ litany of questions 
for intelligence, outlined in the previous section, set the conditions for his insight.  
This insight, it turns out, is simultaneously a “rationally compelled pronouncement of 
judgment,” the verbal expression of which is Oedipus’ pained cry, “Oi, Oi.”82  Oedipus 
then relies on the common visual metaphors to describe his insight, using words like 
clarity (σαφῆ), light (φῶς), exposure (πέφασμαι) and the act of looking 
(προσβλέψαιμι).   
And yet, for both Sophocles and Lonergan, the metaphorical connection 
between insight and ocular vision belies the real cognitional structure (and journey) 
by which truth is, in fact, grasped.  As Byrne notes, “Colloquially we do say, ‘Oh, now I 
                                                        
81 Shakespeare, William.  The Merchant of Venice.  The Norton Shakespeare.  
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997). II.2.68-70, p. 1103. 
 
82  Scholars have long noted that the name “Oedipus” is a deft play on the 
expression, “oi,” one of pain, in addition to being a play on “oida,” Greek verb to 
“know” – “to painfully know.” As Charles Segal points out, “Indeed, [Oedipus’] name, 
in one possible etymology, suggests the meaning “Know Foot” (oida, Gr. “I know,” and 
pous, Gr. “foot.”) That is, “He who knows the riddle of the feet” (Segal, Tragic Heroism, 





see the answer.’ But to speak more exactly, seeing is precisely what we are not doing.  
Seeing is not the way we become conscious of the answer to a question.”83   
Consider Oedipus’ cry:  
Oh! Oh! It all comes clear! 
Light, let me look at you one last time. 
I am exposed – born to forbidden parents, joined 
In forbidden marriage, I brought forbidden death (Lines 1181-1185). 84 
 
It is no coincidence that Sophocles has Oedipus use the third-person singular 
neuter pronoun “it” (τὰ) to describe, essentially, “that which has become clear.”  But 
just what is this act of grasping “it” and what is the “it” that is grasped?  To fully 
answer this question we may turn to Archimedes, another classical figure who, not 
unlike Oedipus, is shrouded in apocryphal myth.  In the opening pages of Insight, 
Lonergan alludes to the story of Archimedes whose famous cry “eureka,” literally 
means “I’ve got it.”85  In Lonergan’s terms, this “it,” no matter how we describe it 
linguistically (intelligibility, the reason, the cause, the explanation, etc.), is the object 
grasped by a very special cognitive act he calls “insight.”   
An insight, according to Lonergan, has five attributes.  First, insight comes as a 
release to the tension of inquiry.  As we have seen, Oedipus has been inquiring up 
                                                        
83 P.H. Byrne, Ethics of Discernment, 28. 
 
84 Sophocles, O.T., 1181-1185.  The Greek is below: 
 
ἰοὺ ἰού: τὰ πάντ᾽ ἂν ἐξήκοι σαφῆ.  
ὦ φῶς, τελευταῖόν σε προσβλέψαιμι νῦν,  
ὅστις πέφασμαι φύς τ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὧν οὐ χρῆν, ξὺν οἷς τ᾽  
οὐ χρῆν ὁμιλῶν, οὕς τέ μ᾽ οὐκ ἔδει κτανών.  
 





until this moment. And while Archimedes is remembered for his “peculiarly 
uninhibited exultation,” just as Oedipus is remembered for his pained cry, “Oi!  Oi!,” 
the significance, as Lonergan notes, “does not lie in this outburst of delight but in the 
antecedent desire and effort that it betrays.”86  This “desire and effort” is, respectively, 
the unrestricted desire to know and the self-correcting process of learning.  Lonergan 
adds, 
Deep within us all, emergent when the noise of other appetites is stilled, 
there is a drive to know, to understand, to see why, to discover the 
reason, to find the cause, to explain.  Just what is wanted has many 
names.  In what precisely it consists is a matter of dispute.  But the fact 
of inquiry is beyond all doubt.  It can absorb a man.  It can keep him for 
hours, day after day, year after year, in the narrow prison of his study 
or his laboratory.  It can send him on dangerous voyages of exploration.  
It can withdraw him from other interests, other pursuits, other 
pleasures, other achievements.  It can fill his waking thoughts, hide 
from the world of ordinary affairs, invade the very fabric of his dreams.  
It can demand endless sacrifices that are made without regret though 
there is only hope, never a certain promise, of success.  What better 
symbol could one find for this obscure, exigent, imperious drive, than a 
man, naked, running, excitedly crying, ‘I’ve got it’?87  
 
Second, insight comes suddenly and unexpectedly.  While we might argue that 
Oedipus’ insight is far more discursive than, say, Archimedes’, his understanding that 
he, of all people, is the cause of the miasma is certainly unexpected.88 
                                                        
86 Lonergan, Insight, 28. 
 
87 Ibid., 29. 
 
88 Meanwhile I am sympathetic to viewpoints which suggest there is a sense in 
which Oedipus “knows” (subconsciously) the truth of his identity the whole time.  I 
will treat this reading in a later section on dramatic bias.  There may be a distinction 





Third, insight is a function not of outer circumstances but of inner conditions.  
Note, that while new data is brought to light as the play progresses, other characters 
in the play, like Jocasta, grasp the truth earlier than Oedipus.  That it takes different 
people different timescales to grasp a puzzle is the prima facie evidence that insight 
is a function of the inner conditions of the knower and could never be merely a matter 
of “ocular vision.”  If that were the case, it would follow that all people with 
functioning eyes would solve the same puzzle instantly. 
Fourth, insight pivots between the concrete and the abstract.  We recall that 
Oedipus has a very concrete problem on his hands, far more dire, in fact, than 
Archimedes’. Oedipus’ city has been “plunged headlong into the depths of 
disaster”…and…“desolation wastes away the harvest/Destroys our herds and grazing 
fields/Blights the women and makes them barren.” 89   Oedipus faces a national 
disaster, not a conman duping a King.  Any hope Thebes may have for the future will 
be contingent upon insight – maybe not Oedipus’, but someone’s – into the problem.  
It is for this reason that Lonergan notes, “by its very nature insight is the mediator, 
the hinge, the pivot.”90 
Fifth, and finally, insight passes into the habitual texture of one’s mind.  In fact, 
Lonergan could very well be describing Oedipus when he says, “Once one has 
understood, one has crossed a divide.  What a moment ago was an insoluble problem 
                                                        
89 Sophocles, O.T., Lines 22-27. 
 






now becomes incredibly simple and obvious.”91  This attribute is the hallmark of a 
good mystery.  What was once so dark and unintelligible all seems so lucid and simple.   
Typically, an insight is separated from the act of judgment in a temporal 
sequence, as the questioner, post-insight, begins to question whether his insight is 
actually correct, with his consciousness enlarging from intelligent to rational self-
consciousness.  Archimedes, for instance, needed time to test his insight in an actual 
concrete experiment, asking an “is it so?” question about his insight.  There are, 
however, occasions in which insight is simultaneous or, at the very least, nearly 
instantaneous with judgment, especially when the questioning process that yields the 
insight affirms along the way the requisite conditions to judge the content of the 
insight correct.   
Oedipus’ insight is, therefore, simultaneously the ground for a virtually 
unconditioned judgment, which effectively fuses the climax of the play’s plot with the 
climax of the questioning process.  In fact, after this critical point, the remainder of 
the play is essentially a protracted denouement.  The situation is now intelligible.  
Oedipus has, as the saying goes, “no further questions,” at least as they pertain to his 
identity as incestuous parricide and defiler of Thebes.  Yes, he will ask a few lingering 
questions about his fate and the fate of his children, as the sphere of his concern 
contracts to more immediate matters, but not at the furious pace he questions prior 
to his insight. The insight has now passed into the habitual texture of his (and our) 
mind. It seems Launcelot is vindicated: the truth is out. 






And yet the Shakespeare line needs revision in light of Lonergan’s analysis.  If 
Oedipus Tyrannus teaches us anything, it is a point foundational to Lonergan’s 
cognitional theory, epistemology and, ultimately, metaphysics: the “truth will out,” 
yes, but only insofar as authentic questioners are willing to do the legwork of asking 
the right questions to “out it.”  Truth, therefore, is contingent upon questioners 
ontologically capable of what Lonergan calls a “virtually unconditioned judgment.”  In 
other words, while a mind does not make something true, there is, nevertheless, no 
truth without minds.  If judgments answer “yes or no” questions, then the road to any 
judgment will be paved by prior questions for intelligence the condition for which is 
an empirical consciousness capable of this kind of cognitive ascent.  Lonergan relies 
on a powerful metaphor taken from embryonic development.  Human consciousness 
is the womb in which truth is conceived, gestates and from which, ultimately, it is 
born (parturition).  Consider Lonergan’s definitive comment, included in its entirety 
to stress its importance (and elegance): 
The criterion, I believe, by which we arrive at the truth is a virtually 
unconditioned.92  But an unconditioned has no conditions.  A subject 
may be needed to arrive at truth, but, once truth is attained, one is 
beyond the subject and one has reached a realm that is non-spatial, 
atemporal, impersonal.  Whatever is true at any time or place, can be 
contradicted only by falsity.  No one can gainsay it, unless he is 
mistaken and errs. 
 
Such is the objectivity of truth.  But do not be fascinated by it.  
Intentionally it is independent of the subject, but ontologically it 
resides only in the subject: veritas formaliter in solo iudicio.  
                                                        
92 Lonergan adds this footnote: “The formally unconditioned has no conditions 
whatever; it is God.  The virtually unconditioned has conditions but they have been 
fulfilled.   Such, I should say, is the cognitional counterpart of contingent being and, as 
well, a technical formulation of the ordinary criterion of true judgment, namely, 
sufficient evidence” (Insight, 70).  For a more complex elucidation of the virtually 





Intentionally it goes completely beyond the subject, yet it does so only 
because ontologically the subject is capable of an intentional self-
transcendence, of going beyond what he feels, what he imagines, what he 
thinks, what seems to him, to something utterly different, to what is so.  
Moreover, before the subject can attain the self-transcendence of truth, 
there is the slow and laborious process of conception, gestation, 
parturition.  But teaching and learning, investigating, coming to 
understand, marshalling and weighing the evidence, these are not 
independent of the subject, of times and places, of psychological, social, 
historical conditions.  The fruit of truth must grow and mature on the 
tree of the subject, before it can be plucked and placed in its absolute 
realm.93 
 
The real is not, therefore, as the empiricist claims, the spatially extended or, to 
use Lonergan’s phrase, “the already-out-there-now-real.”  Instead, for Lonergan, “the 
real” is that which is affirmed in a virtually unconditioned judgment.   
But just what is a virtually unconditioned judgment?  What does it mean to say 
that Oedipus makes the virtually unconditioned judgment that he is the defiler of his 
city, along with all of the corollary propositions that attend it, including judgments on 
the veracity of the prophecies?   
Lonergan tells us “a virtually unconditioned involves three elements, namely, 
(1) a conditioned, (2) a link between the conditioned and its conditions, and (3) the 
fulfillment of the conditions.  Hence a prospective judgment will be virtually 
unconditioned if (1) it is the conditioned, (2) its conditions are known, and (3) the 
conditions are fulfilled.” 94   As it turns out, the latter two criteria (knowing the 
conditions and judging they are fulfilled) constitute quite a high bar, the height of 
which is often underappreciated by those, like empiricists, who equate human 
                                                        
93 Lonergan, A Second Collection, 70-71; italics are mine. 
 





knowing with a rather simplistic standard of “taking a look.”  In a point to which I will 
return later, we may argue (against Nietzsche and others, as it were) that it is not 
wisdom but a casual empiricism, a stance which does equate knowing with “taking a 
look,” which receives the brunt of Sophocles’ critique of knowledge (if one may even 
speak of a “critique”). 
Returning to judgment, consider, for example, a comedy bit that used to 
appear on Late Night with David Letterman.  The bit was called “Will it float?”  In it, 
various objects are presented to the audience with the question for judgment: “Will it 
float?”  In other words, in any given scenario, the game can be reduced to the 
proposition, “X will float in Y.”  Affirm or deny?95  A question for judgment.  One of the 
comedic imports of the game is the readiness with which laypeople are willing to 
make the judgment without (presumably) attempting to do the “cognitive legwork” 
(i.e. questioning) to ascertain whether the requisite conditions of floating (the 
conditioned) are indeed fulfilled.   This legwork often requires far more questions 
than typical people, typically operating in pragmatic descriptive patterns, are willing 
to do and yet Lonergan’s standard is, as he reminds us, merely a “technical 
formulation of the ordinary criterion of true judgment, namely, sufficient evidence.”96 
On Lonergan’s view, to offer judgment, we must first defer to our inquiry.  We 
must first inquire about the conditions that would need to be fulfilled to affirm or 
                                                        
95 Lonergan offers a third possibility that is neither affirm or deny – one might 
simply “consider” the proposition as a hypothesis.   
 
96 Lonergan, A Second Collection, 70.  (See footnote 3).  The full sentence is as 
follows: “Such, I should say, is the cognitional counterpart of contingent being and, as 






deny the proposition.  For example, in the “Will it Float?” game, the most obvious 
condition we learn in high school chemistry class: the density of the object in relation 
to the density of the solution.  But relative density is only one condition which, on its 
own, is not a sufficient condition to actualize or “cause” the physical event called 
floating. 97    It is for this reason that Lonergan would describe density as an 
“explanatory conjugate.”  An object may be more or less dense than another.  In this 
sense, having a particular density does not necessitate an object to float but it is an 
important relational condition among others. In fact, further questions would in fact 
reveal that greater density is not the only condition – the student of hydrostatics 
knows gravitational fields or non-inertial reference frames set new conditions.  
Would the object, for example, float in the solution if both were moving closer and 
closer to the speed of light?  The denial of extreme conditions such as these is implicit 
in the Latin qualifier, ceteris paribus, invoked in hypothetical scenarios. 98   When 
making our judgments we do not expect these bizarre conditions to obtain and yet we 
understand – through yet another act of judgment – that certain changes are not 
impossible.99   
                                                        
97 In this sense, in terms of modern theories of causation, Lonergan’s view 
seems most closely aligned with JL Mackie, whose understanding of causation is 
couched in language about fulfilling conditions. 
 
98 In my classroom I often challenge my students to do the “cognitive legwork” 
of ascertaining the conditions needed to be fulfilled in order to make even basic, 
uncomplicated judgments.  I write on the board: “Frost played lacrosse at UNC Chapel 
Hill.”  Then I ask: yes, or no?  Affirm or deny?  It is often shocking to hear the dubious 
procedures – loaded with uncritical assumptions – whereby some students 
immediately deny the proposition. 
 
99  Likewise, I often show my students a YouTube clip of the famous MLB 





Lonergan next invokes the concept of deductive inference (specifically, modus 
ponens) while simultaneously acknowledging the obvious drawbacks of pure 
deduction by using the phrase “virtually” as a hedge against, say, a Humean objection 
that any judgment “presupposes other judgments to be true.”  He writes, 
Now the conclusion is a conditioned, for an argument is needed to 
support it.  The major premise links this conditioned to its conditions, 
for it affirms ‘If A, then B.’ The minor premise presents the fulfillment 
of the conditions, for it affirms the antecedent A.  The function, then, of 
the form of deductive inference is to exhibit a conclusion as virtually 
unconditioned.  Reflective insight grasps the pattern, and by rational 
compulsion there follows the judgment.  However, deductive inference 
cannot be the basic case of judgment for it presupposes other 
judgments to be true.  For that reason we have said that the form of 
deductive inference is merely a clear illustration of what is meant by 
grasping a prospective judgment as virtually unconditioned.100  
 
A further elucidation of this principle may be found in the old logic mystery, “Who 
Killed Torrelli,”101 which appears below.  The reader is encouraged to attempt to 
solve the puzzle before moving on: 
One and only one of the men mentioned below killed Torrelli.  
Each one of the five men made three statements, two true and one 
false.  Their statements were: 
 
Lefty:  “I did not kill Torrelli.  I never owned a revolver.  Spike did it.” 
Red:  “I did not kill Torrelli.  I never owned a revolver.  The other guys 
are passing the buck.” 
Dopey:  “I am innocent.  I never saw Butch before.  Spike is guilty.” 
                                                        
as the ball has left his hand and ask, “how many think the ball will hit the mitt?”  Some 
assume yes, others suspect a trick and say no but very few predict the appearance of 
an unlucky bird that flies right across the path of the ball and explodes in a ball of 
feathers and guts. 
 
100 Lonergan, Insight, 306. 
 
101  I am indebted to Professor Patrick H. Byrne of Boston College for first 
introducing this mystery to me in the context of Lonergan and the virtually 





Spike:  “I am innocent.  Butch is the guilty man.  Lefty lied when he said 
I did it.” 
Butch:  “I did not kill Torrelli.  Red is the guilty man.  Dopey and I are 
old pals.” 
 
Like in Oedipus, the question which underpins the mystery, “Who killed 
Torrelli?,” (e.g. “Who killed Laius?”) at first blush sounds like a question for 
intelligence.  With five options presented, however, the puzzle really becomes five 
questions for judgment: Lefty killed Torrelli, yes or no?  Red killed Torrelli, yes or no?  
Dopey killed Torrelli, yes or no? Spike killed Torrelli, yes or no?  Butch killed Torrelli, 
yes or no? 
Notice that while there are multiple (more complex) ways of solving this 
puzzle (using truth tables, etc.), a quick glance at the statements and the rules reveals, 
that in order for “X to be the killer” (the conditioned) statements professing innocence 
paired with statements indicting others would both need to be false, violating the 
rules of “two true, one false.”  A quick inspection of the statements reveals that 4 of 
the 5 suspects (Lefty, Dopey, Spike and Butch) all claim innocence while 
simultaneously indicting others.  But if they were the killers (K), then both of these 
statements would be false (F).  But they can’t both be false (the rules fulfill the 
condition). Lefty, Dopey, Spike and Butch, therefore, by modus tollens, are not the 
killers.  Red is the only solution which avoids contradiction.   
Likewise, Oedipus’ “eureka” moment, which stands upon a mountain of 
questions and insights, is the product of nearly identical reasoning, which itself is the 
byproduct of Oedipus’ ontological capability of ascending to rational self-





which is empirical consciousness.   Although by no means fully explicit to him (for he 
never really attempts true self-appropriation) his reasoning runs like this: 
If…“I have killed a man (M)” and “that man is my father (F)” and “I have 
slept with a woman (W)” and “that woman is my mother (J)” and “I have 
scars on my ankles (A)”…then “the Delphic prophesy is correct (P)” and 
“I am the source of miasma (S)”   
 
          (M · F · W · J · A)  כ  P · S  
   (M · F · W · J · A)          
P · S                           
 
There are, of course, potential contradictions which Sophocles must deftly surmount 
in order to make the judgment “virtually unconditioned,” a necessity in order for 
Oedipus’ final insight to pack such a dramatic and definitive punch.  In the service of 
this punch, Oedipus’ ankle wounds, the drunken guest’s speech, the Corinthian 
shepherd’s pronouncement that Polybus and Merope are not, in fact, Oedipus’ 
biological parents all add additional conditions that reinforce the virtually 
unconditioned truth of the conclusion.  For example, Oedipus might be willing to 
affirm that he killed Laius (at the three roads) but refuse to believe Laius was his 
father, given the contradiction between the statements, “Laius is my father” and 
“Polybus is my father.”  To be told, therefore, “but Polybus and Merope are not your 
biological parents,” provided he believes it,102 makes it possible to fulfill what was 
thought to be an impossible condition.  Note that within this reasoning process the 
original question of the play, the mystery itself, “who is the land’s defiler?,” is only one 
condition in the full and complete judgment of “Oi! Oi! It all becomes clear.”  Oedipus 
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might, for example, affirm sexual relations with Jocasta but then deny that Jocasta is 
his mother.   
It is his ankle wounds (A) that become the key data required to link the present 
Oedipus with the past Oedipus and, by extension, the previous king, Laius, across 
time.  Note that this “linking” is clearly not a matter of mere ocular vision.  Oedipus’ 
ankle wounds, which he has seen his whole life as a matter of ocular vision and which, 
previously, he has uncritically dismissed – He tells us, “An old affliction; why speak of 
it now?” (1033) – become newly intelligible as they unite the two prophecies.  Were 
it not for the sense data of the wounds and the leap of insight, Oedipus would 
presumably be unable to link the image of the baby described in the testimony of the 
shepherd – “I found you in a tangled ravine on Mount Cithaeron” (1026) – with his 
present self as one identity over time.  As Lonergan would put it, Oedipus is an 
“intelligible unity, identity, whole” which intelligibly unifies different data at different 
times in insights.  Only now, through insight, do the ankle wounds become the 
“mediator, the hinge, the pivot.”  In fact, Oedipus’ insight in this moment is not unlike 
an insight we all have that is so common it often goes unnoticed: namely, the moment 
we reflect on a baby picture and connect the baby in the image with ourselves.  How 
do we do that, when the image in the photo, for all intents and purposes, looks nothing 
like us?   
The slow conception, gestation and parturition of “whole truth” in Oedipus’ 
consciousness illustrates Lonergan’s most famous claim that “genuine objectivity is 
the fruit of authentic subjectivity”103 which, for Oedipus, seems like a pyrrhic victory.  
                                                        





What better way to affirm this claim than by adverting to the way in which different 
aspects of the “whole truth” are, first, scattered about the consciousnesses of others 
in the play.  For example, the Theban shepherd knows that Oedipus has killed Laius 
but does not yet know that Oedipus is the same boy he handed away.  Conversely, The 
Corinthian messenger knows that Oedipus was the boy he was handed years ago but 
does not know he is also the man who killed Laius.  Jocasta soon understands that 
Oedipus is the infant she gave away years ago and is therefore guilty of incest but 
could not know that this man also killed her previous husband, Laius.   Now, through 
an interpersonal journey, in which these different fragments have been mined from 
the islands of individual consciousness where they were hidden, Oedipus is able to 
assemble them into a monument called “the whole truth.”   
And so, like Archimedes, while Oedipus might not be able to articulate at this 
juncture just what has occurred in his reflective insight without, as Lonergan says, 
“prolonged efforts at introspective analysis,” he nevertheless understands that this 
judgment is special – it meets a far higher standard than a “mere guess.”  We do not, 
after all, shout “Oi! Oi!,” on the heels of “mere guesses.”  Further, Oedipus’ need to be 
surer than a “mere guess” becomes ironic, especially when considered against other 
moments in the play in which he is so famously rash – in his suspicions of Tiresias and 
Creon, for example.  Here, in this climactic moment, Oedipus is neither rash nor swift 
(tachys), nor is he indecisive in judgment.  Perhaps this prudence is a function of his 
growing suspicion that now, it is his own fate on the line.  Grasping, for the first time, 





In fact, the entire enterprise of attempting to judge correctly whether you 
committed a crime in the past immediately points beyond a mere empirical 
verification criterion of meaning.  The past cannot be sensed but it can be judged.  
Oedipus ankle wounds are evidence that he might be the “same” infant Jocasta 
abandoned years ago but they are no confirmation.  If Oedipus had no wounds on his 
ankles, would this confirm he wasn’t the baby?  Do wounds on the ankles confirm it?  
Not necessarily.  Instead the judgment comes in a network – instead it is the 
intelligible unification of a number of pieces of sense (and non-sensible) data.  As 
Byrne notes, “Yet even when sensible data are found that meet the reflective criteria 
of fulfilling conditions, these are seldom the complete or sole set of conditions that 
must be fulfilled.”104  
We note that it is in this moment in the drama, because it is so well-executed, 
and, not coincidentally, loaded with questions, that we recognize, like Oedipus does, 
that there is no room for even hyperbolic doubt or paranoia.  Even David Hume would 
agree that Oedipus is the killer, despite the spatiotemporal distance between Oedipus 
the killer and Oedipus the Tyrannos.  Byrne writes, “When we know someone to be 
the same person, what is the same is the intelligible unification of those different 
sense data.  And the conditions that must be fulfilled to judge sameness of 
intelligibility are different from sameness of sensible data.”105  
There are obvious interpretive implications of this analysis.  For example, 
when the climax of the play is couched in terms of insight and virtually unconditioned 
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judgment, Oedipus’ decision to gouge out his eyes becomes yet another ironic 
moment of misdirected anger, not unlike the misdirected anger at Tiresias and Creon.  
Oedipus’ eyes are not the problem.  They work just fine.  In fact, they have performed 
their function admirably – ocular vision.  Nevertheless they become the scapegoat for 
Oedipus’ intellectual failure – the failure to grasp the now obvious point that ocular 
vision is not the whole of knowledge.  In fact, in the next section I will discuss the 
irony that Oedipus’ first decision (post insight) is the choice to harm his eyes, a fitting 
testament to his lack of discernment on the level of rational self-consciousness.  
We should note as well that Oedipus’ virtually unconditioned judgment that 
he is the land’s defiler is not the first time we have seen Oedipus’ intelligent 
consciousness enlarge into what we have described as rational self-consciousness.  
There are a few moments prior to this one, interpolated amidst what is primarily 
intelligent consciousness, which foreshadow the reasoning process Oedipus uses in 
his final judgment.     
Recall, for example, Oedipus’ initial hope in summoning the Theban herdsman 
earlier in the action of the play.  Oedipus hopes that the data the herdsman will 
provide will exonerate him: “I will await the herdsman;/He is now my only hope” 
(836-837).  When Jocasta inquires as to why the herdsman could possibly be a herald 
of hope, especially given the trajectory and import of the questioning, Oedipus 
reminds her of her own earlier statement, saying, “Let me tell you; if what he says 
agrees/With your story, then I will escape this crisis” (839-840).  Jocasta fails to 
understand the link between the premise (the conditions) and the conclusion (the 





say?”  Oedipus then offers the first instance of reasoning, the hallmark of rational 
consciousness.  His reasoning is rooted in a putative contradiction in number.   
He says, 
You said he explained how Laius was killed 
By several thieves.  If he still says thieves,  
Then I could not have killed him. 
How can one be the same as many? (Lines 842-845, my italics) 
 
Notice this final, italicized question.  While the question seems to be a question for 
intelligence (how), it is actually a question for judgment: one is the same as many, yes 
or no?  Or, is it possible for one to be “the same” as many?  In Lonergan’s terms, this 
question is illustrative of Oedipus’ transition from questioner to reasoner, from 
intelligent consciousness to rational consciousness.  His ascent parallels the soul’s 
ascent as it moves from pistis to dianoia in Plato’s divided line.  In Book VII of The 
Republic, for example, Socrates discusses what he calls “summoners,” using the 
relations of fingers on the hand.   
The ones that don’t summon the intellect are all those that don’t at the 
same time go over to the opposite sensation.  But the ones that do go 
over I class among those that summon the intellect, when the sensation 
doesn’t reveal one thing any more than its opposite, regardless of 
whether the object strikes the senses from near or far off.106  
 
A “summoner” (παρακαλοȗντα), in Socrates’ use of the word, is a perception that 
“summons” the intellect.  As Miriam Byrd has noted, “One is summoned when the soul, 
content with its acceptance of sense perception as representative of reality, is 
confronted by a perception which appears to have contradictory qualities.” 107  
                                                        
106 Plato, The Republic. (trans. Alan Bloom). (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 






Socrates then launches into an extended discussion of “calculation” (λογισμόν) and 
the calculative powers of the soul, as opposed to the sensitive or affective.   
Likewise, for Oedipus, immanent in his cognitional structure is the desire to 
reconcile the contradiction between two mutually exclusive perceptions – in this case, 
one thief or many thieves but not (simultaneously) both.  The insights Oedipus has 
accumulated thus far, through the self-correcting process of learning, have disclosed 
a potential contradiction which cannot stand and so he must question the very 
groundwork of the two imagined scenes and their apparent mutual exclusivity.  Laius 
was either murdered by multiple men or one but not both: Either M or O.  Oedipus, in 
other words, ascends to logical relations to reconcile the problem, beyond the world 
of sense.  In Platonic terms, as Miriam Byrd notes, “The soul realizes that sense 
perception is no longer deemed adequate to understanding the world, and it is 
provoked to use thought, appealing to intelligible entities in order to solve the puzzle 
(524d–e). This leads the soul from pistis to dianoia.”108   
We should note also the heavy irony that Oedipus’ attempt at reasoning here 
is not even the first time in the play he has questioned a putative contradiction in 
number.  Earlier, when Oedipus inquired of Creon about the fate of the herdsman, 
Creon tells Oedipus that “he said he saw only one thing for certain” (119).  Oedipus 
immediately believes this may be the source of hope, asking, intelligently, “What was 
that? One thing could reveal much more/Hope can spring from such a small 
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beginning” (120-121).  Creon then explicitly states the key premise from which 
Oedipus deduces his hope.  Creon says, quite authoritatively, “A pack of thieves killed 
him in ambush;/Not one man alone, but many” (122-123, my italics).  Yet Oedipus, in 
what is often cited in the secondary literature as a subconscious slip, changes the 
plural to a singular: “How could a thief dare to do such a thing/Unless he had been 
paid off by someone here?” (124-125, my italics).  Similarly, when Creon earlier 
explains that the cause of miasma is “murder,” Oedipus replies by rushing, without 
evidence, to a singular murderer, asking, “who is this man?”  Yet Creon proceeds to 
inject the first misdirected image, saying, “[Laius] is dead, and the command is clear: 
Punish the killers by force” (my italics).109 
Still later in the play, Oedipus uses a similar reasoning process when he is 
informed of his adoptive father Polybus’ death.  In this later scene, the accepted 
premise is: Polybus is Oedipus’ father.  Oedipus, of course, is worried he has killed his 
father.  But Polybus has just died.  The key, from Oedipus’ perspective, is to 
demonstrate that if Polybus died by some other manner than by Oedipus’ own hand, 
it cannot be literally true that he killed his father.  This would be an obvious 
contradiction.  The tragedy is amplified as we watch Oedipus infer a correct 
conclusion from an untrue premise.  And so Oedipus says,  
Why?  Why, dear wife, should we observe the oracle 
At Delphi, or strain to see signs from birds screeching 
                                                        
109 We cannot help but wonder, here, why Creon says “killers” in the plural?  Is 
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clarify the issue?  “Wait,” Oedipus might have said.  “Are we looking for one man or 
many here?  What’s the deal?  Let’s get the basic facts clear.”  His ultimate failure to 
demand clarification mirrors, as I will argue in a later section, his failure to demand 





In the sky?  They led me to believe that I would kill 
My father, yet he’s dead and buried deep in the earth. 
And here am I, who never raised a hand against him, 
Unless my absence made him die brokenhearted. 
Then, I suppose, I could be called his killer, 
But not the kind contained within these worthless oracles. 
Polybus has taken those with him to Hades. (Lines 964-972) 
 
Oedipus’ reasoning is again tied to what seems to be a contradiction in two mutually 
exclusive perceptions.  The formal logic, underneath its more rhetorical formulation, 
might be expressed in two syllogisms in modus ponens in which the conclusion of the 
first becomes the minor premise of the second: “If my father died of natural causes, 
then I did not kill my father.  My father died of natural causes.  Therefore, I did not kill 
my father.  If I did not kill my father, then the oracle is wrong.  I did not kill my father.  
Therefore, the oracle is wrong.”  Obviously this impressive chain of deductive 
inference is valid but not sound, since it is contingent on the truth of the (false) 
proposition, “Polybus is my father.”  
The marital exchange that follows on the heels of Oedipus’ extended use of 
reasoning is provocative.  Jocasta uses the speech above to confirm her initial belief, 
totally devoid of reasoning, that Oedipus had nothing to fear in the first place.  She 
says: “Exactly what I said in the beginning” (Line 973) to which Oedipus replies, “You 
did, but fear misguided me” (Line 974).  We take from this statement that Oedipus 
believes his affective self has been running interference with his reasoning.  Yet, in an 
ironic reversal, Oedipus’ affective response here (his latent fears) seems, 
unbeknownst to him, to have a better purchase on the truth than does his reasoning.  





“reasoning” is not really reasoning after all. This is a topic to which I return in Chapter 
Two. 
Nevertheless, in spite of an obvious unease in his affective self, Oedipus now 
cites fresh data (Polybus’ death) as confirmation of a latent suspicion that Delphi is a 
sham, in spite of the earlier recollection of the rumor of his adoption.  Here we must 
unearth a few layers of irony.  Oedipus is a man revered for his “judgment” – recall, 
the old supplicant says, “you understand what to do at such times/that is clear; all of 
us trust your judgment.”  Yet one of his first “insights” in the opening of the play – 
after apparently many “sleepless nights” – is to defer to the very Oracle he now 
suspects as quackery. Like Socrates’ quest in The Apology, Oedipus’ deference to the 
wisdom of Delphi, “the will of the gods,” only initiates an ironic quest to deny them.   
Further, Oedipus’ reasoning here, if correct, would have Delphi exposed once 
and for all as a sham, a major coup for his Theban community.  As Bernard Knox notes, 
the veracity of prophecy and even prophecy as a legitimate art was an intellectual 
battleground in 5th century Athens.  Knox points out that “Athens during the 
Peloponnesian War was plagued with degenerate exponents of the prophetic art, men 
who were in the business for money and who carefully shaped their prophecies to fit 
the desires of their customers.”110  He then cautions, however, that “to deduce from 
the demonstrable bad faith of charlatans the falsity of prophecy as a whole was a 
further step which few were willing to take, for the truth of divine prophecy was a 
                                                        





fundamental assumption of that combination of ritual cult and heroic literature which 
served the Greeks as religion.”111  
Now, it would be one thing if Oedipus’ speech above were directed specifically 
at Tiresias, like his earlier speech, in which Oedipus might very well be indicting 
“degenerate…charlatans.”  But it seems clear here that his indictment is precisely the 
stronger claim to which Knox alludes: “the falsity of prophecy as a whole.”  Oedipus 
asks, “Why, dear wife, should we observe the oracle/At Delphi, or strain to see signs 
from birds screeching/In the sky.”  This is, instead, a judgment about the fundamental 
pragmatic value of religion, the “validity of the whole traditional religious 
worldview.”112   
For a brief time, reasoning, rooted in the calculative power of the soul (Plato) 
or the rational consciousness (Lonergan) has won the day against the mysterious, 
archaic forces of a worldview (fatalism) that was still strong but in danger of growing 
stale.  And yet this moment is fleeting.  Oedipus discovers that his reasoning was not 
reasoning at all.  Almost paradoxically, reason, if correctly used, would only have 
validated and grounded prophecy.   
Ultimately, this paradox is precisely what obtains.  Oedipus’ reasoning does 
grasp “the whole truth” in this moment of insight and judgment and Oedipus 
experiences what Lonergan calls “intentional self-transcendence.”  Oedipus’ virtually 
unconditioned judgment takes him “beyond” what “seems” to be the case to “what is.”  
In other words, he has reached objectivity (“what is”) through what Lonergan calls 
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“authentic subjectivity,” the tireless questioning process even at the risk of his own 
peril and discomfort.   And “what is” is precisely what prophecy said it would be. 
 
The Aftermath: Trading Self-Transcendence for Self-Harm 
 
We have finally arrived at the point in Oedipus Tyrannus wherein we find 
Oedipus’ consciousness in full possession of the horrifying truth of his identity.  
Oedipus has completed “the slow and laborious process of conception, gestation, 
parturition.”113 To continue with Lonergan’s taxonomy, Oedipus is on the verge of yet 
another “enlargement of consciousness,” from rational consciousness to rational self-
consciousness, the “highest” level in the self-correcting cycle of learning (see diagram 
below).  
Recall that Oedipus has made virtually unconditioned judgments of fact; but 
he must now make virtually unconditioned judgments of value.  He must make 
decisions.   Yes, the detective has his man.  But what should he do with him? That the 




                                                        





When Oedipus retreats inside his palace at line 1185, after his infamous 
insight on line 1182, he “sees” the whole situation so clearly (“Oh! Oh! It all comes 
clear!”), that he will now choose to blind himself in a vain (and undiscerning) attempt 
to un-see it.  We must recall what it really means to say that he “sees” the whole 
situation clearly. Thus far we have used the strategy of replacing the verb “to see” 
with the verb “to understand.”  Now, however, in addition to his insight, Oedipus has 
made a virtually unconditioned judgment.  He not only “understands,” he “knows.”  
He has transcended ocular vision – the world of sense appearances – to understand 
and to know the truth of his identity and, as a corollary, the falsity of his previous 
identity.   We may now replace the verb “to see” with “to understand and to know.”  
Oedipus’ self-blinding, therefore, is not only an attempt to un-see the horror; it is an 
attempt to un-understand and to unknow what cannot be un-understood or un-
known.    
The decision to self-blind is a fruitless and ineffective one of course for, as 
Lonergan points out, once achieved, insight passes into “the habitual texture of the 
mind.”  Oedipus seems to immediately recognize this attribute of insight, crying, 
“Inescapable, unspeakable!/Ohhh!/Again and again, so much agony!/Memories 
stabbing, piercing me with pain!” (1315-1318)   
Given this inescapable understanding and, now, this inescapable knowledge, 
Oedipus finds himself poised to actualize potential self-transcendence.  This 
transcendence is a potential because, as Lonergan says, “ontologically the subject [in 
this case, Oedipus] is capable of an intentional self-transcendence, of going beyond 





utterly different, to what is so.”114  And yet, while I have demonstrated in previous 
sections the various “enlargements” of Oedipus’ consciousness which he effectively 
actualizes, at this point in the self-correcting cycle, Oedipus fails, and the enlargement 
remains in potentia.   
Instead, as I will now endeavor to show, Oedipus’ development remains 
arrested, in a static state of undistorted affectivity that will make moral conversion 
impossible.  The play ends with Oedipus hovering in a liminal state, somewhere 
between rational consciousness and rational self-consciousness.  He makes decisions, 
yes, but they spring from a distorted affective self and, as such, are arguably not 
decisions at all.  I would add that the liminal position in which Oedipus finds himself 
at the end of the play becomes further confirmation of McCoy’s claim that, “Sophocles 
does not reject the rational in favor of a tragic vision that is anti-rational or non-
rational; rather, the rational itself includes an affective element.”115   
These final scenes consist, for the most part, of the Messenger’s secondhand 
report of Oedipus’ eye-gouging followed by a dramatic exchange between Oedipus 
and Creon which begins on line 1419 and runs to the last line of the play.  Both 
moments give us good reason to think that despite his questioning and famous insight 
(1182), Oedipus’ questions cease, and he fails to achieve self-transcendence.  In fact, 
despite superficial or outward changes post-insight (his loss of the throne, Jocasta’s 
suicide, his eye-gouging, his reunion with his daughters, his eventual exile), Oedipus’ 
final moments upon the stage betoken an obstinacy in character that endures into and 
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throughout Oedipus Colonus, as he fails throughout the course of that play to ask those 
additional questions which might lead to new insights and, ultimately, moral 
conversion.  The final few scenes of Oedipus Tyrannus merely foreshadow the way in 
which, for Oedipus, old biases die hard, and will continue to die hard in “Colonus.”  My 
reading concurs with the viewpoint Paul Davies proposes in “The End of Sophocles’ 
O.T.”: 
At the end of the play Oedipus is no wiser than Ajax is in his play as to 
his true position as a mortal within a universe made and controlled by 
the gods.  He has learned nothing, I repeat, except some purely factual 
information as to the identity of his mother and father.  To an intelligent 
member of the chorus or the audience, as to a Creon or an Odysseus, 
this factual information would be the starting point for a series of 
profound insights and illuminations regarding the limits of man’s place 
in the world.  It has to be said that the play itself gives us no grounds 
whatsoever for attributing any such illumination to Oedipus.116 
 
It is important to recognize here that analyzing Oedipus’ character in terms of 
how closely he approximates authenticity does not amount to some paternalistic 
demand that Sophocles ought to have crafted Oedipus as some sort of moral 
exemplar.  As Dodds notes, “for neither here nor anywhere else did Sophocles portray 
that insipid and unlikely character, the man of perfect virtue.” 117    This “insipid 
character” is unrealistic and Lonergan seems to concur with his unlikeliness, saying, 
“human authenticity never is some pure and serene and secure possession.”118   As 
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cliché as it may sound, authenticity is a journey, not a destination.  But it does not 
follow from this that Sophocles is somehow averse to encouraging us to entertain 
alternative visions of human behavior in comparison with that which he has 
presented.  In other words, if a tragedian depicts a character with failings and 
vulnerabilities, which Oedipus clearly has, it seems quite legitimate enterprise 
(beyond my primary goal of merely elucidating Lonergan’s thought) to offer an 
implicit standard from which those failings and vulnerabilities depart. 
Therefore, to measure the failure of Oedipus’ self-transcendence in Lonergan’s 
terms, we must assess the level to which Oedipus becomes willing to withdraw from 
unauthenticity and eliminate oversights and misunderstandings.  If transcendence 
involves a change, a “going beyond” some previous state, it follows that if we can show 
that a character has not changed from where he began, no transcendence will have 
occurred.  In an essay called “Faith and Beliefs,” Lonergan writes: 
Self-transcendence involves a tension between the self as transcending 
and the self as transcended.  It follows that human authenticity never 
is some pure and serene and secure possession.  It is ever a withdrawal 
from unauthenticity, and every successful withdrawal only brings to 
light the need for still further withdrawals.   Our advance in 
understanding is also the elimination of oversights and 
misunderstandings.  Our advance in truth is also the correction of 
mistakes and errors.119 
 
While it is true that Oedipus strives over the course of the play to eliminate 
oversights and misunderstandings, the striving stalls, as Oedipus enters the arena of 
action and decision with its attendant feelings and judgments of value (rational self-
consciousness).  Over the next few pages I devote some time treating these decisions 
                                                        





post-insight, paying close attention to Oedipus’ feelings as intermediary between 
judgments of fact and judgments of value.  My analysis will follow closely Patrick H. 
Byrne’s The Ethics of Discernment, an important text on Lonergan’s thought which 
offers, in Byrne’s words, a “plausible synthesis, that pulls together various sources 
into an integrated account of what I will call ‘the structure of ethical 
intentionality’.”120    I should add as a minor caveat that my analysis will capture 
neither the full breadth and scope of Lonergan’s thoughts on feelings and values, nor 
the breadth and scope of Byrne’s text.  Interested readers on this specific topic are 
encouraged to consult those excellent texts. 
 
“Oh! Oh! It all comes clear!”: Now What Should I Do? 
 
We may begin by pointing out that, for Lonergan, just as there are virtually 
unconditioned judgments in matters of fact (rational consciousness), there are also 
virtually unconditioned judgments of value (rational self-consciousness).  And yet 
between these two levels of consciousness is, to use Byrne’s phrase, “a fertile field” of 
feelings.  In what Byrne describes as a “cryptic remark,”121 Lonergan once wrote, 
“Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value lie apprehensions 
of value.  Such apprehensions are given in feelings.”122   
A brief discussion of Oedipus’ horizon of feelings makes sense at this juncture.  
In fact, a reader may fairly object that, until now, I have neglected the way in which 
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Oedipus’ feelings are integrated in the dynamism of cognitional structure.  Although 
I will discuss fears and anxieties in my discussion of dramatic bias in Chapter Two, 
the previous pages have run the risk of over-intellectualizing a drama that orbits 
around our affective hopes and fears, oscillating between jubilation and anxiety and 
then, finally, horror.  I have risked reducing Oedipus to a sort of human calculator 
when he is, after all, embodied and, in virtue of being embodied, comes equipped with 
an entire “affective” dimension.  The phenomenon of embodiment, especially given 
the body’s infirmities (blindness, ankle wounds, etc.), as one questions, judges and 
chooses, is clearly a significant theme throughout the play.  Further, in a simpler 
sense, feelings are just a basic and pervasive phenomenon in our lives and to neglect 
them would leave any analysis incomplete.  As Byrne notes, Lonergan used to say that 
“feelings are the mass and momentum of human living.”123  
Typically, as the diagram above indicates, after insight and judgment in 
matters of fact, an agent’s consciousness becomes sublated into the structure of 
ethical intentionality.  This sublation occurs the moment an agent says, “Okay.  I 
understand and know the situation.  Now, what should I do?”  The agent, in other 
words, begins to ask questions of value, questions which, in Byrne’s words, intend 
“practical insights into possible courses of action.”124  In other words, just as the goal 
of questions for intelligence and judgment was to grasp understanding and a virtually 
unconditioned judgment of fact, the goal of questions of value is to “grasp of virtually 
unconditioned value” until, ultimately, a judgment can be made about that value in a 
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decision.  The action that is the result of the decision will implement the value.  Byrne 
distills the equation in the following form: “‘Intelligible, possible course of action I has 
a value V,’ where I is supplied by a practical insight and V is supplied by a person’s 
horizon of feelings.”125  Linguistically, the link between feeling and value is obvious 
enough.  We hear people say, for example, “I feel education is key to a healthy 
community.”  This feeling is an anticipation of the forthcoming judgment of value that 
education is actually valuable and that we should implement that value in various 
real-world policy decisions.   
Byrne uses the illuminating example of Elizabeth Bennet from Jane Austen’s 
Pride and Prejudice to effectively illustrate the tension between competing values vis-
à-vis feelings.  As Byrne writes, Elizabeth’s “feelings for pleasure and security were 
felt as of considerably less value than her feelings about her personal integrity and 
her feelings about the character of other people.”126  
 We might, by way of comparison, use Daisy Buchanan from Fitzgerald’s The 
Great Gatsby to illustrate a character whose feelings anticipate opposite values.  Daisy 
Buchanan’s fears make the feeling of security of considerably more value than her 
feelings of love for Jay Gatsby.   In the end of the novel, to the chagrin of many readers, 
Daisy chooses to stay with Tom Buchanan, despite his boorishness and manifest 
flaws, causing many readers to question Daisy’s judgment and, as such, her character.   
In fact, it is Gatsby’s belief that Daisy will choose him simply because he has wealth 
that belies Gatsby’s own misjudgment of Daisy’s values.  The famous scene at the 
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Plaza hotel showcases this misjudgment, as Fitzgerald describes Daisy stuck in the 
middle of Tom and Gatsby but, as the truth of Gatsby’s identity becomes, like with 
Oedipus, clearer and clearer to her in the form of a virtually unconditioned judgment 
(rational consciousness), she begins to pull away in fear.  Daisy’s growing fears, now 
that the material facts are clear, anticipate her forthcoming judgment of value that, as 
Fitzgerald will write, the “dream is dead,” and that life with Gatsby will be untenable, 
despite their love.  Thus, she decides to implement her value by staying with Tom. 
“That drug store business was just small change,” continued 
Tom slowly, “but you’ve got something on now that Walter’s afraid to 
tell me about.” 
I glanced at Daisy who was staring terrified between Gatsby and 
her husband and at Jordan who had begun to balance an invisible but 
absorbing object on the tip of her chin.  Then I turned back to Gatsby – 
and was startled at his expression.  He looked – and this is said in all 
contempt for the babbled slander of his garden – as if he had ‘killed a 
man.’ For a moment the set of his face could be described in just that 
fantastic way. 
It passed, and he began to talk excitedly to Daisy, denying 
everything, defending his name against accusations that had not been 
made.  But with every word she was drawing further and further into 
herself, so he gave up and only the dead dream fought on as the 
afternoon slipped away, trying to touch what was no longer tangible, 
struggling unhappily, undespairingly, toward that lost voice across the 
room.127  
  
Returning to Oedipus, of significance is the way in which a man who has 
established himself as a vociferous questioner despite his fears (in the first 4/5’s of 
the play), and a man who, for right or wrong, has a reputation for wisdom, asks no 
questions of value after the material facts have been clarified, understood and known.  
In other words, conspicuously absent in Oedipus’ cognitional structure is an “ethics 
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of discernment.”  There are no, “so what should I do?” questions.  We might, for 
example, see him consider, at least verbally in a speech, whether his feelings toward 
the relative disvalue of his eyes is worth destroying them.   
Recall the scene of Oedipus’ eye-gouging.  Sophocles recruits the character of 
a messenger to deliver the news of the bloody aftermath of Oedipus’ insight, a 
common technique in Greek theater.  After the truth is out in the light of clarity 
(σαφής), both Oedipus and Jocasta retreat from it, taking refuge in the dark palace, 
out of the public spotlight.  From one perspective, the interior of the palace might be 
a place where cooler heads prevail, a place where discernment might win the day.  
From another perspective, Jocasta and Oedipus have retreated to a den of affective 
dimensions, the place where their marriage was consummated and which is now 
befouled, desecrated.  Both resort to self-harm in fits of emotion.  The messenger 
describes the scene to the chorus and the audience: 
 
She was hanging there, his wife.  We saw her 
Hanging in a noose of braided rope. 
Then he saw her.  He howled in misery, 
Loosened the hanging rope, and laid her down 
On the ground, poor woman. 
Then a horrible sight: he tore out the long pins 
Of beaten gold that adorned her clothes, 
Lifted them up, and plunged them into his eyes, 
Crying out, “Now you may not see the evil, 
Not the evil I have done – or suffered. 
From now on, you must gaze in darkness 
On forbidden faces, while the ones you should have seen 
You’ll never know.”  That was his litany. 
Again and again he chanted it and struck his eyes. 
Blood was running down from the sockets, 
Staining his cheeks red, an unstoppable flood 






On the heels of the messenger’s morbid news, Oedipus appears through the 
great palace doors, back on stage and in the public eye, so that his hideous and 
gruesome visage is visible to both chorus and audience.  As Woodruff points out, “the 
actor playing Oedipus may have changed his mask while off-stage, or the blinding may 
have been depicted on his existing mask with the addition of red paint or of ribbons 
representing blood.”128  The choice to self-blind with Jocasta’s dress pins is an obvious 
reference to the other wounds on Oedipus’ body: the scars on his ankles, also the 
result of pins (pinions) thrust into him in what was no doubt a fit of his parents’ 
emotion.  Might we relate the two acts as the capricious actions of unintelligent 
procedure?  Like parents, like son?  Might this action be construed as another tragic 
breakdown, an opportunity for authentic growth and self-transcendence gone sour?   
In one sense, Sophocles has saved us from a good amount of analysis here.  We 
could be assessing the anticipatory feelings and fine ethical distinctions and nuanced 
questions of value Oedipus considers within the palace, not unlike a Hamlet or a 
Macbeth, but we cannot: because Oedipus does not make them.  Instead, he says very 
little and, when all is boiled down, makes only two decisions post insight: one is a 
decision to gouge out his eyes.  He explicitly cites this decision as a free choice, saying, 
“But I did this…By my own hand” (1333-1335).   And the second decision is more of a 
choice to inaction or passivity, opting not to challenge or question his own fidelity to 
the oracle’s fiat to “punish the killers by force,” (107) which Oedipus earlier took as 
his own “obligation to the dead” (134) for “driving out this infection” (138).  Yet now, 
with the situation clarified, he never once asks questions of value regarding whether 
                                                        





these statements should be reconsidered or amended given the potentially mitigating 
data of his acting in ignorance or the equally mitigating data that his present 
predicament is the result of his own parents attempting to kill him.    
Of utmost importance here is that this final section of the play, from the 5th 
Chorus (Fourth Stasimon) to the final line, is contingent upon the clarification 
(σαφής) of the concrete situation that Oedipus describes in his moment of insight.  
Now that the material facts are understood by all actors on the stage in insight 
(intelligent consciousness) and known in judgment (rational consciousness), the 
entire landscape, Thebes, the world, has darkened.  Even the chorus’ feelings toward 
the universe have changed.  It is no longer friendly, but unfriendly.  They lament, 
famously,  
Oh, what a wretched breed we mortals are:  
our lives add up to nothing.   
Does anyone, anyone at all  
harvest more of happiness than a vacant image,  
And from that image fall away?   
You are my pattern, your fortune is mine,  
You, Oedipus, your misery teaches me to call no mortal blessed (1186 – 1196).  
 
That Oedipus’ overreactions and rash decisions ironically come upon the heels 
of clarification is nothing new.  Recall that in the first scene of the play, when Creon 
returns with counsel from Delphi, Oedipus asks a question for intelligence (how) 
regarding how to deal with the situation.  Creon’s response is emphatic: “The purge 
is banishment, or else death for death” (100).  Six lines later, Creon reiterates the 





109).129  Note again a reference to “clarity” (σαφῶς); the implication is that anyone 
who misinterprets this fiat would miss something that was clearly stated – in other 
words, an unclear thinker.   
Yet a few scenes later, in a questionless speech, Oedipus seems to go well 
beyond the scope of the Delphic proclamation, making decisions that lack 
discernment about scales of value.  He says, “I forbid any inhabitant of the 
land/Where I hold the seat of power/To share the sacred or hold sacrifice,/Or to 
sprinkle the water of holy rites/Banish him, shun him from your homes./This is the 
man who has plagued us” (236-243).  Then, later, he adds, unequivocally, “I damn the 
killer, whoever he may be,/An unknown man, or one of many./May he suffer and die, 
pain beyond pain./I damn myself, if I should come to know/That he shares my hearth 
and home” (246-250).  These claims seem illustrative of man who has taken a “clear 
command” and interpreted it in a disproportional way, not unlike a man failing to 
recognize his measurements are the byproduct of a parallax view. 
McCoy concurs.  After pointing out Oedipus’ first mistake, that of conceiving of 
“justice and injustice as morally absolute categories in a world in which such 
categories do not always neatly apply,” she adds that,  
A second failing might be found in Oedipus’ harshness with the one that 
has killed the king, for his vows to exclude the man entirely from 
society are extreme. He declares that the polluted one may not reside 
in his land; is not to be welcomed by any in the land, not even greeted 
by its citizens; excluded from worship and even excluded from the 
hospitality of water to wash his hands (236–42). Exile alone was an 
appropriate ritual response to pollution, but Oedipus lays these 
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additional conditions of refusing water or even a simple greeting to the 
polluted man. If Oedipus had imagined himself as the criminal, would 
he not have considered the possibility that such additional demands 
are beyond the requirements of purification?130 
 
Now, at the close of the play, we find something similar going on.  The 
clarification of the material facts has changed Oedipus’ horizon of feelings; but his 
feelings change in an extreme, disproportional, confused and, at times, contradictory 
way.  Most obviously, Oedipus now has feelings of hostility and anger toward his eyes 
and, failing to discern whether those feelings spring from a distorted affective self, 
makes a negative judgment about their value, shouting at them, “Now you may never 
see the evil/Not the evil I have done – or suffered./From now on, you must gaze in 
darkness/On forbidden faces, while the ones you should have seen/You’ll never 
know” (1271-1275).  He then implements the disvalue of his eyes by destroying them. 
 Obviously, to a person engaged in the questioning structure of ethical 
objectivity, there would emerge better, more appropriate ways to deal with such a 
horror.  The chorus recognizes Oedipus’ affective distortion, saying,  
Amazing horror! 
Nothing worse can come upon a man. 
Was it madness that struck your mind? (1297-1299)  
 
The chorus then challenges the wisdom of the decision: “I can’t agree with 
what you did: Better to die than to be blind” (1367-68).  Oedipus then replies with a 
telling statement that seems inconsistent with self-transcendence or a newfound self-
appropriation, saying, “Don’t tell me that what I did was not for the best.  I do not want 
opinions, I do not need advice” (1369-70).  This statement is yet again indicative of a 
                                                        





man who has not learned much over a drama which has consisted of others teaching 
him things he did not know.  One would think that at this point, Oedipus would be 
more amenable to advice.   
Instead of recognizing here, in an intersubjective way, that the insights of 
others (the Chorus) can communicate valuable data about our own missteps, Oedipus 
doubles down on his capricious choice, telling them that if he could gouge out his ears, 
he’d do that too: “If I only I could stem the stream of sound,/Then I’d shut away my 
broken body/Hearing silence, seeing nothing:/Sweet oblivion, where the 
mind/Exists beyond the bounds of grief” (1386 – 1390).131  Oedipus seems to be 
fantasizing here of a consciousness with no sense modalities to pollute it.  And yet, he 
also recognizes that this type of consciousness would still not escape the memories, 
saying, “Inescapble, unspeakable!/Ohhh!/Again and again, so much 
agony!/Memories stabbing, piercing me with pain!” (1315-1318).   
The Chorus calls attention to this contradiction, replying, “Do not be amazed: 
Your agony’s so great,/You feel it twice, first in body, then in soul” (1319-1320).  The 
chorus, in contrast to Oedipus, seems hyper-aware of the futility of attempting to deny 
understanding and knowledge by destroying the sense modalities, seemingly 
recognizing the greater philosophic point we have made throughout this chapter that 
insight is not a matter of ocular vision and that, as Lonergan has said, “What is obvious 
in knowing is, indeed, looking.  Compared to looking, insight is obscure, and the grasp 
of the unconditioned is doubly obscure.  But empiricism amounts to the assumption 
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that what is obvious in knowing is what knowing obviously is.”132   Oedipus continues 
to make this error.   
Meanwhile, in a surprising twist perhaps, Oedipus’ feelings of love for his 
daughters only seem to strengthen in the light of clarification of material facts.  
Oedipus’ feelings of love anticipate the judgment that his daughters are valuable to 
him, a theme which will be developed in Colonus.  And yet we might have predicted, 
for example, after seeing what he does to his eyes, that his daughters would face a 
similar fate, at the hands of his sword, perhaps.  Recall that when Oedipus enters the 
palace after his insight, his feelings toward Jocasta change in the light of clarification.  
He shouts, “Bring my sword./And where’s my wife – no, not my wife,/Mother of two 
crops, myself and my children” (1255-1257).  In one sense it would be more 
consistent for Oedipus to harbor new feelings of hostility toward his daughters now 
that he knows and understands that they are the byproduct of ugliness, an incestuous 
union. Instead, he demonstrates heightened feelings of love for them.   
Ironically, despite his feelings of hostility toward the senses of sight and 
hearing, he quickly touts the power of the sense of touch with his daughters, saying, 
“If only I could hold them one last time” (1466).  Then, in another moment of 
contradiction, he touts the very sense of hearing he previously asked to be destroyed, 
saying, “What’s this?/I can hear them, yes, by all the gods, my darlings!/They’re 
crying, crying…Creon, you took pity, You sent me what I love more than 
anything…anything” (1471-1474). 
                                                        





The second choice Oedipus makes (again, without an ethics of discernment) is 
to remain in fidelity to his and the oracle’s command to “punish the killers by force.”   
Oedipus finds himself in the ironic situation of being subject to his own harsh decree 
which, in keeping with the play’s thematic concerns, was levied with incomplete 
information.  He immediately asks his fellow Thebans to “cast me out this place, my 
friends,/Quickly, cast me out:/I am the destroyer, the curse,/The man the gods loathe 
most of all” (1340 - 1346).  On the one hand, we feel a certain admiration for Oedipus, 
for choosing to remain faithful to the fiat despite the intervening data.  On the other 
hand, remaining in fidelity to that decree, despite the data, seems obstinate, 
imperious and narrowminded, betokening a failure of self-transcendence. 
So, what are we to make of the fact that Oedipus asks no questions of value 
about the punishment?  At no point, for example, does he ask the questions, “should 
we proceed?  Should we stick to the command?”   Further, what are we to make of the 
fact that Oedipus makes no attempt to exculpate himself from the crime, or, at the 
very least, contextualize the crime to mitigate the punishment?  Clearly, when 
Oedipus accepts Delphi’s initial suggestion to “punish by force,” the assumption is that 
Thebes will be dealing with a premeditated murder or, at least, a brutal regicide.  The 
entire Theban community now understands and knows that this is not the case.  In 
other words, the situation is far more complex than initially thought.  Recall McCoy’s 
earlier claim that Oedipus thinks in “morally absolute categories in a world in which 
such categories do not always neatly apply.” 
Freud famously argued that the conspicuous absence of any prolonged 





facie evidence of Oedipus’ inner conviction of his own guilt over acting out his two 
primal subconscious desires – the desires to kill the father and sleep with the mother.  
Freud writes, “The hero makes no attempt to exculpate himself by appealing to the 
artificial expedient of the compulsion of destiny.  His crime is acknowledged and 
punished as though it were fully conscious – which is bound to appear unjust to our 
reason, but which psychologically is perfectly correct.”133   
An alternative viewpoint, and a simpler one (insofar as it does not recruit 
empirically unverifiable subconscious drives), is merely that Oedipus has a distortion 
somewhere in the cognitional cycle that precluded (until 1182) certain images from 
consciousness that would have elicited insights.  This preclusion (or bias) continues 
now, as he fails to ask questions about his present predicament that would lead to 
insights and judgments of value and reorient his older position which is now 
antiquated.  After all, we must not overlook the fact that Oedipus not only has the 
insight and judgment that he is the killer, he has also had a more general insight (a 
meta-insight) into what understanding actually is.  In other words, in addition to his 
insight about his own identity, Oedipus also grasps for the first time that, as Byrne 
noted previously, “seeing is not the way we become conscious of the answer to a 
question.”  In one sense, this meta-insight is more powerful than the specific insight 
that he is the defiler.  It is a bad enough to be an incestuous parricide but worse may 
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be Oedipus’ newfound understanding that he never even knew what it was to know, 
never understood what it was to understand, never judged what a judgment actually 
is.  Not only is his personal identity crumbling, his identity as a knower – and 
therefore as a reasoner and judger – is crumbling.  This meta-insight should have 
disclosed the irony to Oedipus that his decisions to gouge out his eyes and remain in 
fidelity to his earlier fiat are just more instances of unquestioning obstinacy.   
Oedipus’ imperiousness continues when, on 1381, he demands again, and as if 
he were still the king, that the people of Thebes implement his proclamation, 
shouting, “I gave the order: Cast out the curse!” (1381).  The chorus is hesitant.  
Oedipus asks no questions about their hesitancy and, a few lines later, he demands it 
again, “By all the gods, you must let me hide away, Cast me into the sea, kill me, shun 
me from sight” (1411).  And then later, “Cast me out, quick as you can, to a 
place/Where I will never speak to another human” (1436). 
At this point Creon replies, from a far more circumspect and discerning stance, 
that he needs to see what the gods want him to do, to which Oedipus, bound to the 
earlier proclamation: “But that is clear, it was ordained: The father-killer is defiled 
and so must die” (1441).  Creon says “we need to be sure” and then, “Yes, and this 
time you should believe the god.”  Oedipus then expresses his profound worry over 
the familial disgrace he has bestowed upon his daughters ironically exhorting them, 
“Pray that you always lead measured lives./Better lives than lived by your own 
father.”  Then, Oedipus’ imperious returns again, as he dictates to Creon, again as if 





Oedipus, in other words, misses an opportunity for genuine growth. He stands 
on the cusp of self-transcendence insofar as he has learned two key things: 1.) he 
understands who he really is in terms of the truth of his birth and 2.) he understands 
what understanding really is.  This dual-insight places him in an excellent position to 
make far more discerning choices.  Instead, Oedipus christens this newfound identity 
with a rash, imperious and violent choice to mutilate himself (a fitting tribute to his 
wife’s rash, imperious and violent choice to hang herself) and then, after the self-harm 
is inflicted, he opts to sacrifice the welfare of his children on the altar of an uncritical 
fidelity to his earlier hope for the killer, “May he suffer and die, pain beyond pain.”  In 
other words, Oedipus’ moment of potential self-transcendence recedes away from 
him the moment he reaches it and he abandons the pursuit.  He does not ascend to 
rational self-consciousness to ask those pertinent questions about what should be 
done. 
 
Concluding Thoughts: Oedipus’ Imperiousness (Anticipating Bias) 
 
Oedipus’ abandonment of these further pertinent questions leaves us to infer 
that aside from learning the identity of the killer, Oedipus has learned nothing else of 
substance.  To further validate the claim that Oedipus’ consciousness fails to reach 
Lonergan’s fourth level of rational self-consciousness, I conclude this section by 
turning to Davies’ basic points in “The End of Sophocles’ O.T.”   
As a preliminary clarification, Davies cites Livingstone’s brief 1939 essay 
which points out a common misconception about the ending of Oedipus Tyrannus – 
specifically, the viewpoint, held by many, that many readers incorrectly understand 





misperception that the play ends with Oedipus exiled or, at least, leaving Thebes.  This 
viewpoint is probably informed by many of the famous paintings of Oedipus (Jalabert, 
Giroust) which, indeed, depict Oedipus leaving Thebes or at Colonus.  Davies reminds 
us, via Livingstone, that the play ends instead with Oedipus entering the palace at 
Creon’s behest.  Davies writes, “This, then, is the close of the 'O. T.' It is easier to say 
how the play does not end - not with Oedipus wandering out a blind beggar etc.” 
With the ending of the play clarified, Davies then pivots to his central concern.  
He finds the lengthy exchange between Oedipus and Creon (partially cited above) 
startling for it is “curious inconsequentiality.”  Davies writes,  
Surely the most striking feature of them is their curious 
inconsequentiality. As early as 1429 Creon is insisting that Oedipus 
enter the palace.  He repeats the request almost a hundred lines later 
(1515) and even then it is not until ln. 1521 that Oedipus reluctantly 
consents to go and then not without demur. Likewise, as soon as Creon 
enters, Oedipus begs (1436) to be cast out of the land. At 1518 he is still 
making the same request and Creon is still giving the same cautious 
response. This seems an oddly indecisive way in which to end a great 
drama. (271). 
 
  What then is the point of the conversation?  To venture an explanation about 
the function of the exchange, Davies cites Taplin who cites as persuasive the position 
held by classicist Colin MacLeod.  Macleod asserts, in a letter to Taplin, that the 
function of the scene is to powerfully illustrate Oedipus’ newfound impotence – he is 
totally in Creon’s hands.   
“The point is,” MACLEOD is reported as writing to TAPLIN, “that 
Oedipus, formerly the king, now cannot even control his own destiny: 
he has to be in Creon's hands (Creon whom he treated so sharply).” 
MACLEOD continues: “The entry to the house is deeply significant. 
Oedipus cannot escape from the place where he blinded himself and 
Jocasta killed herself, to death or desolation: he has to go on being 
humiliated and guilt-ridden where he belongs. I think this is very fine: 





quietly 'refuses' it to Oedipus, to bring out something far more realistic, 
down-to-earth, and painful.”134 
 
Davies, however, questions the legitimacy of this thesis as well, wondering 
whether the theory constitutes an underestimation of Sophocles’ prodigious gifts as 
a dramatist.  In other words, if MacLeod is correct, that Sophocles wants to show 
Oedipus in Creon’s hands, a semi-competent dramatist could have and would have 
done so far more effectively than that which is depicted from lines 1419 to the last 
line of the play.  Davies writes, “Sophocles could quite easily have composed a more 
emphatic scene wherein Oedipus' dependence on Creon was fully stressed; as the 
play stands it is brought out clearly enough (see above p. 269 f.).”  Instead, Davies 
continues to stress the scene’s “curious inconsequentiality.”    
Davies then arrives at his basic thesis.  If we stipulate that the scene is not 
inconsequential (because Sophocles was, after all, an accomplished tragedian) and 
that the scene does not really depict Oedipus as putty in Creon’s hands, an alternative 
view emerges.  Specifically, Sophocles wants to demonstrate that Oedipus (and Creon 
too, for that matter) has not changed at all.  Davies writes,  
And finally the imperious ἐπισκήπτω at 1446.  Clearly the old desire 
for mastery is with him still: he knows best how he must be punished, 
and with the same rash eagerness and haste that characterised his 
actions at the cross-roads, his proclamation of the punishment for 
Laius' killer, and his putting out of his own eyes inside the palace, he 
has given no thought to the gods' wishes on the matter. The speech he 
makes about his children shows some change of tone: ἴθ᾽ ὦναξ, / 
ἴθ᾽ ὦ γονῇ γενναῖε: are words of pleading, softer and more yielding, 
as their aim demands. But towards the end the familiar imperiousness 
returns: πειστέον, κεἰ μηδὲν ἡδύ at 1516 is the old Oedipus 18, and 
despite this apparent concession to the change in circumstances, the 
next lines show him laying down (and Creon accepting) the terms 
                                                        





under which he will enter the palace. Not every monarch would endure 
so cataclysmic a reversal of fortune to retain such a longing for 
mastery.135  
 
Davies is quick to point out that Creon too is “the same as before,” adding that 
“this explains why the final scene of the play comes so dangerously close to impasse: 
neither character must, neither character can, change” (276).  Davies then compares 
Oedipus to Richard II.  He quotes Peter Ure, who says of Richard’s character, he is 
tragic because his “loss of power has not freed him, for himself at least, from the 
burden on majesty” (277, see footnote).  Davies asks, “Is not this Oedipus’ tragedy 
too?  The last scene of the play shows him still acting spontaneously like a king, in the 
old imperious manner, although the once equivalent temporal power has now fallen 
away” (277).  Davies’ comparison of Oedipus to Richard II, via Peter Ure, is to be 
juxtaposed against comparisons between Oedipus and Lear.  For example, R.G.A. 
Buxton, says, “Like Gloucester in ‘King Lear,’ Oedipus will gain insight but lose his 
eyes” (footnote 24).  Davies asks, to the contrary, “Why not say Oedipus loses his eyes 
to symbolize his lack of insight?” (277, footnote 24).  He adds, 
So that it is for Oedipus that this interpretation of the end of the 'O. T.' 
has most relevance. For him the outer change has been total, the inner 
change nil. To put it positively, his character is so strong that it has 
remained intact amid the rubble of his outer state. To put it negatively 
he has learnt nothing. The purpose of the play may well be to illustrate 
to the audience the fragility of mankind, even the strongest and 
cleverest of whom may in a moment be struck down.  It is a lesson 
totally lost on the man who proves its truth. 
 
It is easy to see how Davies’ analysis maps well onto my basic contention that 
Oedipus has failed to achieve self-transcendence in Lonergan’s taxonomy.  As I have 
                                                        





attempted to show, Oedipus asks no additional questions post-insight.  In Lonergan’s 
terms, Oedipus is biased.   
It is fitting, therefore, to now turn now to an extended discussion of “bias” as 
we attempt to probe deeper into Lonergan’s thought and its broad applications to the 
play.   In the next chapter I will argue that not only does Sophocles go to great lengths 
to showcase Oedipus’ interfering biases, those biases endure into Oedipus at Colonus, 
painting a portrait of an obstinate man who refuses to yield to questioning.  Oedipus, 
in other words, begins to garner a reputation that is the opposite of the reputation of 
wisdom for which he is (erroneously, I will argue) revered.  Ultimately, this point will 
have important implications for the roiling debate about whether it is appropriate to 











In Chapter One I elucidated the dynamism of Oedipus Tyrannus by tracing how 
Sophocles portrays Oedipus’ self-correcting sequence of his questions and answers 
until he arrived at his famous insight and virtually unconditioned judgment.  His 
insight and judgment were then followed by his consequent self-transcendence, a 
critical juncture at which Oedipus has an opportunity to choose among questions of 
value.  He then undermines any potential for real growth by making inauthentic, 
extreme, brash, and obstinate choices; choices more consistent with some of his 
earlier ones.  We are now in position to expose the various “interferences” in the 
dynamic, self-correcting sequence which, as I will argue, gives Oedipus’ journey its 
especially tragic and ironic dimension.   
I will argue in this chapter that the tragedy (and irony) of the play pivot on the 
“polymorphism” of Oedipus’ consciousness.  A corollary to this argument is that we 
may understand some of the muddled thinking and the bitter intersubjective quarrels 
in the play – including but not limited to Oedipus v. Tiresias, Oedipus v. Creon and 
Oedipus vs. Jocasta – through the prism of Lonergan’s discussion of “bias.”  My 
discussion of bias naturally leads to an interpretation of the play that finds Sophocles 
indicting, not wisdom per se, as Nietzsche argued,136 but those who fail to understand 
                                                        
136  In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche writes, “Wisdom, the myth seems to 
whisper to us, is an unnatural abomination: whoever plunges nature into the abyss of 
destruction by what he knows must in turn experience the dissolution of nature in his 
own person. The sharp point of wisdom turns against the wise man; wisdom is an 
offence against nature” (Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 48).  Yet, in a point to which 
I will return later, it seems absurd to label Oedipus as somehow an exemplar of 





what it means to correctly understand; those, in other words, who would deign to 
reduce understanding to a simple matter of “taking a look,” to use Lonergan’s phrase.   
By the end of this chapter, my position will approximate McCoy’s, that 
“Sophocles does not reject the rational in favor of a tragic vision that is anti-rational 
or non-rational; rather, the rational itself includes an affective element.”137  I add to 
this that in addition to including an affective element in the rational, Sophocles forces 
us to enlarge our concept of rationality even more, avoiding the mistake of concluding 
that, to paraphrase Lonergan, what is obvious in rationality (sense knowledge) is 
what rationality obviously is. This position incidentally avers Champlin, who 
connects Sophocles with Parmenides: Oedipus is an Everyman who, like the throngs 
of Parmenides’ “know-nothing” mortals, lives by his senses, in spite of their deception, 
and is therefore deceived into what Parmenides famously called “the way of opinion,” 
the antithesis of “the way of truth.” 
As a preliminary step, this chapter requires a brief (and slightly technical) 
discussion of one of Lonergan’s most important overarching distinctions in Insight: 
descriptive vs. explanatory knowing.  “Descriptive” knowing, according to Lonergan, 
relates “things to our senses,” while “explanatory” knowing relates “things to other 
things.”  This distinction offers a profitable approach to the age old appearance-reality 
dichotomy in general and, specifically, the appearance-reality dichotomy within the 
play, on which the tragedy and irony is constructed.   
                                                        
(deinotes) and may have achieved a reputation for cleverness, but wise?  Wise? Would 
Socrates gouge his eyes out with Xanthippe’s dress pins?   
 





To that end, I will recruit Lonergan’s descriptive-explanatory distinction to 
contrast Oedipus’ encounter with the riddle of the Sphinx, the solution to which 
requires understanding “man” in an explanatory context, with Oedipus’ attempt to 
discern Laius’ murderer, which should also require an explanatory understanding but 
which, as I argue, Oedipus fails to recruit, opting instead to rely solely on his senses, 
i.e., descriptive knowing.  Knox argues Oedipus is a man of swift action (tachys), but 
it is precisely his swiftness of action that leads him to privilege sense knowledge in 
lieu of cautious discernment.  I will argue that this privileging of sense knowledge is 
ultimately a function of what Lonergan calls “general bias,” which treats 
commonsense descriptive knowing as omnicompetent.  
We may take as a point of departure for this section Segal’s claim that, “the 
entire action of the play may be viewed as one huge, collective test, a reenactment of 
Oedipus’ contest with the Sphinx…Oedipus increasingly directs the intellectual power 
that made possible his external victory over the monster to the harder riddles of his 
own origins and the horrible secrets of his life.”138  I will suggest that this viewpoint 
is inaccurate; as the word “reenactment” implies a similarity in the solving processes 
of both the Sphinx’s riddle and Laius’ murder.  Claims of similarity, however, belie the 
very different patterns of experience in which Oedipus finds himself during each of 
the two puzzle-solving scenarios. 
 
Descriptive vs. Explanatory Contexts   
 
                                                        





We may begin with Lonergan’s crucial distinction between “descriptive” 
knowing which relates things to our senses and “explanatory” knowing which “relates 
things to other things.”  The two contexts, according to Lonergan, differ only in virtue 
of the criterion of relevance, only insofar as further questions (within the self-
correcting cycle) take the empirical investigator beyond the pragmatic interests and 
concerns of daily life.  Further questions move the empirical investigator “beyond” 
the descriptive context wherein questions have ceased, since “further inquiry would 
lead to no immediate appreciable difference in the daily life of man.”139  When the 
scientist removes his lab coat and leaves for the day, for example, he immerses 
himself in the practical knowing of daily life, the life of the layperson.  Is it not safe to 
assume that when he leaves his lab the scientist engages in a kind of knowing that is 
not scientific-explanatory?  A kind of knowing that deals with the relation of things to 
his own interests and concerns?  Perhaps he knows a more efficient way than does the 
tourist to get from Cambridge to downtown Boston in rush hour.   
Whatever the example, both ordinary commonsense knowing, with its 
emphasis on description, and scientific knowing, with its emphasis on explanation, 
presuppose the single, invariant structure of knowing indicated in Chapter One.  As 
Lonergan reminds us, both laypeople and scientists “reach their conclusions through 
the self-correcting process of learning … they reach very different conclusions 
because, though they use essentially the same process, they operate with different 
standards and criteria.”140  Just as the biologist and the physicist are not made of 
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different clay, neither are scientist and layperson.  The layperson’s knowledge often 
resides in the domain of ordinary descriptions.   The objects of the layperson’s 
knowledge are, as Lonergan says, “just as much an object of knowledge as any other, 
for it is reached by beginning from the level of presentations, by advancing through 
inquiry, insights, and formulation, by culminating in the critical inquiry of reflective 
understanding, the grasp of the unconditioned, and the rationally compelled 
pronouncement of judgment.”141   
And yet, even though they are separate yet complimentary domains, the 
problem, as Lonergan points out, is that “in principle, they cannot conflict, for if they 
speak about the same things, they do so from radically different viewpoints.” 142    
Lonergan then adds, “when I say that in principle they cannot conflict, I mean of 
course that in fact they can and do.  To eliminate the actual conflict, it is necessary to 
grasp the principle and apply it accurately.”143  
Clearly, the notion of a conflict between what appears to be the case from one 
perspective, and the actual truth from another viewpoint, is central to Oedipus 
Tyrannus.  So what does Lonergan mean by his claim the two contexts conflict?  A 
simple discussion of the phenomenon of sunsets will illustrate the principle. 
In his 3rd “Meditation,” Descartes tells us: 
I find within myself two distinct ideas of the sun.  One idea is drawn, as 
it were, from the senses.  Now it is this idea which, of all those that I 
take to be derived from outside me, is most in need of examination.  By 
means of this idea the sun appears to me to be quite small.  But there is 
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another idea, one derived from astronomical reasoning, that is, it is 
elicited from certain notions that are innate in me, or else fashioned by 
me in some other way.  Through this idea the sun is shown to be several 
times larger than the earth.  Both ideas surely cannot resemble the 
same sun existing outside me; and reason convinces me that the idea 
that seems to have emanated from the sun itself from so close is the 
very one that least resembles the sun.145 
 
Although he does not express the phenomenon in these specific terms, 
Descartes is meditating on the interplay in cognition between the descriptive and 
explanatory heuristic contexts: there is the sun in relation to his senses and the sun 
in relation to his astronomical reasoning.  And yet, there are not two suns but one, a 
fact grasped by insight.  
The question of whether one type of understanding has a better claim on the 
“real sun” is incoherent.  Yet typical arguments from those who privilege explanatory 
knowing is that scientific explanation or, to use Descartes’ language, “astronomical 
reasoning,” demonstrates that sunsets are a systemic illusion, placing laypeople 
somehow in error or in a world, to use Parmenidean language, of deceptive opinion.  
Yet on Lonergan’s view, the layperson’s error – if he is to make one – would rest only 
on the way in which he verbally formulated his insights.  If a man watching a sunset, 
for example, were asked to describe what he sees, his verbal report will be no less the 
formulation of insights generated from his descriptive context.  “The sun looks like 
it’s moving across the sky,” he will say.  His knowing, from this domain, relates the 
phenomenon to his senses and, further, to his past experiences of moving objects.  His 
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eyes have seen, no doubt, a basketball descend along its parabolic arc into the hoop, 
for example, and the sun looks like a slower moving, fiery basketball in the sky.   
More fundamentally though, his claim that the sun looks like it is moving is 
inextricably tied to his human interests and concerns.  The further question, “but is it 
really moving?” is irrelevant to him.  After all, he may be an accountant.  He may say: 
who cares?  It does not occur to him to probe any “deeper,” to ask further questions 
that might push him “beyond” his descriptive context because that sort of pursuit is 
irrelevant to his bean-counting concerns. More importantly, the layperson implicitly 
grasps the prudence of parsimonious speech.  For example, he does not say, and 
knows not to say, “the sun is not only moving but the earth on which I stand is the 
center of the solar system.”146  
Empirical investigations, by contrast, do probe deeper, asking further 
questions the layperson has left untouched due to the scientist’s criterion of 
relevance.147  The scientist in this sense is but a transformed layperson – transformed 
not in virtue of “what he is” ontologically but in virtue of alternating his heuristic 
pattern.  But his new explanatory context, most importantly, is still beholden to the 
initial descriptive context he has left behind as his point of departure.  The 
descriptions provided by the layperson are transformed into what Lonergan calls 
                                                        
146  As Byrne has pointed out, even the “center” of our solar system is just 
another point of reference within the larger system.  “A fully explanatory account,” 
Byrne notes, would come “only in virtue of a Riemannian geometry that relates every 
reference frame to every other one.” 
 
147  Conversely, the scientist also leaves aside questions that are highly 






“scientific descriptions.”  Here, “the scientist selects the relations of things to us that 
lead more directly to knowledge of the relations between things themselves. Ordinary 
description is free from this ulterior preoccupation.”148  These scientific descriptions, 
which prescind from the initial descriptions of commonsense, become, as Lonergan 
says, “the tweezers by which we hold things while explanations are being discovered 
or verified, applied or revised.”149   
This point is so deceptively simple it requires additional emphasis: returning 
to our analogy, the scientist cannot demonstrate the sunset to be illusory without first 
experiencing on the level of sensible presentations the relation between the illusion 
and us.  It is precisely the relation between the illusion and us that he holds in his own 
consciousness as data as he attempts to “explain” it in relation to other things.  This 
complementarity of the descriptive and explanatory domains is precisely why, on 
Lonergan’s view, the explanatory viewpoint can in no way contradict commonsense, 
descriptive knowing.  It leaves commonsense knowing intact in its domain while 
offering additional insights from its new specific perspective of relating things to 
other things.  Yet as Lonergan notes, “since we are things, the descriptive relations [of 
things to us] must be identical with some of the explanatory relations [of things to 
one another].”150 To eliminate any actual conflict in the two contexts it is necessary, 
as Lonergan says, “to grasp the above principle and apply it correctly.”   
                                                        









To clarify this idea, Lonergan takes the respective propositions on sunsets and 
offers three cases of: 1.) ignoring the distinction of the domains 2.) denying the 
distinction of the domains and 3.) accepting the distinction of the domains.  In the first 
case, if the distinction between the domains is ignored, “one faces the dilemma of 
choosing between the propositions”151: 
The planets move in approximately elliptical orbits with 
the sun at their focus. 
 
The earth is at rest, and the sun rises and sets. 
 
In the second case, if one chooses to deny the distinction, “one is committed to the 
more rigorous choice between the propositions”: 
From every viewpoint, the planets move in approximately 
elliptical orbits with the sun at their focus. 
 
From every viewpoint, the earth is at rest, and the sun rises 
and sets. 
 
But in the third case, if one affirms the distinction, as Lonergan suggests, “one will 
reject all four of the preceding propositions to assert both of the following”: 
 
From the viewpoint of explanation, the planets move in 
approximately elliptical orbits with the sun at their focus. 
 
From the viewpoint of ordinary description, the earth is at 
rest, and the sun rises and sets. 
 
Only from this third position is all logical conflict eliminated: “for the qualifying 
reservations prevent the propositions of one universe from contradicting the 
propositions of another.” 152   As such, the explanatory viewpoint, in its grasp of 
                                                        







primary qualities, often attempts to bind itself to the terms “knowledge, real, 
objective,” while demoting the descriptive, commonsense view by binding it to the 
terms “belief, apparent, subjective.”  On this view, as Lonergan says, “knowledge is 
science, and where common sense diverges from science, partly it is the darkness of 
ignorance and error, partly it is the twilight soon to be replaced by a scientific 
dawn.”153    
The relevance of this descriptive-explanatory dichotomy to the meaning of 
Oedipus Tyrannus is clear.  As he attempts to solve Laius’ murder, Oedipus seems 
unable to detach himself from his own first-person, descriptive perspective.  He 
relates everything to his “viewpoint from ordinary description” instead of relating 
“things to other things,” as a special prosecutor might.  Oedipus, in other words, seems 
unable to understand that an explanatory approach would grasp his relation to other 
things and would, presumably, reveal himself as (at least) a potential solution.  He 
would, like a scientist who explains why, during a sunset, the sun seems to move from 
the viewpoint of description, be able to explain all the various “seemings” within his 
own human identity, until all apparent contradictions are reconciled.  And while this 
line of analysis might be construed as unfair, or blatant Monday morning 
quarterbacking, the irony that Oedipus has already demonstrated a prowess in 
precisely this sort of understanding during his encounter with the Sphinx makes it 
legitimate.  Oedipus has already boasted an understanding which transcends 
seemings.  Only in this narrower sense does Segal’s claim that the play is a 
“reenactment” of the Sphinx episode have any validity. 
                                                        





What, then, differentiates the riddle of the sphinx from the riddle of Oedipus’ 
identity? 
 
The Riddle of the Sphinx: Background  
 
Sophocles’ audience was familiar with the Oedipus myth, including Oedipus’ 
encounter with the Sphinx, the mythical monster with the body of a lioness and the 
head of a woman. Yet, Oedipus’ legendary encounter with the Sphinx, while absolutely 
crucial to understanding the irony of the play, is not specifically discussed.  As Paul 
Woodruff notes, “Oedipus establishes his eminence by solving the riddle of the 
Sphinx, but the riddle itself does not loom large in the play.”154 
Although there are a few versions, the most widely accepted version of the 
Sphinx’ riddle is this:   
 
 
The translation is as follows: “There is on earth a being two-footed, four-footed, and 
three-footed that has one name; and, of all creatures that move upon the earth and in 
the heavens and in the sea, it alone changes its form.  But when it goes propped on 
                                                        





most feet, then is the swiftness in its limbs weakest.”155  Linguistically, the riddle is 
simply a declarative statement, albeit cryptic in content.  In actuality, though, in 
Lonergan’s terms, the riddle discloses a question for intelligence: Who or what is this 
curious X with the capacity to walk on four legs, three legs and two legs at different 
times of the day? 
When we transform the enigma into a question for intelligence, the riddle, as 
most riddles do, appears to disclose putative contradictions from the viewpoint of 
description.  Yet we know that riddles pivot on precisely this appearance-reality 
dichotomy.  It’s a riddle, we say, and because it’s a riddle, there must be some way to 
reconcile an appearance of contradiction from a real one.  This is the task for 
intelligence that any decent riddle presents.  And it is surely no coincidence that the 
putative contradictions to be reconciled in the Sphinx’s riddle, and the appearance-
                                                        
155 In the intro to his translation, Woodruff (Sophocles, O.T. 2003) includes the 
riddle as translated by Hugh Loyd-Jones who derives his rendering of the riddle from 
seven sources.  Woodruff notes that Loyd-Jones’ “reading of the text is influenced by 
his judgment of the purpose to which Aeschylus put the riddle in Agamemnon” 
(xxxviii).  Loyd-Jones rendering is this: “It is two-legged on land and four-legged, not 
one shape,/And three legged too.  It changes its nature when on earth./It moves 
crawling or in the air or on the sea./But when it goes bustling along three legs,/Then 
the speed in its limbs becomes most feeble.”  To me, this translation only affirms the 
point: that the solution to the riddle requires a departure from the descriptive 





reality dichotomy on which they pivot, are nearly identical to those contained in the 
action of the play.   
In fact, as we showed in the previous chapter, Oedipus’ pivotal question, posed 
throughout the play as he tries to solve the mystery, “how can one be the same as 
many?”, is grounded in a similar if not identical contradiction.  The appearance of the 
contradiction seems to be a deduction from the law of identity as a premise.  Likewise, 
the riddle of the sphinx – which is often neatly distilled to “what has four feet in the 
morning, two in the afternoon, three in the evening” – is grounded in what seems to 
be metaphysically self-evident (also given the law of identity): just as one thief can’t 
also be many thieves, creatures, as far we have seen, cannot change the quantity of 
their allotted appendages. Yet, presumably, Oedipus solved the Sphinx’s riddle 
courtesy of a direct insight that transcended contradictory sense images, mere 
appearances. It seems, in other words, that the very source of his fame is his unaided 
ability to grasp the intelligibility beyond the illusory world of sense appearances. 
Thus, the elder suppliant says, “You came to Thebes, saved us from the Sphinx,/And 
without any help, delivered us from despair” (Lines 31-36).  Bernard Knox argues that 
Oedipus’ fame as a byproduct of this exchange is justified, writing, “In Oedipus’ 
acceptance of the challenge of the Sphinx the great qualities of the hero of the play 
were all displayed.  It took courage, for the price of failure was death; it required 
intelligence: gnōmēi kurēsas, says Oedipus, ‘I found the answer by intelligence’; and it 
needed tremendous self-confidence.”156 
                                                        





But there are important differences between the two riddles.  First, in direct 
contrast to the action of the play, Oedipus’ encounter with the Sphinx occurs in a sort 
of cognitional vacuum, which is fitting, given how little attention the scene is given. 
We infer that when Oedipus encountered the Sphinx she was terrorizing a foreign city 
(Thebes).  As a Corinthian, he was under no obligation to liberate Thebes.  Yes, 
Oedipus was “apolis” and in need of a new home, but it nevertheless seems possible 
that he could have avoided the Sphinx in an effort to find a new city with fewer 
perilous challenges on entry.  Instead, he courageously stays and, lucky for Thebes, 
and lucky for him, has an insight.  In a solitary, insular act of understanding – which 
is then inexcusably confused for wisdom – Oedipus grasps “man” qua man.   That is to 
say, despite the confusing, contradictory sense images the riddle evokes, Oedipus 
understands “man” in a detached, explanatory way, as a unity-identity-whole that 
develops across time.157    
Oedipus understands, in other words, man as an intelligibility, and is therefore 
able to liberate himself from the sensible changes that have caused others confusion.  
As most riddles do, the difficulty of the Sphinx’s riddle rests on an assumed 
egocentrism or, at the very least, the anthropocentrism of the riddle-solver.  We infer 
that countless others before Oedipus ruled themselves out as potential solutions, 
unable to transcend their descriptive knowing and understand themselves in the 
abstract.  Thus, we might say that from the viewpoint of ordinary description, there is 
no such creature that fulfills the attributes described in the riddle.  From the viewpoint 
of explanation, however, man, when understood developmentally within the process 
                                                        





of his aging over time, does. 158   Lonergan’s descriptive-explanatory dichotomy 
discloses what makes the riddle so challenging vis-à-vis self-knowledge.   On the one 
hand, we are so close to ourselves in the descriptive sense that we understand much.  
On the other hand, it is precisely due to our proximity that we struggle to understand 
ourselves in an explanatory way.   Our capacity and incapacity for self-knowledge, 
therefore, at once places us above the beasts but below the gods.  I am reminded of 
the words of Alexander Pope, 
Placed on this isthmus of a middle state, 
A being darkly wise, and rudely great: 
With too much knowledge for the sceptic side, 
With too much weakness for the stoic’s pride, 
He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest; 
In doubt to deem himself a god, or beast 159 
 
Likewise, solving the riddle of Laius’ murder would seem to require a similar 
approach but, instead, it is the descriptive solving process itself that becomes the stuff 
of drama, as Sophocles deftly juxtaposes Oedipus’ gifts as renowned riddle-solver (in 
the past) with his far more protracted, laborious and discursive struggle to solve the 
riddle of Laius’ murder (in the present).   
One obvious reason, and why we cannot accept Segal’s own word 
“reenactment” to describe the investigation, is that this time, the setting is local and 
                                                        
158 The notion of a man’s development over time, from infant, to two-footed 
adult, to the three-footed (cane), blind, elderly man, a man far more like Tiresias, is 
also mirrored in Oedipus’ own development over the course of the play.  As Segal 
notes, “Oedipus…emerges from this final trial more like a prophet than a king.  He has 
lost his eyes but gained something of Tiresias’ vision of truth” (Segal, Tragic Heroism, 
52). 
  





personal; Oedipus does not therefore approach this problem, his own problem, with 
the cool, dispassionate demeanor of the detached scientist.160  His inquiry is instead 
related to his own interests and concerns which, in contrast with the Sphinx episode, 
makes him more susceptible to bias and, as some commentators have pointed out, far 
less wise.  I am reminded of one of my favorite lines from Camus’ The Plague: 
“Stupidity has a knack of getting its way; as we should see if we were not always so 
much wrapped up in ourselves.”161 
 
The Riddle of the Sphinx as Metaphor for Explanatory Understanding  
 
Most editions of Oedipus Tyrannus include some version of the following diagram in 




                                                        
160 One might object here that in his dealings with the Sphinx, Oedipus is as 
self-interested in solving the riddle as he is in determining Laius’ murderer.  If he fails 
with the Sphinx, he dies – he therefore couldn’t be more self-interested in solving the 
puzzle.  My claim refers more to the very nature of the puzzle and his approach to it.  
It is an abstract riddle (although it ironically is self-referential).  Further, Oedipus is 
alone with the Sphinx and there is no community to save and no one else whom he 
may consult.   
 





But why include such a chart?  What insights is this image supposed to stimulate?   
The first and most obvious answer is that family lineage – in this case, the 
House of Cadmus – is central to understanding the play.  Editors recognize that it 
behooves readers to know something about the relevant familial relations in order to 
grasp the meaning of the play.  Here in Thebes, it seems, familial relations are not only 
important, they are, at times, confusing; hence the curious diagonal connecting 
Jocasta and Oedipus. 
But there is something more significant at work here.  A “family” is a term 
which connotes a network of relations.  A “family tree” is a pictorial representation of 
that network, of which one individual is only a part.  A family tree, in Lonergan’s 
terms, depicts “the relation of things to other things.”  To see one’s own position on a 
family tree is a humbling experience, as even the unbridled egoist must acknowledge 
his relative smallness in a larger context.  He also becomes cognizant (or at least he 
should) of the radical contingency of his own being and the various conditions that 
needed to be fulfilled to engender it.   
Further, and more importantly, a family tree illustrates the multiple roles we 
play – as father and uncle, mother and aunt, grandson and grandfather, etc. It is 
somewhat ironic, therefore, that when we read Oedipus Tyrannus with the aid of this 
image in advance, we are effectively jumping the very cognitive journey Oedipus 
makes in the play, as he attempts to understand (see) where he fits in the whole.  And 
so while having the image in advance certainly contributes to the dramatic irony of 





chart!”162  Instead, part of his task is to piece the chart together through his own 
questioning.  Yet, like the riddle, to fully, truly and authentically “know thyself” (γνῶθι 
σεαυτόν) the Delphic oracle demands, would require an understanding that is at once 
connected to and detached from one’s own reference frame, no small feat.  The riddle 
adverts to three reference frames that cannot be simultaneously adopted (birth, 
maturity, old age).  Likewise, to understand oneself as an intelligibility requires an 
understanding of one’s past, present and future. 
Attempting to see the relation of parts to wholes, as opposed to merely 
understanding one’s own experience – as in the famous Protagorean axiom, “man is 
the measure of all things” – is the aspiration of scientific inquiry and explanatory 
understanding.  Protagoras, as Segal notes, “was the best known of the Sophists…” 
whose sayings “express a human-centered, rationalistic speculation that is embodied 
to some extent in the hero of Oedipus.”163  Yet Protagoras’ most famous proclamation 
is, “Of all things man is the measure, of the things that are, that they are, and of the 
things that are not, that they are not.”164  One of Sophocles greatest artistic triumphs 
is the way in which the riddle of the Sphinx, and Oedipus’ success at solving it, exposes 
the irony of his later failure to understand himself in the context of an interrelated 
network far “beyond” man as its measure.  As Byrne notes,  
 
                                                        
162 I should note here that it’s not as if the Greeks would have been in the dark 
about their family lineage.  The problem in Oedipus, of course, is that certain familial 
relations are not yet known.  Instead, false parentage has deceived. 
 






Every descriptive understanding of how things are related to this or 
that human being will be transformed and enriched by being 
incorporated into a more comprehensive context.  That is to say, 
common sense inevitably takes an individual or a particular group of 
human beings as the ultimate focal point of descriptive relationships.  
But this cannot be the whole story.  Each person and human group is 
itself always intrinsically related to all other people and indeed to all 
other non-human objects – and not only in the present state of the 
universe but throughout the whole of time.165  
 
And so, we may now ask, along with Segal, if the content of Oedipus’ insight is an 
understanding of “man” in an explanatory, relational context, why then is he unable 
to understand himself in that way as a potential solution to the murder-riddle?  Why 
does he insist on making himself the “focal point of descriptive relationships” and 
miss the “comprehensive context?”  That the famous “knower” is “blind” to the puzzle 
of his identity – despite perfectly functioning ocular vision – is the central irony of the 
play.  What, therefore, in human cognition, makes such tragic ironies possible?  And, 
if they are possible, may we avoid such tragic ironies in our own lives?  Lonergan 
provides an answer.  
 
Patterns of Experience  
 
 Because he is human, Oedipus, like us, moves in and out of what Lonergan calls 
“patterns of experience.”  When dealing with the Sphinx, for example, we presume 
Oedipus to be primarily in an intellectual pattern.  The answer to her question is 
abstract, solvable in a vacuum.  It requires no data collection, no practical, inter-
subjective exchanges and it culminates in an explanatory understanding of “man.”  
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Even the setting indicates these features.  Oedipus stands outside the city walls in the 
quietude of a liminal space where he can ruminate.  Consider, for example, the way 
Jean-August-Dominique Ingres portrays Oedipus and the Sphinx in his famous 
paintings (below), first in 1808 and then in 1864.166  In those images, Oedipus has 
adopted a pose not unlike Rodin’s “The Thinker,” his foot upon a rock, elbow resting 
on his knee, a contemplative.  Meanwhile, in a narrow sliver of space at the bottom of 












In stark contrast, in attempting to solve the riddle of Laius’ murder, Oedipus 
operates in no such vacuum, for he is no longer a wanderer, “apolis,” but a leader with 
a practical interest in “getting things done.”  He solves the mystery publically amidst 
the hustle and bustle of civic life, people coming and going.  In this public space the 
exigencies of time and space bear down upon him; Thebes is dying, “plunged 
headlong into the depths of disaster” and “desolation wastes away the 
harvest/Destroys our herds and grazing fields/Blights the women and makes them 
                                                        
 166  Jean-August-Dominique Ingres, Oedipus and the Sphinx, 1808–27, oil on 
canvas, 189 x 144 cm, Louvre  (pictured on the far left); Ingres, Oedipus and the Sphinx, 






barren.”167  Oedipus moves from person to person, inquiry to inquiry, at a feverish 
pace, a stark contrast to the philosophical solemnity of a Rodin contrapposto.   
Sophocles, in other words, could not have been more explicit in alerting us to 
the appreciable differences in the two puzzle-solving scenarios; differences which 
should make us wary of Segal’s “reenactment” claim.  In spite of the differences, 
however, there seems to be an assumption, on both Oedipus’ part and the part of his 
Theban “children,” that a man who once enjoyed success solving one (and only one) 
abstract riddle within an intellectual pattern on the outskirts of the city will be equally 
successful in solving a pragmatic problem within his busy civic world, as if a chess 
grandmaster would make a good president simply in virtue of his technē at chess. 168  
If one is hunting for errors, might this be the greatest error in judgment in the entire 
play?  Might Sophocles be offering a commentary on the dangers of placing communal 
faith in a man with a skill set inadequate to the task at hand?  Would any of the other 
characters in the play have fared better?   
Lonergan notes that because different patterns, motivated by different 
interests and concerns, elicit different questions, they can and do lead us astray – 
especially when the insight sought turns out to be the fruit of a neglected question, a 
question that might have been asked were one operative in a different pattern.  So, 
just as he was successful in solving the sphinx’s puzzle, Oedipus eventually gets to the 
bottom of the second puzzle, “Who killed Laius?”  Here, however, the insight comes 
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far less readily and with far more dramatic bumps in the road, making for a better 
play.  But why is Oedipus unable to discern that the two puzzles are, at least, not 
unrelated? Why does he, a rational agent in so many other ways, instead leap to 
conspiracies which have almost zero evidence in support of them? Why does it take 
him so long to discern that he is the killer when the signs are all there?  Why, to 
formulate the question in Lonergan’s terms, is he unable to shift his consciousness 
into a more successful pattern of experience and eradicate interferences?  As Charles 
Segal asks, “How could Oedipus, famous riddle-solver, not grasp the truth when it is 
spoken so clearly?”169  These are the questions to which we now turn. 
The word “polymorphism” literally means “many shapes.”  It comes from the 
Greek poly (many) and morphe (shapes).170  Lonergan repeatedly describes human 
consciousness as polymorphic. “The pattern in which [consciousness] flows,” he says, 
“may be biological, aesthetic, artistic, dramatic, practical, intellectual, or mystical. 
These patterns alternate; they blend or mix; they can interfere, conflict, lose their 
way, break down.”171  The list of these seven patterns, or “heuristic contexts,” is by no 
means exhaustive.  Patterns link together insights within determinate fields for 
questioning and, as such, lead to differentiated discoveries via specific types of 
insights.172  Lonergan further defines a pattern of experience as a “set of intelligible 
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171 Lonergan, Insight, 411. 
 
172  Ibid., 29. In a brief discussion of Archimedes, Lonergan implies the 
etymological relation between the word “heuristic” and the word “eureka,” literally 





relations that link together sequences of sensations, memories, images, conations, 
emotions, and bodily movements.”173 Patterns are differentiated, therefore, by their 
varying interests and concerns which do not necessary align and, even worse, could 
potentially be oriented toward mutually exclusive goals – hence, “interfere, conflict, 
lose their way, break down.”    
On the most basic level, Lonergan notes that we are obviously biological 
creatures and, as such, operate within a framework of our basic biology, the lowest 
“level” beneath all that we do.  To say, then, that a pattern of experience is “biological” 
is “simply to affirm that the sequences converge upon terminal activities of 
intussusception or reproduction, or, when negative in scope, self-preservation.”174 A 
very simple example of a potential breakdown is the brilliant theoretician on the 
verge of discovery as hunger or fatigue begins to overtake his inquiry.  He asks, 
“should I eat?” or “should I sleep?” or “should I continue theorizing?”  It is not long 
before the questions within his biological pattern begin to pull him away from his 
theoretical musings, perhaps to the determent of a breakthrough the world will never 
know.  
As Aristotle noted long ago, however, we are far more than merely biological 
creatures.  We are symbolic animals as well.  We write symphonies and operas (and 
PhD dissertations) for no other purpose than self-justifying joy.  In these pursuits our 
consciousness is operative in the aesthetic pattern.  Lonergan adds, “One is led to 
acknowledge that experience can occur for the sake of experiencing, that it can slip 
                                                        







beyond the confines of serious-minded biological purpose, and that this liberation is 
a spontaneous, self-justifying joy.”175   I myself recall hours upon hours spent in my 
parents’ basement with my instruments, recording music, losing track of all time, in 
what can only be described as self-justifying joy – it certainly was not my parents’ joy 
to hear countless retakes on the drum set, although now they have confirmed to me 
they were happy they allowed it.  
A corollary to this emerging taxonomy is Lonergan’s vehement insistence that 
questions tied to different patterns all lead, equally, to knowledge.  And while one 
might be tempted to dismiss the aesthetic pattern as, say, the pursuit of purposeless 
purpose, there is still quite a bit of intelligence behind the aesthete’s inquires.  
Consider Lonergan’s complete statement about the artistic pattern.  This comment 
will be important given the attention I will pay to the dramatic pattern, which 
Lonergan places as a “specialization, or an extension, of the aesthetic.”176 
Moreover, just as the mathematician grasps intelligible forms in 
schematic images, just as the scientist seeks intelligible systems that 
cover the data of his field, so too the artist exercises his intelligence in 
discovering ever novel forms that unify and relate the contents and acts 
of aesthetic experience.  Still, sense does not escape one master merely 
to fall into the clutches of another.  Art is a twofold freedom.  As it 
liberates experience from the drag of biological purposiveness, so it 
liberates intelligence from the wearying constraints of mathematical 
proofs, scientific verifications, and commonsense factualness.  For the 
validation of artistic idea is the artistic deed.  The artist establishes his 
insights, not by proof or verification, but by skillfully embodying them 
in colors and shapes, in sounds and movements, in the unfolding 
situations and actions of fiction.177 
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The Intellectual vs. the Practical  
 
After distinguishing between, first, the biological pattern and second, the aesthetic 
pattern, Lonergan discusses the intellectual pattern, in which the conscious subject is 
able to control the flow of incoming sense data.  Lonergan says, “to the liveliness of 
youth, study is hard.  But in the seasoned mathematician, sensitive process easily 
contracts to an unruffled sequence of symbolic notations and schematic images.  In 
the trained observer, outer sense forgets its primitive biological functions to take on 
a selective alertness that keeps pace with the refinements of elaborate and subtle 
classifications.”178  We may cite the intellectuals we know as anecdotal evidence to 
support Lonergan’s claim; those special individuals capable of losing themselves in a 
theoretical problem even to the detriment of their biology (forgetting to eat) and 
practical living (forgetting to pay the water bill).   
Standing alongside the intellectual pattern, and often opposed to it, is the 
practical pattern of experience.  Lonergan notes, “beyond the biological, the aesthetic 
and the intellectual, there is ordinary human living.  But ordinary living is still 
conscious and has its own pattern of experience, a direction – namely, ‘to get things 
done.’” 179   Even the mathematician, who returns to earth from the “unruffled 
sequence of symbolic notations and schematic images,” may discover when he 
returns home a leaky faucet or an oil burner in lockout and a chagrined wife anxious 
to take a hot shower.   This math genius must remove his “theoretical hat” and put on 
                                                        
178 Ibid., 209. 
 





his “practical hat.”  Human beings, in other words, “wear many hats,” an aphorism 
which aptly describes a fact about the human condition which Lonergan is merely 
elucidating: the drama of human living involves playing many roles with different 
“interests and concerns.” If they did not, one would wear only “one hat.” Meanwhile, 
because the tension of human living is often a function of the demands our different 
roles present to us and, as such, the different questions those roles elicit, we may face 
existential crisis scenarios in which questions lead to insights which disclose 
conflicting courses of action.   
Oedipus too wears “many hats,” simply in virtue of the fact that he is a human 
being.  We might say, first and foremost, that he is (apparently) Τύραννος (tyrant) 
but will soon discover that he is really βασιλεύς (king).  But Oedipus is obviously 
much more than tyrant and king.  He is a husband, a father, a brother-in-law, a son, an 
adopted son, a riddle-solver, and, at the very bottom, a man.  In fact, it is this last 
identity that becomes most significant.  Oedipus is a man with past experiences 
heretofore subordinated but now, courtesy of the unrestricted desire to know, ready 
to percolate to the surface and potentially disrupt his course of action as King.  This 
is why McCoy notes, “part of the tragedy here is that Oedipus the king’s interest is 
contrary to Oedipus the man’s interest.”180   
Apart from knowing that he is king at the opening of the play, Oedipus lacks a 
comprehensive purchase on these other identities and the intelligibility of his past.  
He understands descriptively and, as such, more narrowly than he would if he could 
grasp himself within the larger network to be exposed from the viewpoint of 
                                                        





explanation.  He knows, for example, he is Jocasta’s husband but does not understand 
that he is her son.  He knows that Creon is his brother-in-law but not that he is also 
Creon’s nephew.  He knows that he is father to Antigone but not that she is also his 
half-sister.  He knows that Polybus and Merope are his parents but not that they are 
his adoptive parents.  He knows the riddle of the sphinx, but not the riddle of his own 
identity.  He understands, as Saint Paul’s adage goes, through a glass darkly.181  These 
other identities will ultimately be grasped in his quest for self-knowledge, but only 
after he conquers his biases and enlarges his descriptive context. 
It is precisely Oedipus’ quest for self-knowledge that represents a stark 
departure from the standard detective story.  In that type of story, the protagonist-
sleuth typically oscillates between two patterns of experience – the practical and the 
intellectual.   The “thing to get done” is to discover whodunit, a task which will require 
a variety of practical insights.   The sleuth must know the relevant people to interview, 
the appropriate tact for questioning an unstable witness, the customs of the 
neighborhood, the intricacies of criminal procedure, the bureaucratic red tape to 
avoid, traffic snags, the late night diner with the best pastrami, etc.  Later, though, 
perhaps in the quietude of his study, the detective falls into the intellectual pattern, 
as he attempts, through an organizing intelligence, to unite all the sensible data he 
has collected into one, cohesive intelligibility, at which point he cries, “Eureka” and 
takes action to arrest the husband – it’s always the husband.  It is no coincidence that 
Lonergan begins the preface to Insight by alluding to the detective story:  
                                                        
181 Saint Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians, 13:12: "For now we see through 





In the ideal detective story the reader is given all the clues yet fails to 
spot the criminal.  He may advert to each clue as it arises.  He needs no 
further clues to solve the mystery.  Yet he can remain in the dark for the 
simple reason that reaching the solution is not the mere apprehension 
of any clue, not the mere memory of all, but a quite distinct activity or 
organizing intelligence that places the full set of clues in a unique 
explanatory perspective.182 
 
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s character Sherlock Holmes, for example, is a master 
of practical data collection.  Holmes famously cries, in one adventure, “Data! Data! 
Data! I can’t make bricks without clay.”183  He is adept at hitting the streets and even 
boasts the boxing acumen to handle adversaries physically.  But Holmes is equally 
famous for his nearly catatonic state of theorizing, a state that rivals meditation, as 
Watson often discovers Holmes reclining on a sofa or slumped in an armchair: “He sat 
frequently for half an hour on end, with knitted brows and an abstracted air…”184  
Later, Watson says of his friend, “Sherlock Holmes had, in a very remarkable degree, 
the power of detaching his mind at will.”185  Holmes justifies this intellectual pattern, 
saying to Watson, in another story, “Problems may be solved in the study which have 
baffled all those who have sought a solution by the aid of their senses.” 186  Holmes 
even plays the violin, an original Stradivarius, leaving readers and Watson to wonder 
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whether his playing is merely a method of liberating his consciousness from the 
exigencies of the day’s practical pattern.  From A Study in Scarlet,   
 
When left to himself, however, [Holmes] would seldom produce any 
music or attempt any recognized air. Leaning back in his arm-chair of 
an evening, he would close his eyes and scrape carelessly at the fiddle 
which was thrown across his knee. Sometimes the chords were 
sonorous and melancholy. Occasionally they were fantastic and 
cheerful. Clearly they reflected the thoughts which possessed him, but 
whether the music aided those thoughts, or whether the playing was 
simply the result of a whim or fancy, was more than I could 
determine.187 
 
And yet, for all of this, unlike Oedipus, we know very little about Holmes’ own 
personal life.  With the exception of a few moments, Holmes is rarely the subject of 
his own drama.  The repressed memories of Holmes’ youth rarely rise up to become 
relevant psychic contents.  We sense that Holmes is so single-minded of purpose, in 
fact, that he will not allow these psychic contents to distract him from the goal.  So 
much so, Watson reflects, “I sometimes found myself regarding him as an isolated 
phenomenon, a brain without a heart, as deficient in human sympathy as he was pre-
eminent in intelligence.  His aversion to women, and his disinclination to form new 
friendships, were both typical of his unemotional character, but not more so than his 
complete suppression of every reference to his own people.  I had come to believe 
that he was an orphan with no relatives living.”188  We might add here that, on a 
Lonergan interpretation, Watson is incorrect in his judgment about his friend, 
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Holmes.  Holmes is an emotional character; his horizon of feelings just differs from 
typical people.   
Oedipus Tyrannus, in contrast, is not a typical detective story.  As ER Dodds 
points out, “despite certain similarities the Oedipus Rex is not a detective story but a 
dramatized folktale. If we insist on reading it as if it were a law report we must expect 
to miss the point.”189  Further, because it is a folktale and a myth, Sophocles’ audience 
understands that Oedipus does not understand and can look on from a privileged 
viewpoint.   
But Dodds is clearly underselling the play.  I would argue that Oedipus 
Tyrannus is both a folktale and a detective story; the addition of a third pattern of 
experience, the dramatic, however, elevates it to a status that transcends that genre 
distinction, as the investigation becomes self-referential.  This feature is what makes 
the play uniquely compelling. 
We can easily imagine, for example, a hypothetical version of the play in which 
someone other than Oedipus is Laius’ killer; the Theban herdsman, for example.  Let 
us imagine the play then divorced of its tragic irony.  It is, instead, a straightforward 
detective story, not unlike a Sherlock Holmes adventure, in which Oedipus, as Holmes 
often is, is solicited by his people to solve the murder.  If this were all, Oedipus would 
oscillate primarily between two patterns190: the intellectual pattern of solving the 
puzzle for the sake of solving it and the practical pattern of finding and banishing a 
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potential threat to civic life and order.  Yes, we want to solve mysteries to help our 
friends; but we also want to solve mysteries for the sake of solving them.191  Initially, 
this dual-motivation, a function of two patterns, describes Oedipus as well.   He has a 
pragmatic interest in solving the case.  He tells us as much: “I do not do this for some 
far-off cousin/I have my own reasons for driving out this infection/The killer, 
whoever it may be, could kill again/And lay those deadly hands on me/As I serve this 
cause, so I serve myself” (Lines 137 – 141).  But we also get the sense that Oedipus is 
a man of great curiosity; a curiosity that was dormant but which has now been 
rekindled.  In fact, we marvel as Oedipus proceeds in the face of his own self-
destruction simply because, as we discussed in Chapter One, “truth will out” and he is 
the man to “out it.”  He wants to know who killed Laius simply because, as the old 
adage goes, inquiring minds want to know. 
Of course, as Dodds noted above, this is not the whole plot of Oedipus Tyrannus.  
Instead, the source for the play’s tragic irony, and that which separates Oedipus in 
terms of genre, is the addition of a third pattern of experience – the dramatic – which 
complicates the landscape in profound ways, ways that make the play far more than 
a “dramatized folktale.”   In Oedipus, the data collection process of the typical 
investigation story unbeknownst to the investigator sets the conditions for psychic 
contents within the investigator’s consciousness, in the form of memories, heretofore 
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repressed or uncritically neglected, to cascade to the surface.  Soon it is those psychic 
contents that are questioned making the self the object of potential intelligibility.  The 
quest for the killer, understanding the “he,” becomes identical with the quest for self-
knowledge, understanding the “I.”   
 
The Dramatic Pattern  
 
The foundation of Lonergan’s “dramatic pattern of experience” is the rich 
mental life we enjoy within our consciousnesses, a function of the interplay between 
lower and higher levels, between unconscious processes (one’s neurology) and the 
phenomenological data of one’s consciousness (psychic contents).  Observe a man on 
a commuter train as he goes through the motions of his commute – he sips coffee, 
fumbles with the paper, stares out the window, etc.  An attractive woman sits down 
next to the man.  He attempts to make small talk but is awkward.  Before long he 
retreats to his staring out the window.  You may never know that presently, unfolding 
within this man’s consciousness, a dramatic narrative is playing out, as he wrestles 
with the demons of an abusive childhood, his recent divorce which he believes is 
related to that childhood, and the resultant struggle to make meaningful connections 
in his adult life.  This was an opportunity and he feels he has blown it once again.  The 
anxiety sets in.  The guilt.  The fear.   
Thus Lonergan says, “behind palpable activities, there are motives and 
purposes; and in them it is not difficult to discern an artistic, or more precisely, a 
dramatic component.”192  Lonergan’s dramatic pattern, in other words, requires us to 
                                                        





accept the claim that the psychic contents of consciousness can and do subordinate 
what Lonergan calls “neural demand functions.”  In fact, Lonergan claims this is the 
first condition of the possibility of having a dramatic pattern at all: “The first condition 
of drama,” he tells us, “is the possibility of acting it out, of the subordination of neural 
process to psychic determinations.”193 Why, we may ask, do we sometimes use the 
adjective “dramatic” to describe certain people?194 We all know people in our lives 
who conduct their affairs as if they are living in a Hollywood film, as if the world is 
watching their every move, even when it is not.  These dramatic folks seem more 
concerned with winning the affection of others, for example, often to their own 
detriment.  Like our man on the train, these are people for whom the dramatic pattern 
of experience preselects and arranges psychic contents while excluding others.   
Obviously, this model of human consciousness is a matter of dispute, 
especially in recent debates within philosophy of mind.  And while a full discussion of 
“Lonergan on consciousness” would bring us too far afield here, we should point out 
that Lonergan is very careful to note the inverse relation as well: that neural demand 
functions clearly exert their influence upon the physic.  After all, we could not 
perceive without an optic nerve. As Lonergan notes, “Just as an appropriate schematic 
image specifies and leads to a corresponding insight, so patterns of change in the optic 
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must live a drama in fashioning a ridiculous escape plan.  (See Jane Smiley’s terrific 






nerve and cerebrum specific and lead to corresponding acts of seeing.”195  The danger 
of acknowledging this necessary (but not sufficient) condition is an oversight which 
leads to a kind of neurological determinism 196  or, as Lonergan notes, to assume 
“neural demands are unconditional.”197  On Lonergan’s view, in contrast, the pattern 
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196 In Chapter 4 I will discuss “determinism” as a metaphysical commitment 
that falls under Lonergan’s rubric of “position and counter position,” a dialectic 
Sophocles clearly exploits for dramatic purposes.  In fact, many modern arguments 
which reduce our behavior to brain chemistry seem eerily reminiscent of Sophoclean 
fatalism.  In Oedipus at Colonus, Oedipus essentially makes a point that we now hear 
in modern criminal trials deflecting personal blame to external circumstances beyond 
one’s control:  
 
You rant on about taboo killings, 
Foul marriages, and vile incest. 
It was I who suffered these things 
But the gods made it so, 
Exorcising some ancient grudge 
Through my bloodline. 
I cannot be blamed for the crimes 
I inflicted on myself and my family, 
You won’t find a single reason 
Why I deserved any of it. 
How was it my fault 
That my father received 
A prediction that he would 
Be killed by his very own son? 
That happened before I was born –  
I had not even been conceived! 
But I was born, unluckily, 
And yes, I did fight and kill my father, 
But I had no idea who he was – 
I didn’t know what I was doing. 
How can you call me guilty 
When I knew nothing…nothing!” 
 





of experience is prior and becomes the filtration system for the psychic contents.  
Consider the full passage from Insight: 
 
Already we have noticed, in treating the intellectual pattern of 
experience, how the detached spirit of inquiry cuts off interference of 
emotion and conation… In similar fashion, the dramatic pattern of 
experience penetrates below the surface of consciousness to exercise 
its own domination and control, and to effect, prior to conscious 
discrimination, its own selections and arrangements.  Nor is this aspect 
of the dramatic pattern either surprising or novel: there cannot be 
selection and arrangement without rejection and exclusion, and the 
function that excludes elements from emerging in consciousness is now 
familiar as Freud’s censor.198  
 
In spite of our inability to directly access the consciousness of others, we find 
evidence of the dramatic pattern in the symbolic, ritualistic ways in which we and 
others make living a work of art.  This is why Lonergan locates the dramatic pattern 
as a “specialization, or an extension, of the aesthetic.”199  He adds, “Not only, then, is 
man capable of aesthetic liberation and artistic creativity, but his first work of art is 
his own living.”200  We are not merely ants or bees who “mindlessly” perform our 
roles; nor are we pure intellects “devising perfect blueprints for human behavior.”  
We have motivations and purposes of which we are conscious and which pattern our 
behavior – hence, Oedipus’ claim, “I have my own reasons for driving out this 
infection.”  Lonergan writes, “It is true enough that eating and drinking are biological 
performances.  But in man they are dignified by their spatial and psychological 
separation from the farm, abattoir, the kitchen; they are ornamented by the elaborate 
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equipment of the dinning room, by the table manners imposed on children, by the 
deportment of adult conversation.”201  The implication of these statements is broad.  
Given the data that our lives adopt ritualistic and symbolic significance, on Lonergan’s 
view, no reductionist metaphysical commitment could ever explain why we opt to use 
the good China vs. paper plates, or why, as Father Joseph Flanagan used to say, 
“monkeys eat, but only humans dine.”202  
 
Blending and Interfering  
 
The tragedy and irony of Oedipus Tyrannus therefore hinges on the “blending 
and interfering” of patterns of experience, and particularly the dramatic.  We need 
only briefly examine Jocasta as the more obvious paragon of interfering patterns.  The 
curious diagonal line we observe in the family tree (above) connects her to Oedipus 
as wife, a social role that has, during the action of the play, superseded her primary 
(biological) role to him as mother, represented by the traditional vertical line 
extending to Oedipus from her “horizontal” relationship with Laius.203  Jocasta’s dual-
relation explains much of her psychological turmoil throughout the play, and her 
words and actions may become less puzzling to us when we recognize that she is 
straddling and negotiating two “interests and concerns” which may be mutually 
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exclusive: a mother’s protective instinct vs. a wife’s obligation to be truthful to her 
husband.   
Initially, there seems to be a moral dubiousness to Jocasta’s request to stop 
Oedipus from questioning, as she famously exhorts, “No! By all the gods, if you have 
care for your life,/Stop these questions.  Have I not suffered enough” (1060-1061).  
We must recognize, however, that this request comes only after she, like Oedipus, has 
had the insight (and virtually unconditioned judgment) that Oedipus is the boy she 
abandoned long ago.  Her insight discloses an important point: an identical insight 
can occur within a different horizon of meaning, as determined by the agent’s pattern 
of experience.  In other words, Jocasta’s insight, which includes all the content that 
Oedipus’ insight will include a few scenes later, is nevertheless tokened to her 
biological and social role.  Yes, Jocasta “sees” that Oedipus is the killer; but, smuggled 
within that understanding is a corollary which, for Jocasta, is more devastating than 
the premise: she has been sleeping with the son she abandoned, a dual-atrocity that 
yields a dual guilt, of both of a mother and a wife.  Here we have a clash between the 
biological pattern (a mother’s biological imperative to care and nurture her child) and 
the dramatic pattern (the anxiety, fear and guilt that are a function of a wife’s taboo 
relation with her husband-son). 
  From her point of view as mother, Oedipus been brought back from the dead.  
She will not suffer witnessing him hurt again and yet she knows that he, as a mature 
man and her husband now, is deserving of the truth of his birth.  Jocasta’s protective 
maternal instinct becomes all the more ironic given her initial decision to expose her 





had him thrown away –/By other people – into a wilderness of mountains” (717-719) 
– a decision in defiance of the protective maternal obligation as mother she now 
recruits.  We might therefore infer that had Jocasta adopted her present pose of 
protective mother back then, she wouldn’t need to do so now as a wife.  Or, we may 
read Jocasta’s desire to protect her husband as the maternal desire she denied years 
ago.  She will not, in other words, see him destroyed twice and is therefore willing to 
play the role of the deceptive wife.  It becomes less of a surprise that when Oedipus 
does understand his dismal fate, she kills herself, unable to deal with his double-death 
having been unable to protect him at two successive junctures in her care-giving 
roles, maternal and spousal.   
Oedipus Tyrannus forces us to revel in the tension that arises when different 
patterns yield contradictory insights vis-à-vis access to potentially harmful truths.  
Jocasta’s cry, “Have I not suffered enough?” displays her unenviable state: a divided 
consciousness, in which her obligation to protect her son-husband from harm clashes 
against his right to know the truth.  Her character raises an interesting tension vis-à-
vis Lonergan’s analysis: while there is theoretically no question for which we would 
not desire the answer, there are moments in which we understand, through insight, 
that the maturity or psyche of either ourselves or the one who seeks the answer may 
be too deficient or fragile to receive it from us and thus, in certain (presumably rare) 
instances, suppressing the truth is justified.  It seems we must be careful, though, 
about the authenticity of the reasons we offer for suppressing the truth.  Is it in our 
personal interest to do so or in the interest of the person for whom the truth is being 





participate? I will address this question in a later section on communal responsibility 
and progress and decline.  For now, we are left to delight in Sophocles’ obvious 
doubling of Jocasta with Merope.  Back in Corinth, long ago, Merope made a similar 
decision to shield her child from the truth out of material protection which, one might 
argue, was misguided and, not surprisingly, led to disastrous consequences.   
Like Jocasta, Oedipus’ patterns of experience also interfere.  Clearly, Oedipus’ 
initial goal is to “get things done,” as he operates in a predominantly practical pattern.  
Prior to the opening scene, in which the elders exhort Oedipus in supplication, we 
learn that Oedipus has already had the practical insight to send Creon to consult 
Delphi: “I have already sent Creon, my wife’s own brother,/To the Pythian oracle, 
Apollo’s shrine at Delphi” (71-72).  A hallmark of the practical pattern, Oedipus is 
hyper-concerned with the exigencies of time.  He is not, after all, attempting to prove 
Fermat’s last theorem in his study but, instead, trying to find a killer who could strike 
again.   And so he says of Creon, “But he should have returned by now;/Too much time 
has passed since he left./I fear what might have happened – where can he be?” (73-
75).  Later, Oedipus tells the Chorus that on Creon’s advice, he has also sent for 
Tiresias, another instance of a practical insight which comes prior to the public’s 
suggestion of it.  Again, Oedipus perseverates on the time-pressure: “I have seen to 
that already.  On Creon’s advice/I sent a herald to fetch him.  Twice now.  Where is 
he?/I can’t believe he has not yet arrived” (287-289).   
In addition to the passing of precious time, Oedipus is equally frustrated that 
the Theban unrestricted desire to know has become a restricted desire.  He is 





Creon offers what seems to be a legitimate reason for the restriction: “The Sphinx.  
Her riddles made us set aside/That mystery; we had to deal with the trouble at hand” 
(130-131).  At this point, Oedipus vows to take matters in his own practical hands 
and, using more light and vision imagery vows, “I will see it exposed,” a line which is 
roughly equivalent to, “I will bring the dark things to light.”204  In this vow Sophocles 
concretizes the juxtaposition between the unrestricted desire to know with an 
external force of restriction (the Sphinx) and an additional self-imposed restriction at 
the hands of the Theban community at large (willed ignorance).  It is for this 
committed immersion in the practical pattern of experience that Knox describes 
Oedipus as a man of swift action (tachys) in a battle against this sort of communally 
willed ignorance, claiming that “the man whose intelligent and courageous action 
made him the envy of his fellow men will not accept a life based on willed 
ignorance.”205  
Further, as I mentioned earlier, Oedipus has a practical self-interest which 
motivates him beyond his concern for his Theban children.  He acknowledges quite 
plainly that answering his questions is not wholly a function of “fellow-feeling.”  It will 
serve him well too: “I do not do this for some far-off cousin./I have my own reasons 
for driving out this infection;/The killer, whoever it may be, could kill again/And lay 
those deadly hands on me./As I serve this cause, so I serve myself” (137-141).  At this 
point in the drama, Oedipus is practically and intellectually engaged.  We must ask, 
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therefore, at what point does Oedipus’ practical pattern of experience “blend, mix, 
interfere, breakdown” with his dramatic pattern?  
The answer to this question comes no later than the very next scene.  In fact, 
the breakdown happens so quickly it borders on absurd.  Oedipus, who up until this 
point seems intelligent, reasonable and responsible transmogrifies into the opposite 
of those, sounding ignorant, judgmental and irresponsible, launching into a wild 
conspiracy theory, in which he first indicts Tiresias and then Creon.  His conspiracy 
theories, especially in spite of the explicit claims that he is the killer, become the prima 
facie evidence that he is retreating into a drama within the drama.   We sense that if 
Oedipus could only quiet the voices of his inner narrative, and liberate himself from 
this pattern, he would be ostensibly more successful in the practical (and intellectual) 
pattern of solving the riddle of Laius’ murder.  He cannot, though, and at this point the 
real source of drama pivots to the question of whether one man will break his 
intellectual bad habits and conquer his biases. 
The first explicit moment of the blending and interfering of the dramatic 
pattern specifically appears at Line 353.  In his prodding of an initially reticent 
Tiresias, the prophet finally shouts, “You are this land’s defiler, you are the curse!”  
Oedipus, of course, is famously incredulous.  At 362, Tiresias speaks the truth again 
in no uncertain terms, saying, “I say that the murderer you seek is you.”  Not only is 
Oedipus again incredulous, his incredulity mounts instead of dissipating, as one might 
expect when a man with a reputation for wisdom doubles-down on his indictment. 
Then, at 450, Tiresias, offended by Oedipus’ misdirected (and public and therefore 





on the cake.  It is an unequivocal retelling of Oedipus’ own dramatic narrative as an 
outsider arriving in Thebes: “I tell you, the murderer of Laius, the object/Of your self-
proclaimed manhunt,/The one you’ve sought for so long – he is here./He seems at 
first to be a newcomer from abroad,/Yet soon he’ll be seen as a born Theban.  But no 
joy/For him in that” (450-454). 
This moment, and Oedipus’ forthcoming response, is pivotal in appreciating 
the interference of the dramatic pattern.  In a consciousness not so deeply 
subordinated by the dramatic pattern, this inter-subjective exchange would be an 
opportunity for learning and for serious reflection and discernment.  One might, for 
example, say to oneself: “Here I have a man, a national treasure, known for his 
incredible and uncanny prophetic gifts indicting me, of all people.  He has also implied 
that I am not a foreigner but a native born Theban.  Is this even possible?  Perhaps I’m 
missing something here.”  This, in other words, is the moment at which Oedipus now 
has at least one reason to suspect that, perhaps, appearance is not reality.  Yet, instead 
of adopting an authentic, self-appropriated pose, he famously suspects conspiracy, 
shouting, “Did you plot all of this, or could it be Creon?” (378). 
Unlike certain commentators in the secondary literature, I read this question 
as the verbal evidence of the dramatic pattern.  The question, which here 
masquerades as a question for intelligence, lacks the authenticity of Oedipus’ prior 
inquiries.  It is not, in other words, a question the answer to which Oedipus really 
desires.  I would argue, in fact, that Oedipus does not even believe in a conspiracy, 
even as he inquires about one, a strange but not uncommon psychology.  His question 





one asks when one recognizes one is guilty.  It is a deflection, a smokescreen, a 
question that steers the inquiry away from what is being repressed in consciousness, 
but which is now dangerously close to rising to the surface.   Since he does not yet 
understand and know who is, we may infer the problem is his affective self, where 
dramatic bias lurks.   
In fact, when Tiresias replies to the question with yet another definitive 
answer – “Creon doesn’t plague you, you plague yourself!” (379) – Oedipus launches 
into a speech meant to ridicule Tiresias in an unwarranted (even cruel) ad hominem 
attack.  It is no surprise that in his speech Oedipus suddenly and unauthentically 
recruits pointed “us/them” language, attempting to elevate himself and demean the 
prophet as an “other.”  Instead of treating Tiresias as one of his “children” too, Oedipus 
lumps the prophet into a vile group of charlatans, describing them as “you people.”  
The “us/them” linguistic distinction heightens the irony given Oedipus’ birth as a 
native Theban, i.e., “one of them.”  Oedipus then asks a few additional questions in his 
invective but what was once authentic inquiry has become highly stylized and 
rhetorical, even bloviating.  Sophocles then further amplifies the irony by having 
Oedipus begin to audaciously tout his own intelligence, calling himself, with tongue 
in check, “ignorant Oedipus.” 
 
Prosperity, power, skill surpassing skill –  
These should be admired, not envied. 
What jealous craving eats away at you people? 
Is it because of my tyranny?  I never asked for it; 
It was handed to me by the city. 
For this, my dear old friend, loyal Creon, 
Longs to cast me out, stalking in secret, 
Ambushing me with this conniving trickster. 





Is personal profit.  To the future you’re blind! 
Tell me, when have your prophecies been proved? 
When the Sphinx sounded her deadly song 
Did you speak to save our people then? 
The riddle could not be solved by just any man. 
It needed the skills of a seer, but where were you? 
You saw no omens, you made no revelations, 
There was no divine inspiration, you knew nothing.   
Then I came, ignorant Oedipus, I silenced her 
By using my mind, not signs from the sky! (380-398) 
 
As Segal points out, this harsh exchange closes with Tiresias shifting from clearly and 
unequivocally indicting Oedipus the man to clearly and unequivocally indicting 
Oedipus’ rationality.  The blind prophet shouts, “Go inside and reckon these things up 
and if you catch me as one who’s false, then say that my intelligence in prophecy is 
nil” (461-462).  The Greek is below: 
εἴσω λογίζου: κἂν λάβῃς ἐψευσμένον,  
φάσκειν ἔμ᾽ ἤδη μαντικῇ μηδὲν φρονεῖν. 
 
Sophocles continues the indictment of Oedipus’ rationality when, like his 
exchange with Tiresias, Creon also demands that Oedipus assess whether he can 
“reckon” or “calculate” (εἴσω λογίζου) the claims he is making.  After the Second 
Chorus [First Stasimon], which breaks up the previous exchange with Tiresias and 
the forthcoming exchange with Creon, Creon enters the scene in order to clarify what 
he has heard about Oedipus’ conspiracy theory.  He tells the Chorus, “Fellow citizens, 
this is terrible, what I hear./This accusation against me, by our ruler Oedipus,/It’s 
outrageous.  Amid all this trouble,/If he now thinks I have done him any harm,/In 
word or deed, any harm whatever” (513-517).  The Chorus attempts to assuage 





charges.  In a highly telling passage, the Chorus tells us, “But it was driven by anger, 
not thought./I don’t think he meant to blame you” (523-524). 
Oedipus enters and, after a bitter exchange, Creon offers a compelling reason 
for why a conspiracy theory is a ludicrous hypothesis, asking the questions that 
Oedipus has failed to ask because he is too wrapped up in what I will soon call his 
dramatic and individual bias.  Creon says, “No!  Look at yourself from my point of 
view,/And ask this question first: Do you think anyone/Would choose to rule in 
constant fear/When he could sleep without trembling/And have exactly the same 
power?” (583-587).  Line 583, which Meineck and Woodruff translate as, “No!  Look 
at yourself from my point of view,” is extremely telling, especially in light of our 
previous discussion about the descriptive-explanatory dichotomy.  Creon is 
essentially asking Oedipus to adopt a pose that would take him beyond the sphere of 
his limited descriptive knowledge, rooted in his senses and his feelings.  Jebb renders 
the line as, “Not so, if you would reason with your heart as I do with mine.”  And Fitz 
and Fitzgerald, the most literal of the three, write, “No.  Reason it out, as I have done” 
(οὔκ, εἰ διδοίης γ᾽ ὡς ἐγὼ σαυτῷ λόγον).  All three translations have in common a 
sacrifice of λόγον, or computation, reckoning, at the altar of emotion.   
Like the conclusion of the exchange between Oedipus and Tiresias, Sophocles 
asks us to consider whether Oedipus’ apparent gifts are really legitimate.  In stark 
contrast to his reputation, these scenes are symptomatic of a defect in intellectual 
character.  There is a certain close-mindedness that unites them.  The contemporary 
philosopher Quassim Cassam has written extensively about conspiracy theories and 





recent essay, “Bad Thinkers,” Cassam argues that our approach to people who believe 
in wild conspiracy theories ought to be to critique their character, as opposed to 
evaluating the reasons for their beliefs.  He writes, “Usually, when philosophers try to 
explain why someone believes things (weird or otherwise), they focus on that 
person’s reasons rather than their character traits.”206   Cassam then goes on to point 
out that this approach, of rationalizing explanations, “take you only so far.”207  The 
reason is because one tends to explain one questionable belief by pointing to more 
questionable beliefs that ground the first.  Instead, Cassam concludes we might be 
better off using the phrase “intellectual vices,” borrowing from the philosopher Linda 
Zagzebski’s book Virtues of the Mind.  He then adds that, “Our intellectual vices are 
balanced by our intellectual virtues, by intellectual character traits such as open-
mindedness, curiosity and rigour.”208  The problem, as Cassam notes, is that “Like 
other bad habits, intellectual bad habits can be too deeply entrenched to change.”209   
Perhaps most indicative of the interference and breakdown of Oedipus’ 
intelligent inquiry, what Cassam would call an intellectual vice, is the complete 
reversal he makes vis-à-vis his contemptuous attitude toward Tiresias (expressed 
above).  As Champlin notes, “Oedipus completely and instantly rejects the charges, 
not seeking any clarification.”210  Yet, only a few scenes later, when Jocasta arrives 
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and awakens a “dread recollection,” Oedipus returns to Tiresias with what seems to 
be a newfound clarity and a concomitant respect for the blind prophet.  Champlin 
adds, “Oedipus’ conception of Teiresias has changed twice in a brief time.  Initially he 
exalts the seer; next he reviles him; finally, coming full circle, he begins to accord him 
respect once again.”211  How are we to explain this sort of wild oscillation and total 
lack of discernment in an otherwise rational agent?  To what do we attribute this 
curious admixture of both rational and irrational or even, in its extreme form, the 
absurd?   
We can find the explanation in what Lonergan calls “bias.” 
 
The Four Biases 
Lonergan’s discussion of bias becomes relevant when we ask: what has 
become of the dynamism of Oedipus’ cognitional structure, elucidated in Chapter 1?  
Why has the unrestricted desire suddenly become restricted?212  Why is Oedipus, an 
authentic questioner in the play’s initial scenes, now leaping to ridiculous questions 
that are leading him astray, instead of asking the more pertinent (and obvious) ones?  
Why does a memory from his past, heretofore repressed, suddenly enter into his 
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consciousness as new psychic content which, when queried, leads to insights that 
return Oedipus to the correct path? 
Patrick Byrne notes that “bias,” in Lonergan’s lexicon, “means precisely 
interference with inquiry and with the self-correcting sequence of questions and 
answers that constitutes the dynamism of the cognitional structure.”213  Bias is, to use 
another of Lonergan’s phrases, a “flight from understanding.”214  To borrow from 
Cassam, bias is an intellectual vice, the opposite of which are the intellectual virtues 
which Lonergan reduces to the “transcendental precepts.”  In Method in Theology, in 
his chapter on the “Human Good,” Lonergan writes:  
Progress proceeds from originating value, from subjects being their 
true selves by observing the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be 
intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible.  Being attentive includes 
attention to human affairs.  Being intelligent includes a grasp of 
hitherto unnoticed or unrealized possibilities.  Being reasonable 
includes the rejection of what probably would not work but also the 
acknowledgement of what probably would.  Being responsible includes 
basing one’s decisions and choices on an unbiased evaluation of short-
term and long term costs and benefits to oneself, to one’s group, to 
other groups.215 (my italics) 
 
 When we consider, just to take one example, Oedipus’ heated exchange with 
Tiresias above, we may ask, “Is Oedipus attentive?” No.  The prophet repeats the 
pronouncement of guilt three times, almost as if Oedipus isn’t hearing them.   To use 
a worn-out but apt adage, Oedipus hears but he isn’t listening.  Is Oedipus intelligent?  
No.  If intelligent consciousness is characterized by asking questions, it seems there 
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are far more questions to ask here, questions that clearly go beyond the sensible 
world.  Recall Champlin’s claim that Oedipus “instantly rejects the charges, not 
seeking any clarification.”  Instead of these clarifying questions, Oedipus asks 
rhetorical questions in the service of embarrassing the prophet: “What jealous 
craving eats away at you people?” (382) and, “Tell me, when have your prophecies 
been proved?” (390) and “When the Sphinx sounded her deadly song/Did you speak 
to save our people then?” (391-392) and “[The riddle] needed the skills of a seer, but 
where were you?” (393-394). 
Is Oedipus reasonable?  No.  We need only recall our earlier discussion of 
virtually unconditioned judgments to point out that there is zero data conditioning 
the affirmative judgment that either Tiresias or Creon (or both) is a conspirator.  In 
fact, there is good data conditioning the opposite negative judgment (albeit not 
virtually unconditioned yet) that Tiresias and Creon are not conspirators.  After all, 
the prophet repeatedly asks to be left alone and does not want to say anything – 
“Please let me go home.  It’s for the best/You bear your load; let me bear mine” (320-
321).   Likewise, for his part, Creon offers a compelling narrative for why it would be 
ludicrous for him to conspire against Oedipus when he enjoys the benefits of being 
king without paying the costs: “Do you think anyone/Would choose to rule in constant 
fear/When he could sleep without trembling/And have exactly the same power?” 
(583-587) So, is Oedipus responsible?  Clearly not.  Unless Thebes has adopted some 
strange, new hallmark of responsibility that involves choosing to publicly indicting 





Especially relevant to bias is the second transcendental precept, being 
intelligent, which, in addition to inquiry, for Lonergan means grasping “hitherto 
unnoticed or unrealized possibilities.”  In other words, a bias occludes intelligence by 
precluding the subject from asking more pertinent questions that would lead to 
insights into these other avenues, unrealized possibilities. While this definition may 
appear to be a more esoteric use of the term bias, it is actually quite similar to the way 
the word is used in current cultural vernacular.  For example, if a man is said to have 
a gender bias, that man has some sort of interference blocking a correct 
understanding of the actual state of affairs vis-à-vis gender.  On Lonergan’s view, the 
man’s gender bias is rooted in a failure to ask all the pertinent questions which, if 
asked, would liberate him or her from the bias.  
For example, consider the following riddle I use in my class.  It is, admittedly, 
a bit outdated now but a few years ago it offered a sobering commentary: 
A father and his young son are both in a horrific car 
accident together. Both have equally life-threatening 
injuries and are simultaneously airlifted by two separate 
helicopters to two different hospitals within two miles of 
each other. They are both wheeled into operating rooms 
where two different surgeons prepare to operate on them, 
one surgeon for each patient. The surgeon operating on 
the father makes the first cut and immediately begins, but 
the surgeon operating on the son draws back the scalpel 
and says, “I can´t operate on him. This child is my son!” 
 
How is this possible? 
 
Like the riddle of the sphinx (or the riddle of Laius’ murder), the riddle above is really 
a question for intelligence. The problem, of course, is that the question for intelligence 
– how is this possible? – in the biased consciousness becomes a red herring.  If the 





another location?  One is immediately tempted to ask: how is it possible to bi-locate?  
The riddle, in other words, pivots on what appears to be a metaphysical impossibility 
(provided, of course, one accepts as true the premise that it is impossible to bi-locate).  
Meanwhile, the simpler (and fairly obvious) answer is that the surgeon operating on 
the boy is the boy’s mother.  In fact, it’s almost too simple an answer.  Yet there are 
plenty of people who fail to get the insight, even plenty of women, much to their 
disappointment.  Is their error understandable and therefore excusable?  As we 
meditate on the riddle, the psychic contents we recruit are images of male surgeons.  
Surgeons, of course, are not necessarily male but bias blocks that inquiry.  To the 
unbiased inquirer, the simple question, “but must a surgeon be male?” transcends the 
uniform sense data.   
Lonergan discusses four types of bias which I will treat in order, all which 
Sophocles depicts:  dramatic, individual, group and general bias.  Like his discussion 
of patterns of experience, there is no indication that the list of biases is exhaustive.  
Depsite this discussion, it’s important to remember that Oedipus does ultimately 
conquer these biases and arrives at the truth in a virtually unconditioned judgment.   
In other words, it is telling that Sophocles has the unrestricted drive to know win the 
day in the end and for that, Oedipus is to be commended.  It is not his flaws, therefore, 
but his commitment to the truth at all costs that makes him worthy of the mantle, 
“tragic hero.”  Further, when we include Oedipus at Colonus in the discussion, a text to 
which I will turn in Chapter 3, it seems that in spite of the tragic fate that Oedipus’ 





conditions for new growth and healing in Athens.  As I will point out later, this seems 
to be an insight that both Nietzsche and Freud missed. 
 
Dramatic Bias in Oedipus  
 
Like Quassim Cassam’s recent work on “Bad Thinkers,” mentioned above, 
Lonergan’s discussion of bias is, at root, about flaws in our intellectual characters.  
Bias is conquered, in part, by what Lonergan calls “self-appropriation,” the taking 
ownership of one’s own consciousness, which would recognizing as choice-worthy 
Cassam’s list of “open-mindedness, curiosity and rigour.” 216    In fact, all four of 
Lonergan’s biases are connected to the opposite of these: close-mindedness, an 
uncurious stance toward the world (lack of inquiry) and an intellectual laziness.  
Lonergan begins his discussion of bias within the consciousness of the subject 
(dramatic) and then moves outward in what I imagine to be concentric rings, treating 
that subject’s relation to others (individual) and then the intra-communal tensions 
(group) within a larger field until he reaches the most pernicious bias (general) which 
diagnoses and treats of a particularly pervasive (and erroneous) ontological 
assumption. 
The first and most intimate bias that Lonergan mentions is dramatic bias and 
is not surprisingly located within the dramatic pattern of experience (see above).  
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fidelity to the self-correcting cycle of learning.  As I point out in Chapter 3, this 






Dramatic bias is, at root, a condition of avoidance to the point of neglect.  The subject 
neglects the data of consciousness (psychic contents) which, if queried, might yield 
insights about oneself and, therefore, would set the conditions for one’s growth and, 
ultimately, one’s self-transcendence.  The central feature of the dramatic bias is what 
Lonergan calls “scotosis” which, technically speaking is merely the condition of 
suffering from a scotoma, a cognitive blind spot.  Longergan says, “Let us name such 
an aberration of understanding a scotosis, and let us call the resultant blind spot a 
scotoma.” 217  Lonergan relies on this ocular metaphor to further underscore the 
uncritical correlation between knowledge and ocular vision.  Like a person suffering 
from a traditional ocular blind spot, the individual with dramatic bias has a scotoma 
in his understanding of the psychic contents of his consciousness.  The blind spot is a 
function of introversion, of which only human beings are capable, which overtakes 
the biological extroversion of his animal evolutionary past.  Animals, in other words, 
don’t need to worry about dramatic bias.  Lonergan writes, 
This introversion, which overcomes the extroversion native to the 
biological pattern of experience, generates a differentiation of the 
persona that appears before others and the more intimate ego that in 
the daydream is at once the main actor and the sole spectator…The 
incomprehension,  isolation, and duality rob the development of one’s 
common sense of some part, greater or less, of the corrections and the 
assurance that result from learning accurately the tested insights of 
others and from submitting one’s own insights to the criticism based 
on others’ experience and development.218  
 
                                                        







The passage above aptly describes Oedipus’ heated (and dramatic) exchanges 
with both Tiresias and Creon; exchanges in which Oedipus’ common sense is robbed 
and where he is unable to “submit one’s own insights to the criticism based on others’ 
experience and development.”  Instead, the self-correcting cycle adopts a perverse 
trajectory, as false insights begin to expand the scotoma and Oedipus grows even 
more volatile, his theories more preposterous.  And while it might be argued that, at 
this point, Oedipus lacks “sufficient evidence” to judge himself as the killer, or that 
Tiresias is a reliable prophet, it does betoken an unwillingness to remain in stage in 
which he continues to marshal the evidence and reserve judgment (aporia). 
Nevertheless, we infer that if left unchecked, Oedipus would lead himself into 
a world of darkness.  Lonergan writes, “Insights that expand the scotosis can appear 
to lack plausibility; they will be subjected to scrutiny; and as the subject shifts to and 
from his sounder viewpoint, they will oscillate wildly between an appearance of 
nonsense and an appearance of truth.”219 
We should appreciate the way Sophocles presents Oedipus’ quarrels with 
Tiresias and Creon as constituting a total reversal of Oedipus’ pose in the opening 
scenes of the play, in which the dynamism of Oedipus’ questioning transformed the 
potentially intelligible sense data – the supplicants, the murder investigation, etc. – 
into the actually intelligible.  In contrast, in these exchanges, Oedipus allows his fears 
and anxieties to run interference, possibly, if one is partial to a Freudian gloss, 
because he knows the truth already, because it resides latent in his subconscious.  As 






Father Joseph Flanagan once wrote, describing dramatic bias, “Just as your 
questioning reaches from the intelligible level down into the sensible level and 
prepares the data of your internal or external consciousness for insights, so your 
anxieties and fears can direct questioning away from certain conscious data.  You do 
not wish to understand certain data because you are fearful of making discoveries.”220   
Flanagan’s gloss on dramatic bias here discloses an important disagreement between 
Lonergan and Freud. The truth of X cannot “already be known” (in the subconscious, 
for example) because the images that would be the condition of the possibility of 
judging X as true have been precluded from consciousness.  You cannot literally be 
afraid of what you do not know. 
For example, after a heated exchange with Creon, in which Creon reiterates 
Tiresias’ claims that Oedipus is Laius’ murderer, Oedipus brushes them aside in fear.  
This behavior is consistent with dramatic bias, as Flanagan notes, “Besides the desire 
to know manifesting itself in attentive questioning, there are the fears that may block 
or divert this questioning.”221  When Creon asks, at 622, “What do you want?  To 
throw me out of Thebes?,” Oedipus replies, “No, not exile.  I demand your death.”  The 
suggestion of death here is harsh enough but, when coupled with the total lack of 
evidence, it becomes absurd.  Creon asks, incredulously, “Why won’t you believe what 
I tell you?” (625).  Oedipus replies by calling Creon “contemptible” (626).  Then, in a 
                                                        
220 Joseph Flanagan. Quest for Self-Knowledge.  Toronto: University of Toronto 
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fit of histrionics, Oedipus laments, “Oh, my city, my city…”(629) (ὦ πόλις πόλις) to 
which Creon replies, poignantly, “I belong in this city, it’s not only yours!” 
(κἀμοὶ πόλεως μέτεστιν, οὐχί σοι μόνῳ, 630.)  Yet Oedipus is unmoved by what 
should be a powerful and thought-provoking retort.  Lonergan might as well be 
describing Oedipus’ behavior when he writes:  “Again, consideration of the contrary 
insight may not reach the level of reflective and critical consciousness; it may occur 
only to be brushed aside in an emotional reaction of distaste, pride, dread, horror, 
revulsion.”222   
How, then, does Oedipus conquer the enlargement of his scotoma and 
ultimately shrink it?  How does he move from absurd conspiracy theories to a sober 
discernment of the data of his consciousness and, ultimately, to the truth of self-
knowledge?  The short answer is that Sophocles depicts the unrestricted desire to 
know as wounded but not mortally wounded; the self-correcting process has been 
waylaid but not irrevocably lost.  In fact, Oedipus returns to the path of self-discovery, 
ironically, when his wife takes up the questions for him.  Sophocles discloses here an 
important point about inter-subjectivity: sometimes it is the questions of others that 
bring us back into the fold, as others take up the mantle of inquiry that we have 
temporarily shrugged off out of bias. 
Jocasta returns Oedipus to the correct path by asking a basic, authentic 
question for intelligence.  Arriving on the scene, attempting to mollify Oedipus’ 
concerns, she asks, “Why are you so angry?” (699).  As McCoy has pointed out, 
because this question comes from his wife, its meaning is different than it would be 
                                                        





had it been asked by, say, a citizen.  Jocasta’s question, as a wife, probes at something 
deeper in Oedipus, an invitation for deeper self-knowledge and his affective 
responses.223   
This question has the immediate double effect of both underscoring Oedipus’ 
disproportional emotional reaction while at the same time attempting to make it 
intelligible by inquiring into the reasons for it.  When Oedipus tells Jocasta that he 
suspects Creon and that Creon has audaciously fingered Oedipus as Laius’ murderer, 
Jocasta asks two more questions for judgment: “Was he a witness?  Or is he acting on 
hearsay?”  When Oedipus explains that it was a “malevolent soothsayer” (705) who 
revealed this information, Jocasta attempts to quell Oedipus’ fears which, in typical 
Sophoclean irony, has the effect of enflaming them.  She goes on to explain, to the pity 
and delight of the audience, that her former husband Laius received an oracle: “I won’t 
say/”From Apollo”; it came from priests – that “Laius would die at the hands of a 
son/That would be born to him and me.”/But Laius was killed by strangers/At a place 
where three roads meet. That’s the story” (711-716).   
This critical moment, in which Oedipus’ mind begins to “reel,” christens his 
turn inward, as introversion overcomes the extroversion native to the biological 
pattern.  The image of the three roads is apparently powerful enough to demand 
sustained scrutiny and, as such, ushers in a newly returned intelligent consciousness.   
It is the mention of the “place where three roads meet,” a place later revealed to be 
“Phocis” (where the road divides, “one from Delphi, one from Daulis”) that triggers a 
memory in Oedipus’ consciousness.  The memory, heretofore latent, now becomes 
                                                        





questionable psychic content, potentially (newly) intelligible.  The questioning of the 
image then sets the conditions for the emergence of more previous acts of sense 
experiencing from Oedipus’ past (as memories) cascading to the surface.  As Byrne 
notes, memories are “acts that recapitulate the contents of previous acts of sense 
experiencing.”224 Oedipus suddenly becomes awash in memories, as he recruits into 
consciousness previous acts of sense experiencing in an effort to make what was 
repressed intelligible.  Unfortunately for Oedipus, these memories, which are now 
coupled with new data, take on a negative valence.  He says, “What you’re telling me 
shakes my soul,/Sends my mind reeling one way then another” (726-727).   
In contrast to the opening scenes of the play, the data to be questioned now is 
not the sensible data of the external world but the data of consciousness (psychic 
contents).  When viewed through the prism of pattern and bias, it is less of a surprise 
that Oedipus should now recollect a very particular moment from his youth – the 
ramblings of a drunken dinner guest – which has clearly haunted him but which he 
has pushed out of consciousness until now.  While some commentators have pointed 
out that it is odd that Oedipus has not discussed any of these events with his wife 
prior to this moment, we may now attribute the lack of discussion to dramatic bias, 
not unlike the Freudian censor. This viewpoint is consistent with a Freudian reading 
in which Oedipus’ subconscious has selected the memory of the drunken dinner guest 
as the appropriate place to begin the narration of an identity he already understands.   
This viewpoint is slightly more reasonable than the more controversial thesis of P.H. 
Vellacot’s article “The Guilt of Oedipus,” which suggests that Oedipus “must have 
                                                        





guessed the true story of his birth long before the point at which the play opens – and 
guiltily done nothing about it.”225  
Of note is that the episode with the drunken dinner guest was data worthy of 
questioning even back then.  Oedipus was deeply shaken by the moment as the 
moment happened and even questioned it with zeal; but we soon learn that the 
inquiry was abandoned.  Now, in the present moment, the recollection of that data 
becomes the relevant data.  This scene may be the ultimate testament to the 
unrestricted desire to know.  It can only be repressed for so long.  Sophocles writes, 
A drunken dinner guest filled with wine 
Blurted out that I was not my father’s son. 
It was all I could do that day to control my rage. 
But on the next day, I went to my mother and father 
Seeking some explanation, and they were furious 
That anyone would speak such spurious slander. 
I was consoled, but a rumor creeps in stealth, 
And soon it started to grate on my mind. 
I left in secret; my mother and father never knew 
I went to Delphi.  But there, Apollo shunned me, 
Denied my questions and sent me away, 
But not before he revealed what was to come. 
Such tormenting horrors!  He said I would 
Mate with my mother and reveal a race 
Too vile to stand in the sight of man. 
He said I would kill my father. 
I heard Apollo’s word, and I ran, 
Tried to fell a universe from Corinth, 
To reach some place that would never see 
The fulfillment of that revolting prophecy. (Lines 779-798) 
 
This speech is pivotal.  It invites a host of inferences, especially if we suspend 
a deterministic reading of the play and imbue in Oedipus a freedom that Lonergan 
will argue we all have – a freedom to think, reflect, marshal the evidence, make 
                                                        





judgments and, ultimately, act on those insights and judgments.  First, what are we to 
make of this mysterious dinner guest who knows “the truth” of things?  Are we to 
infer from this scene that some, maybe even more than a few Corinthians, knew the 
truth of Oedipus’ adoption but, soberly, were afraid to mention it for fear of the King 
and Queen’s reprisal?  This would imply a culture (Corinth) fearful of the truth coming 
to light and that Thebes will now make the same error.  In this case, Sophocles may 
be offering comment that “truth will out” only insofar as authentic cities 
accommodate authentic questioners to out it. Is Sophocles presenting Corinth as a 
culture of suppression at the hands of Timocratic rulers, a place where censorship 
reigns?  Polybus and Merope, for example, may think it more politically expedient to 
keep the truth hidden.  If, for example, their son is not their biological son, then rules 
of succession may be questionable, etc.  But what of their personal, familial reaction 
to their son’s inquiry?  Is it appropriate?  Is it, perhaps, Sophocles’ commentary on 
their inauthentic characters?  After all, it is one thing to keep an adoption secret from 
a younger child for personal reasons, but to be “furious” about “spurious slander” 
when the slander is actually the truth betokens a nearly pathological suppression of 
the truth at any cost.   
Most significant about this speech is that it represents the first (but not the 
last) time Oedipus’ inquiry crashes into obstacles that preclude his having insights.  
Like the opening scenes of the play, here, Oedipus’ desire to know dominates the 
scene, as he tells us, “I went to my mother and father/Seeking some explanation.”  
Again Knox interprets this moment as yet another example of Oedipus’ “decisive 





politic ignorance is seen in his refusal to accept his supposed parents’ attempt to 
smooth down his anger at the indiscreet revelation of the drunken guest; even then 
he demanded clarity, he had to know the truth, and went to Delphi to find it.”226   
But Knox is again too quick to give Oedipus credit, especially if the import of 
the lines above is that Oedipus ought to be praised as some demander of clarity.  Knox 
fails to see that the juxtaposition of Oedipus’ desire to know as a young man with 
Oedipus’ desire to know as a mature adult reveals a major problem: what happened 
to Oedipus’ desire in between?  What became of the spirit of inquiry in the years that 
passed between Corinth and Thebes?  Might Sophocles have structured the play as a 
microcosm of the structure of the development of Oedipus’ life?  The unrestricted 
desire to know is followed by a hiatus rooted in bias, followed by the triumphant 
return of the unrestricted desire to know.  
Clearly the data, the sensible presentation of the drunken dinner guest’s 
speech was no ordinary experience for Oedipus.  We learn that it was powerful 
enough to override the claims made by adamant parents.  His parents’ claims, in other 
words, in spite of their force and conviction, fail to satiate his drive to know, for he 
says “I was consoled, but a rumor creeps in stealth,/And soon it started to grate on 
my mind.” This claim, that the rumor “grat[ed] on my mind,” is the haunting residue 
of unsatisfactorily answered questions.  It is odd, though, that while this 
dissatisfaction is enough to prompt Oedipus to “flee” in the hope of satiating his desire 
to know, that desire apparently fades as quickly as it arrived.  For at Delphi, Oedipus 
is rebuked by Apollo and then given the famous prophecy of incest and parricide.  
                                                        





Oedipus reacts to this prophecy with a caprice equal to his fleeing of Corinth.  Yet 
again, contrary to Knox’s assertions, his failure to demand context or ask clarifying 
questions should remind us of the identical failure to do so when dealing with 
Tiresias.  It is yet another failure in Oedipus’ ability to “reckon” or “calculate” 
(εἴσω λογίζου). 
I offer the following basic train of thought at the risk of playing Monday 
morning quarterback.  Consider:  the truth of the premise, “Polybus and Merope are 
my parents,” requires affirmation before the action of fleeing Corinth in fear of 
Polybus and Merope makes any sense.  For a man who begins his quest with a 
suspicion that his parents are not his parents, it seems odd to then let the prophecy, 
which assumes the premise to be verified, override this initial suspicion.  Like the 
heated exchange with Tiresias, in which it would have behooved Oedipus to ask a few 
clarifying questions, when the Oracle offered its prophecy of murder and incest, 
Oedipus might have said to the Oracle, “Yes, but discerning whether they are actually 
my parents is precisely why I have consulted you.  If I can affirm the fact that they are, 
indeed, my parents, then I will flee.”  The only conclusion we may draw is that 
Oedipus’ ability to “calculate” (εἴσω λογίζου) is being overridden  by the affective 
element of his person.  Fear and anxiety are running interference, leaving us to infer 
that a character who had better control over the affective aspects of his personality 
might have taken a breath and “reckoned” that fleeing Corinth only makes sense if the 





But dramatic bias runs deep and, as Cassam reminds us, “intellectual bad 
habits can be too deeply entrenched to change.”227   
 
Individual Bias in Oedipus  
 
Henry David Thoreau once wrote, “I have yet to hear the first syllable of 
valuable or even earnest advice from my seniors. They have told me nothing, and 
probably cannot tell me anything to the purpose…If I have any experience which I 
think valuable, I am sure to reflect that this my Mentors said nothing about.”228 
Mediate, briefly, on the absolute lunacy of Thoreau’s statement from Walden.  
The famed transcendentalist suggests that his elders have never once – once! – given 
him an earnest piece of advice.  We are aware of the import of Thoreau’s 
“transcendental” philosophy that we should strive to be our own master and march 
to the beat of our own drum, etc., but does it follow from this premise that elders have 
nothing to teach?  In other words, even the transcendentalist apologist, who simply 
describes the philosophy as a quest for individual authenticity, must acknowledge 
that a truly authentic person would surely be open to the advice of others.  Instead, 
Thoreau’s seniors have not a syllable to teach him.  This position seems radically 
biased not to mention ironic given the premium Transcendentalists place on self-
knowledge.    
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We know now through recent scholarship that Thoreau was a bit of an “odd 
duck” and the pages of Walden are loaded with narcissistic and egocentric ramblings.   
In fact, on Lonergan’s view, if we really were to find a person who seriously holds the 
position about elders Thoreau articulates, that person would be a textbook example 
of individual bias, the bias of egotism.  Egotism always prescinds from the premise 
that social order and intersubjective harmony is good.  As Lonergan says, “…it 
remains that there is a sense in which egoism is always wrong and altruism its proper 
corrective.”229  The egoist, in other words, fails to ask the further pertinent questions 
of whether his self-proposed solution will benefit the group.  “With remarkable 
acumen one solves one’s own problems.  With startling modesty one does not venture 
to raise the relevant questions, Can one’s solution be generalized?  Is it compatible 
with the social order that exists?”230  
Recall, for example, Frank Capra’s Christmas classic, It’s a Wonderful Life.  
There is a powerful scene that juxtaposes the pure egotist and the one who embodies 
an “enlightened self-interest.”  George Bailey, played by Jimmy Stewart, is en route to 
his honeymoon, finally given the opportunity to leave Bedford Falls, when he 
witnesses through the raindrops pummeling the cab window a classic “run” on the 
bank.  He immediately delays his own interests and stops into the Bailey Building and 
Loan.  He discovers that the ripple effect of the panic has permeated the Building and 
Loan as well.  He finds countless townsfolk frantic in his small office, demanding their 
money.  Bailey attempts to enlighten them as best he can, informing them of what the 
                                                        







Building and Loan really does, claiming “you’re thinking of this place all wrong.”  
Essentially, he tries to explain that their money is not physically present in the 
building, but invested in the hands of their brethren throughout the Bedford Falls 
community.  When the townsfolk fail to grasp this concept – since it adverts to an 
explanatory knowledge they do not possess – Bailey resorts to his honeymoon 
savings – the brainchild of his new bride, Mary – to tide them over until the crisis has 
passed.   
The next scene, however, is far more important.  It is Capra’s most brilliant 
juxtaposition.  We become acquainted with a hot-tempered, genuine egotist named 
Tom who is concerned only with his biological pattern and who demands the full 
amount – all $242 dollars of it – that he has invested in the Bailey Building and Loan.  
Despite George Bailey’s entreaties, this pure egotist is obstinate, replying, “I’ve got 
$242 dollars in here and $242 dollars isn’t going to break anybody.”  Tom cannot see 
beyond his own biological pattern; in this case, the better securing of his bread.  He 
fails to pivot toward insights into the explanatory picture that would reveal that there 
is a way to pursue his own self-interest while recognizing that without the Bedford 
Falls community, he will have no self-interest to pursue.  Thus, Lonergan concludes, 
“and while the egotist refuses to put the still further questions that would lead to a 
profound modification of his solution, still that refusal does not make intelligence an 
instrument but merely brushes it aside. Egoism, then, is an incomplete development 
of intelligence.”231  






It is no surprise that in addition to his dramatic pattern and the dramatic bias 
which has precluded his inquiry into the psychic contents of his past, Oedipus also 
engages in rhetoric that elevates himself above the community.  Sophocles deftly 
heightens the irony of this rhetoric when we discover that 1.) Oedipus is a native born 
Theban (and therefore, “one of them”) and 2.) he is wrong about his claims to 
greatness, especially in relation to intelligence, as he, unlike so many others, cannot 
see/understand the truth as it is unfolding (or collapsing) around him. 
Examples of Oedipus’ individual bias are abundant and, like Thoreau, often 
find Oedipus resistant to the perspective of the aged and, in the case of Tiresias, the 
infirm, whom Oedipus mocks for lacking sight: [Line].   
This resistance then extends to his uncle, Creon, also an elder.   At line 536, 
Oedipus asks Creon, “What cowardice did you see in me?” Oedipus goes on to tout his 
riddle-solving prowess.  Knox claims that Oedipus’ “insistence on himself is not mere 
vanity, it is justified by his whole experience, which presents itself to him as an 
unbroken record of success due entirely to himself; and this is no subjective 
impression, it is the conclusion of others…the attitude of the priest and the chorus 
shows that Oedipus confidence in himself is no greater than the confidence which his 
fellow citizens feel in him.”232  Knox takes Oedipus as courageous in both the episode 
of the Sphinx and the investigation into Laius’ murder.  He reads Oedipus as a man 
always willing to plunge headlong into the breach of ignorance.  He writes, “the 
courage with which Oedipus assaults the unknown throughout the play is 
                                                        





characteristic of the man who risked his life when he answered the riddle of the 
Sphinx.”233   
While I concur with Knox’s claim that Oedipus’ confidence in himself – “I will 
see it done” – is matched by the confidence Thebans show in him – “Save us…” – it 
does not follow that this mutual agreement that confidence cannot also be 
overweening.  In fact, that may be the point: both Oedipus and Thebes are 
overconfident in man who, far from achieving an “unbroken record of success,” 
merely got it right…one time, as we showed earlier.  Oedipus, on this view, is a one-
hit wonder who is back in the recording studio and feeling out of his depth.  More 
importantly, the confidence he has in himself is ultimately shown to be misguided and 
becomes the prima facie evidence for the claim that he suffers from an individual bias.  
This view is consistent with McCoy’s point that Oedipus fails to consider that, 
Oedipus possesses an overly confident sense of his own 
righteousness, a judgment of the would-be criminal as 
his polar opposite, a tendency to suspect or to blame 
others, rather than to look inwardly.  He assumes an 
absolute division between those who are just and unjust, 
those who care for the city and who bring it harm, those 
who possess virtue and who lack it…Oedipus is unable to 
imagine the possibility of his own moral vulnerability.234 
 
The best evidence of Oedipus’ overly confident sense of his own righteousness comes 
in his attempt to claim (reclaim) Thebes as his city, as if the other inhabitants are 
somehow less tied to it than he.  Recall Oedipus’ laments: “Oh, my city, my city…”(629) 
(ὦ πόλις πόλις).  Recall Creon’s reply: “I belong in this city, it’s not only yours!”  (630) 
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(κἀμοὶ πόλεως μέτεστιν, οὐχί σοι μόνῳ).  Understanding Oedipus as suffering from 
the individual bias of the egotist would transform his description of his fellow 
Thebans as “children” as less a term of endearment and more a term of 
disparagement, as in the paternalistic suggestion that he is the father of the city and 
they are merely children, living under his fatherly protection.   
 
Group Bias in Oedipus  
 
Because Lonergan locates “group bias” within the dialectic of community, my 
discussion of it will naturally fit better in Chapter 3, where I show the way Thebes as 
a community is suffering from what Lonergan calls the “long cycle of decline.”  On my 
view, Sophocles presents Thebes (and Corinth) as immature communities (to be 
compared with Athens) because their development consists of an admixture of both 
the rational and irrational.   
Group bias, for Lonergan, emerges when “society becomes stratified; its flower 
is far in advance of average attainment; its roots appear to be the survival of the rude 
achievement of some forgotten age.  Classes become distinguished, not merely by 
social function, but also by social success; and the new differentiation finds 
expression not only in conceptual labels but also in deep feelings of frustration, 
resentment, bitterness and hatred.” 
Particularly important to this discussion will be the way members of both the 
Theban and Corinthian communities treat the vulnerable.235 Oedipus at Colonus, in 
fact, becomes the antidote to the Theban cycle of decline, a corrective.  This corrective 
                                                        





is symbolized by Theseus who, far more than Oedipus, has self-appropriated.  As 
McCoy notes, “Theseus can better understand limit in Oedipus than others because 
Theseus has a wisdom in which his own experience has been transformed into a 
considered sympathy for others. He does not express anger about his past, but rather 
utilizes those difficult past experiences in order to cultivate this new politically 
friendly relationship with Oedipus.”236 
 
General Bias and Tiresias the Outlier  
 
In his seminal essay, “On Misunderstanding the Oedipus Rex,” E.R. Dodds notes, 
among other points that I will address shortly, that for Sophocles, “as for Heraclitus, 
there is an objective world-order which man must respect, but which he cannot hope 
fully to understand.”237   
I prefer a softer, more refined version of Dodds’ sentiment here: there is an 
objective world-order which man must respect and the totality of which only God 
understands.  Nevertheless, if man aspires to understand it, incompletely, he will need 
to accept what Lonergan once called the “starting strangeness” that reality is grasped 
not by “taking a look.”  Instead, it is grasped courtesy of the dynamic cognitional 
structure I have described in the previous pages.238  In other words, I read Sophocles 
as unequivocal in symbolically concretizing a powerful hostility toward animal sense 
knowledge – as opposed to a rival view of knowledge as grasping intelligibility – and 
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the way in which our embodied, “evolutionarily inherited biological sense of reality” 
privileges the senses, particularly vision. 239   To that end, Sophocles populates the 
play with repeated assaults on the agents of sense, most obviously, the eyes: “…he 
tore out the long pins/Of beaten gold that adorned her clothes,/Lifted them up, and 
plunged them into his eyes.”  Yet Sophocles also recruits sound as another specious 
source: “Could I ever meet the eyes of my people?/Never!  If only I could stem the 
stream of sound,/Then I’d shut away my broken body/Hearing silence, seeing 
nothing:/Sweet oblivion, where the mind/Exists beyond the bounds of grief” (1385-
1390).   
This assault on the inadequacy of the senses as constituting knowledge 
marches to its climax, Oedipus’ eye-gouging, which is the ultimate indictment.  As 
Dodds notes, by this point in the action, “if he [Oedipus] could choke the channels of 
his other senses he would do so.”240   It is no coincidence that as Oedipus comes closer 
and closer to “the truth,” affirmed not by looking but by his virtually unconditioned 
judgment, Sophocles depicts a sort of inverse proportion between objectivity and 
reliance upon the senses: the more “objective” Oedipus becomes in his character, the 
less dependent he is on his animal senses until, when finally in complete possession 
of the “objective truth,” Oedipus is totally blind. 241    
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Objectivity, therefore, has a dual aspect in Oedipus Tyrannus: it is a thing to be 
achieved as well as an attribute of one’s character.  If it is true that we become what 
we most intend, as Aquinas suggests, the person who intends objectivity, in fidelity to 
the self-correcting cycle, will become a more and more “objective” person.  As Byrne 
notes, “Objectivity, therefore, like discernment, is both the quality of a person as well 
as something achieved by such persons.”242 
In a curious twist, Sophocles’ assault on sense-knowledge dovetails with the 
fourth (and most complicated) bias Lonergan mentions in Insight: general bias. 
Lonergan writes, “Besides the bias of the dramatic subject, of the individual egoist, of 
the member of a given class or nation, there is a further bias to which all men are 
prone.  For men are rational animals, but a full development of their animality is both 
more common and more rapid than a full development of their intelligence and 
reasonableness.”243  
For Lonergan, general bias is the most pernicious of the four biases because it 
essentially hides in plain sight, deeply woven into the fabric of the extroverted 
orientation of our animal selves.  Byrne points out that general bias might therefore 
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be called “ontological bias” because it reaches deep into our metaphysical 
assumptions about “the real,” assumptions that are the byproduct of our animal 
heritage.  General bias, adds Byrne, “derives from the disparity between our animality 
and our search for answers to questions for intelligence and reflection.”244  Given our 
animality, we have a hardwired tendency to treat the real as the “already out there 
now,” to use Lonergan’s phrase.  This tendency to treat the real as  identical with the 
spatially extended leads naturally to courses of action which privilege common sense 
knowing as omni-competent and tend to dismiss any form of knowledge that it is not 
consistent with an “empirical verification criterion of meaning.”  As Byrne notes, “to 
someone whose sense of reality is closely tied to the methodical procedures of the 
hard empirical sciences, the insights and virtually unconditional affirmations of 
humanists and philosophers will seem no more than soft opinions about vagaries – 
certainly not tough knowledge about the really real.”245  
For example, in the background of the play is the art of prophecy (and 
soothsaying in general).  This art purports to have knowledge “beyond” the pragmatic 
word of sense experience.  Prophets and soothsayers provide a sort of understanding 
of the world and universe that, at the time it is given, cannot be empirically verified 
and therefore easy to (hubristically) dismiss.  Consider how dismissive (and cruel) 
Oedipus becomes with Tiresias: 
Tell me, when have your prophecies been proved? 
When the Sphinx sounded her deadly song 
Did you speak to save our people then? 
The riddle could not be solved by just any man. 
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It needed the skills of a seer, but where were you? 
You saw no omens, you made no revelations, 
There was no divine inspiration, you knew nothing. 
Then I came, ignorant Oedipus.  I silenced her 
By using my mind, not signs from the sky! (390-398) 
 
Worse, Oedipus then launches into a pointed indictment of the old man’s 
infirmities, which, not coincidentally, become attacks on Tiresias’ sense modalities, 
particularly blindness, when the obvious irony is that relying too heavily upon his 
senses is precisely Oedipus’ problem.  Oedipus shouts at Tiresias, “Your ears and your 
mind are as blind as your eyes…Never-ending night shrouds you in darkness, you’re 
harmless to those of us who see the light” (16). 
On the bitter exchange between Oedipus and Tiresias, Segal notes that “this 
passage also shows how oracle and riddle complement one another as the two sides 
of Oedipus’ tragic situation.  The riddle points to his success and intelligence in saving 
Thebes and winning his high position.  The oracle reveals his helplessness and 
ignorance before the larger powers that surround his life.”246  Reading this exchange 
through the prism of Lonergan allows us to treat Tiresias’ gifts figuratively.  He is the 
agent or representative of a kind of understanding that transcends empirically 
verifiable sense data.  Oedipus, because he is trapped at this point in general bias and 
of equating knowing with taking a look, fails to give this other form of knowing – 
which aspires to grasp the intelligibility of the whole universe, not simply a regional 
outpost – a shot. 
Ultimately, Oedipus learns his painful lesson which, as mentioned earlier, is as 
much about coming to understand what knowing actually is as it is about coming to 
                                                        





understand his own identity.  In his famous insight (detailed in Chapter 1), Sophocles 
has Oedipus, in spite of his senses, affirming something about reality that is separated 
in space and time and not a byproduct of his sense experience.  He affirms its truth in 
spite of his eyes, in spite of taking a look.  Instead, he affirms the truth of his identity 
because it has finally become intelligible, after all these years, as a function of his 
questions.  Tiresias is blind, indeed.  But he still understands.  He knows, perhaps 
better than anyone, that human knowing is more than” taking a look.”  Tiresias, in 
other words, is vindicated in showing Oedipus the central error Lonergan points out: 
the view that, “What is obvious in knowing is, indeed, looking.  Compared to looking, 
insight is obscure, and the grasp of the unconditioned is doubly obscure.  But 
empiricism amounts to the assumption that what is obvious in knowing is what 
knowing obviously is.”248   
In her essay “’Oedipus Tyrannus’ and the Problem of Knowledge,” Champlin 
argues a similar point but does so by connecting Sophocles to the great Parmenides.  
She writes, “Since there is considerable evidence that his stout defendant and pupil, 
Zeno, resided for a time in Athens, visited the residence of Pericles, and taught several 
prominent Greeks there, one is just in assuming that Sophocles, who also frequented 
Periclean circles, was acquainted with Parmenidean monism. Indeed broad hints of 
Parmenidean influence appear in Oedipus Tyrannus.” 249 
Champlin goes on to adduce a connection between the play and its 
Parmenidean influence, locating Oedipus as an Everyman, with the throngs of “know-
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nothing” mortals who live by the deceptive senses and who are thus deceived into 
“the way of opinion.”  She cites Tiresias as “the spokesman for intuitive truth in the 
drama, so Parmenides is his counterpart in the poem; as Oedipus, the Everyman, lived 
in a state of self-deception, so for the same causes do the uncritical throngs mentioned 
in Parmenides’ poem.”250  
The takeaway, in other words, is what Lonergan points out in an essay called 
“Cognitional Structure,” that human knowing “involves many distinct and irreducible 
activities: seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, tasting, inquiring, imagining, 
understanding, conceiving, reflecting, weighing the evidence, judging.”251 
In essence, the systematic bias pervasive throughout the play is the failure to 
recognize “the incommensurability of experiential content with intelligible 
content.”252  In a nutshell, what Oedipus understands fails to match what he sees. The 
irony of Sophocles’ position is that while one might be tempted to read the play as a 
vindication of an ancient art or religious custom, it is really, instead, an indictment of 
those who would reduce knowing to one sense modality, a pose which merely 
reaffirms the basic axiom that there is “more than meets the eye.”  This is far from a 
controversial or “anti-rational” stance.  “  
By far, Champlin’s most intriguing point is the connection she draws between 
Parmenides use of the word for “method” or “right road.”  Champlin notes the index 
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of Diels’ Fragmente to show that Parmenides used the word ὁδός seven times and, as 
such, should be regarded as the “originator of the use of the word ὁδός to mean a 
‘method’ of inquiry” (344).  She asks, “Is it too bold to make a conjecture that 
Sophocles appropriated this use of the word ὁδός and from precisely this source, 
inasmuch as the play is one in which Oedipus pursues truth by the ‘method’ of 
persistent investigation?”   
In the end, Oedipus’ hostility toward Tiresias becomes symbolic of all four 
biases.  First, as dramatic bias, Oedipus’ fears interfere with his ability to consider the 
prophet’s words as true or, at the very least, as possibly true.  Second, as individual 
bias, Oedipus elevates himself over and above Tiresias, and even the rest of Thebes, 
even gloating that the prophet was little help during the Sphinx’s reign of terror.  
Third, as group bias, Oedipus (and Jocasta) identify Tiresias as an “other.”  He is 
quickly lumped into a “group” above which Oedipus’ group is superior.   But it is the 
fourth bias, general bias, which becomes most important in assessing Sophocles 
commentary on the ontological error.  Oedipus ad hominem mockery of the blind man 
become symbolic of a general bias against people who do knowing in a different way.  
If we take Tiresias as symbolic of any kind of understanding that is not merely “taking 
a look” (a fact made obvious by the irony of his blindness) we see that the play is 
loaded with indictments of soothsaying.  And while I am not trying to suggest that 
soothsaying is legitimate business, the attack on soothsaying is really an attack on a 
kind of knowledge that is not a function of “sight.” In fact, as Knox points out, this 





More importantly, the pattern in which Oedipus now finds himself is an inter-
subjective, inter-personal one involving a cast of other characters such as Creon, 
Tiresias, Jocasta and various messengers with whom Oedipus must engage. Oedipus 
proceeds with a confidence that is fueled by one past success – his solving the riddle 
of the Sphinx.   But, we must ask, should Oedipus be this confident?  Is the present 
puzzle similar to the one he famously solved?  Clearly, Oedipus and the suppliants 
think it is.  But their assumptions are rather strange.  The real irony of the play 
becomes a systemic failure, both on Oedipus’ part and the Thebans, to recognize that 
the present dilemma is not the same as the last one.   
Likewise, Oedipus is coming to understand himself as a part of a whole, a 
related network of personal and civic relationships beyond his local sphere, just as 
the family tree diagram explains.  So, while the Greeks may have relied on prophecy 
as an agency (albeit flawed) of understanding the “Divine Order,” this attempt is no 
less true than today’s efforts in physics to see how we fit.  The Greeks, in this sense, 
were correct and the text is no more archaic than our attempts now.  If we want to 
read Oedipus as somehow a “vindication” of the ancient (archaic) worldview, it is only 
a vindication insofar as the ancient worldview is not in the slightest archaic.  We still 
strive to understand our place, just as Oedipus does on the microcosmic level.  As 
Lonergan notes, explanatory understanding, “Reveals to man a universe of being in 
which he is but an item in a universal order, in which his desires and fears, his delight 
and anguish, are but infinitesimal components in the history of mankind.”253  
 
                                                        





Concluding Thoughts   
 
At this point I must anticipate what might be perceived as a danger in my 
argument.  One might ask, why are you making all these points about Oedipus’ failure 
to understand or his failure to understand what it means to understand when the 
horrible fate that befalls him has befallen him long ago, prior to any of these failures?  
In other words, it’s not as if we may attribute his fate to these failures, as in, “See? This 
is what you get when you don’t understand properly.”  Dodds’ has made this very 
point and in a highly effective way.  He argues that even if we could discern some kind 
of error on Oedipus’ part, “it would have no direct relevance to the question at issue. 
Years before the action of the play begins, Oedipus was already an incestuous 
parricide; if that was a punishment for his unkind treatment of Creon, then the 
punishment preceded the crime which is surely an odd kind of justice. 'Ah,' says the 
traditionalist critic, 'but Oedipus' behaviour on the stage reveals the man he always 
was: he was punished for his basically unsound character.”254   
All of Dodds’ points are well-taken.  We cannot, after all, indict Oedipus for 
some kind of moral failure in human knowing when much of the tragedy that befalls 
him occurs prior to that failure.   Further, it would be hard to argue that the pollution 
implies vice, at least in the Aristotelian sense of choice and knowledge of particulars.   
My analysis would be incomplete then if it did not purport to show that the failures 
of Oedipus’ understanding are symptomatic of a systemic failure that predates him 
and which is expressed by the behavior of his parents, his adoptive parents, Jocasta 
and his Theban community – the attempt to restrict the unrestricted drive to know. 
                                                        





If, however, we can show that this failure is what Lonergan calls the social surd 
– the admixture of rational and irrational – and that Oedipus at Colonus ultimately 
demonstrates the love and healing and, ultimately, redemption that ultimately comes 
from adopting a more authentic rationality, complete with an affective element – then 
our analysis will be fair.  After all, as Dodds points out, moral flaws are often 
intellectual flaws at root and the average Greek did not make a distinction between 
the two.  This is a point to which we now turn, as we apply the foregoing analysis to 












The past two chapters were devoted to an analysis of the dynamic operations 
of a single consciousness: that of Oedipus.  Against this background we can now 
enlarge that discussion to treat of the milieu in which Oedipus’ consciousness 
operates and the way in which other conscious subjects interact with him within that 
milieu.  After all, Sophocles’ portrayal of particular communities and places is as vivid 
and complex as his portrayal of particular individuals.   
The “enlargement” of our analysis is consistent with what Lonergan calls 
“generalized empirical method.”  Recall that prior to this chapter we have been 
discussing a single cognitive event, insight, and the various interferences with that 
event, biases.  Recall also that the method by which Lonergan treats insight and bias 
is not the empirical method of natural science but a generalized method which 
“stands to the data of consciousness as empirical method stands to the data of 
sense.”255  We would be remiss, therefore, if we did not extend that method to the 
outer worlds of the play.  This approach entails a discussion of the larger communities 
in which Oedipus acts, namely Thebes and Colonus (and to a lesser extent, Corinth) in 
an effort to analyze not only, as Lonergan says, “the data within a single consciousness 
but also with the relations between different conscious subjects, between conscious 
subjects and their milieu or environment.”256   
                                                        







As I will show, this approach leads to a description of the communities of 
Thebes and Corinth as “cities in decline,” a function of bias, and Colonus as a region of 
redemption and healing, a function of a more compassionate intelligence, symbolized 
by Theseus, who stands as a far closer approximation to wisdom than any of the other 
patriarchal figures populating the play.  Unlike Theseus, it seems that Creon, 
Polyneices, Etocles and even Oedipus himself (like Laius before him) continue to 
engage in violent, obstinate, patriarchal politics, a group bias which precludes them 
from hearing other (especially female) vulnerable voices.  In a point which McCoy has 
stressed, Sophocles’ portrayal of Theseus’ commitment to intelligence and 
compassion in Oedipus at Colonus represents a “stark contrast to Creon’s relative 
impulsiveness.”257   Further, Theseus’ circumspect comportment also represents a 
stark contrast to Oedipus’ fiery obstinacy with Polyneices and, further still, Theseus’ 
courageous willingness to take responsibility of the tense situation in Colonus stands 
in stark contrast to Oedipus’ unwillingness to take any responsibility over his own 
calamity.   
I will further argue that Theseus’ commitment to xenia (guest-friendship) and 
aidos (mercy) underscore Lonergan’s claim that healing and love are capable of 
reversing the mischief and decline that bias causes.  As he says, “Where hatred sees 
only evil, love reveals values” and “Where hatred reinforces bias, love dissolves it” 
and, finally, “love can undo the mischief of decline and restore the cumulative process 
of progress.”258  One of the corollaries of my viewpoint is that while nihilistic readings 
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of Oedipus Tyrannus are certainly possible in a vacuum, those readings should be 
counterbalanced, or at least tempered, by Oedipus at Colonus, as the unintelligence 
and irresponsibility of bias (which may lead to the darkness of meaninglessness 
suggested in Oedipus Tyrannus) is reversed by Theseus’ compassionate overture.  Of 
course, this reversal turns out to be short-lived and the tragic cycle of decline 
continues in the Antigone, as Creon hoists the mantle of biased patriarchal obstinacy, 
failing, like Oedipus, to self-appropriate his own biases until he recognizes them in a 
direct insight which, also like Oedipus’, comes too late. 
 
Cycles of Decline and the Social Surd 
 
No community is perfect.  In any given community, amidst its intelligible 
schemes, rational programs and good people, one also finds unintelligible schemes, 
irrational programs and evil people.  All communities, in other words, are an 
admixture of the rational and the irrational.  Lonergan uses the phrase “social surd
” to describe the extent to which a community cumulatively deviates from perfect 
authenticity and moves instead toward irrationality.  He borrows the term from 
mathematics where “ surd”  connotes an irrational number that cannot be 
simplified, like √2 as opposed to √4.  In Insight, Lonergan writes, “…the social 
situation is the cumulative product of individual and group decisions, and as these 





situation becomes, like the complex number, a compound of the rational and 
irrational.”259   
Like Plato’s city-soul analogy, Lonergan adduces in Insight a parallel between 
the biased community and the individual biased consciousnesses which constitute 
that community.  The “surd” within the individual (his unintelligible schemes, 
irrational behaviors and evil actions) is a function of the biases discussed in Chapter 
2.  As Byrne notes, “Since this surd, rather than perfect authenticity, characterizes the 
lives of most people, to a lesser or greater extent, it poses the profound question about 
the possibility of living a truly good, authentic life.”260  It follows from this that the 
possibility of finding an authentic community is equally questionable.  Instead, more 
often than not, we find communities composed of biased individuals, unable to 
achieve authentic intellectual conversion.  The ability to live an authentic life, 
therefore, may very well be hindered by one’s communal conditions; these conditions 
may constitute a significant hindrance to one’s effective freedom, a phrase which I 
will discuss later.261  In an essay entitled, “The Absence of God in Modern Culture,” 
Lonergan notes, in cultures exists “the disastrous possibility of a conflict between 
human living as it can be lived and human living as a cultural superstructure dictates 
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it should be lived.”262  Communities with this special kind of tension – especially when 
the “cultural superstructure” is biased but the individual within it aspires not to be – 
are likely to encounter what Lonergan calls a cycle of decline which he subdivides into 
a “short cycle,” fueled by group bias and a “long cycle,” fueled by general bias.   
After treating “common sense and its subject” in Chapter 6 of Insight, Lonergan 
moves to an analysis of “common sense as object” in Chapter 7.  Lonergan has in mind 
here the “network of human relationships” that the practicality of common sense 
eventually engenders.  Whereas in primitive times human beings might have been 
content to identify “the good” with the simple satiating of desire, civil communities 
must enlarge their notion of “the good” to include what Lonergan calls the “good of 
order.”  The goodness of order and, inversely, the badness or evilness of chaos seems 
self-evident enough.  Lonergan explains that the good of order “consists in an 
intelligible pattern of relationships that condition the fulfillment of each man’s 
desires by his contributions to the fulfillment of the desires of others, and similarly 
protect each other from the object of his fears in the measure he contributes to 
warding off the objects feared by others.”263   
The pinnacle of the good of order is what Lonergan calls “Cosmopolis” which, 
presumably, is the closest approximation to perfect authenticity, a community in 
which all individuals within it have, through their unrestricted desires to know, most 
closely approximated the ever-moving horizon of total self-appropriation. Further, 
whatever Cosmopolis ultimately is – Lonergan initially treats it as an unknown X and 
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then describes some of its more obvious attributes and non-attributes – its success 
will ultimately come down to its ability to indemnify itself against the slings and 
arrows of chance.264   In a passage crucial to the forthcoming analysis, Lonergan says, 
“The challenge of history is for man progressively to restrict the realm of chance or 
fate or destiny and progressively to enlarge the realm of conscious grasp and 
deliberate choice.”265  As I will attempt to show in Chapter 4, adverting to the concept 
of “fate” in an effort to explain the trajectory of one’s life, on Lonergan’s view, amounts 
to a failure to exercise one’s effective freedom – in short, moral impotence.   
It follows that a community composed of individuals who advert to fate, as 
opposed to attempting to “enlarge the realm of conscious grasp and deliberate 
choice,” would be about as far from a Cosmopolis as possible.  In fact, there are plenty 
of instances throughout both Oedipus Tyrannus and Oedipus at Colonus in which what 
Oedipus attributes to fate might be, from a Lonergan perspective, construed as a 
failure, on the part of either Oedipus or his predecessors, to “enlarge the realm of 
conscious grasp and deliberate choice.”  There are plenty of characters throughout 
the plays, in other words, who could have been more discerning but who attribute 
their lack of discernment to fate.  Further, their lack of discernment often sets the 
conditions for limiting the sphere of choice for their progeny, limiting their effective 
freedom.  A community, in other words, of individuals who have not enlarged this 
realm will find itself in decline.  We need only consider, as a preview, the way in which 
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the sphere of choice open to Antigone has been woefully contracted by, first, the bias 
of her grandfather (Laius) and, second, the bias of her father, Oedipus and, third, the 
bias of her uncle, Creon.  And while she fights admirably against these conditions, they 
constitute such a limit that her actions may seem, especially to her, “fate-bound” even 
when they are not. 
 
The Shorter Cycle  
 
The “shorter cycle” of decline, according to Lonergan, is fueled by group bias.  
Group bias, which I have delayed discussing until now, is essentially individual 
egotism raised to the level of a group, in which one group exerts its dominance over 
another.  Of the “shorter cycle,” Lonergan writes, “The shorter cycle turns upon ideas 
that are neglected by dominant groups only to be championed later by depressed 
groups.”266   
One of the most vivid examples of the way in which decline can be caused by 
both group bias is illustrated in Frèdèric Basiat’s famous "Pétition des marchands de 
chandelles" (“The Candle-Maker’s Petition”).267  In that essay Bastiat offers a tongue-
in-cheek satirical example in which the candle makers in 19th century France, fearful 
of the economic “theory” of laissez faire capitalism, petition the state to take measures 
to literally block out the sun in the hopes of protecting their candle-making industry.   
We come to offer you a wonderful opportunity for your — what shall 
we call it? Your theory? No, nothing is more deceptive than theory. Your 
doctrine? Your system? Your principle? But you dislike doctrines, you 
have a horror of systems, as for principles, you deny that there are any 
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in political economy; therefore we shall call it your practice — your 
practice without theory and without principle. 
 
We are suffering from the ruinous competition of a rival who 
apparently works under conditions so far superior to our own for the 
production of light that he is flooding the domestic market with it at an 
incredibly low price; for the moment he appears, our sales cease, all the 
consumers turn to him, and a branch of French industry whose 
ramifications are innumerable is all at once reduced to complete 
stagnation. This rival, which is none other than the sun...”268 
  
While this example is clearly a Swiftian reductio ad absurdum, it nevertheless 
points to the problem Lonergan is highlighting – that groups often have a “blind spot” 
(scotoma) when it comes to assessing whether some changes constitute an aggregate 
good for society in general. Consider the more recent (and real) example of Uber.  In 
many American cities, particularly the city of Boston, the transportation 
infrastructure has not kept pace with population growth.  Transportation, in other 
words, has been become the equivalent of a declining research program.  The Uber 
app burst upon the scene and was wildly successful (particularly among young 
people) because it provided a needed service and, through the power of its 
technology, allowed riders to connect with drivers in mutually beneficial ways.  No 
longer did young people have to wait, sometimes for hours, for taxis after the bars 
closed at 2 a.m. and the MBTA had shut down (inexplicably) at 1 a.m, leaving a curious 
hour gap.269  
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Not surprisingly, lobbyists representing taxi drivers in many American cities 
(including Boston) immediately fought Uber, petitioning state and local government 
to stop Uber in various creative (bureaucratic) ways.  Instead of recognizing that Uber, 
while certainly not perfect in its own right, constituted progress, efficiency and order 
when compared the present state of affairs, the taxi drivers’ collective could not see 
beyond their own narrow group interest.  Rhetorical appeals were made to highlight 
the historical significance of taxis, the implication of which was taxis are not unlike 
moving historical landmarks and should be protected as such.  The taxi in the 
American city was a development, we were told, we could not afford to lose.   The taxi 
industry was, in other words, unable to regard the technological change as being in 
the “general good of society.”   Thus, in Insight, Lonergan writes,  
Were all the responses made by pure intelligences, continuous 
progress might be inevitable.  In fact, the responses are made by 
intelligences that are coupled with the ethos and the interests of 
groups, and while intelligence heads for change, group spontaneity 
does not regard all changes in the same cold light of the general good 
of society.  Just as the individual egoists puts further questions up to a 
point, but desists before reaching conclusions incompatible with his 
egoism, so also the group is prone to have a blind spot for the insights 
that reveal its well-being to be excessive or its usefulness at an end.270 
 
The most significant group bias in the Oedipus cycle is so enshrined in the 
cultural milieu that it nearly hides in plain sight.  It is the group bias of patriarchy to 
the disparagement of women.  As Professor Christopher Constas reminds students 
before surveying Greek tragedy, we must always recall that the Greeks were 1.) 
patriarchal 2.) slave-holding and 3.) xenophobic.271  The history of Greek philosophy, 
                                                        






for example, is populated only with men who are presented to eager undergraduates 
as bearers of the “cultural flower of the age.”  “But development,” as Lonergan writes, 
“guided by group egoism, is bound to be one-sided.  It divides the body social not 
merely into those that have and those that have not but also makes the former the 
representatives of the cultural flower of the age.”272  Greek tragedy, in contrast to 
Greek philosophy, offers us a glimpse of patriarchal characters who may present 
themselves as “representatives of the cultural flower of the age” but who are, in 
actuality, wilting under the weight of their own chauvinism, symbolized by their 
uncontrolled rage and/or obstinacy.  Instead of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, we have 
Laius, Oedipus and Creon, just to name a few. 
There are, however, glimpses in the Oedipus cycle in which that one-sided 
patriarchal violence gives way to what Christopher Long has called a “politics of the 
in between,” which is typically ushered in by compassion and love, often at the hands 
(and voice) of a woman.273  In “A Father’s Touch, A Daughter’s Voice,” Long argues 
that Sophocles deftly recruits the act of touching to be symbolic of a “politics of the 
between.”  He sees Colonus as a region, along with its leader, Theseus, as the vanguard 
of a new type of community, one rooted in compassion and mutual interdependence, 
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272 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 54. 
 
 273 Consider, if only as a preview, the way in which Antigone and, to a lesser 
extent, Ismene, are treated as props or bargaining chips throughout Oedipus at 





as opposed to the violent patriarchal politics that has dominated Thebes and which 
has, ostensibly, led to its present decline.  He writes,  
For the grove of the Eumenides marks the struggle between the politics 
of patriarchal domination driven by the compulsion to grasp and 
possess and the politics of compassion animated by the desire to be 
touched and recognized.  In and around the sacred grove of the 
Eumenides, a politics rooted not in violence and retribution, but in 
mutual dependence, compassion and respect emerges for a moment 
before succumbing again to the repetition compulsion endemic to 
patriarchal politics.274  
Long’s analysis fits Lonergan’s model despite the fact that there is, in Long’s 
politics of compassion a self-regard as opposed to true self-transcendence.  In Oedipus 
at Colonus, Antigone’s love for her father becomes the prima facie evidence that, as 
Lonergan says, “love can undo the mischief of decline and restore the cumulative 
process of progress.”275  Unfortunately, also in keeping with Lonergan’s notion of 
decline, Antigone’s tender touch (and her voice) are ultimately disregarded by 
stubborn men.  And so, while there are glimpses of a new and more authentic way of 
proceeding, ways in which patriarchal obstinacy yields to healing, these glimpses 
disappear behind the elongated shadows of brash men like eclipsed sunlight behind 
the shadow of the moon.  Long concurs, writing, “Yet, the possibilities that open at 
such moments of truth can dissolve as suddenly as they appear, for old habits reassert 
themselves, compelling the repetition of the very destructive modes of relation that 
led to crisis in the first place.”276   In a point to which I will return shortly, “the 
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repetition of destructive modes of relation” is analogous to the peaks and troughs, 
like a sine curve, of Lonergan’s short cycle of decline.   
 
The Longer Cycle  
 
In contrast to the shorter cycle, with its peaks and troughs, the longer cycle of 
decline, according to Lonergan, is far more protracted and occurs on the level of 
history, and represents an inverse of the kind of progress that higher viewpoints 
make in mathematics and empirical science.  Instead of higher viewpoints which lead 
to a flourishing community, a scenario arises in a community in which,  
 
each successive viewpoint is less comprehensive than its predecessor.  
In each stage of the historical process, the facts are the social situation 
produced by the practical intelligence of the previous situation… 
Finally, at each stage of the process, the general bias of common sense 
involves the disregard of timely and fruitful ideas; and this disregard 
not only excludes their implementation but also deprives subsequent 
stages both of the further ideas to which they would give rise and of the 
correction that they and their retinue would bring to the ideas that are 
implemented.277 
  
The upshot of the longer cycle of decline is that while common sense rises 
above dramatic, individual and group biases, it is still not up to the task of achieving 
the long term (theoretical) insights for a future.  One of the central problems is the 
way in which communities rely on common sense as opposed to more forward 
thinking, theoretical ideas.  One is reminded of Socrates’ warning that the voice of the 
visionary philosopher in the crow’s nest will be disregarded by the deckhands on his 
“ship of state.”  He asks his interlocutors, “Don’t you believe that the true pilot will 
really be called a stargazer, a prater, and useless to them by those who sail on ships 
                                                        





run like this?” (489a).278  And so, when it comes to finding solutions to persistent and 
growing problems, “common sense accepts the challenge, but it does so partially.”279  
As such, the longer cycle leads to three consequences according to Lonergan: 1.) The 
social situation deteriorates quickly. 2.) Detached and disinterested intelligence 
seems more and more irrelevant 3.) Detached and disinterested intelligence is 
ultimately surrendered at the altar of short-term (commonsensical) gains.  These 
consequences set the conditions for the “social surd,” defined above.    
A modern example of this phenomenon, in which the general bias of common 
sense disregards “fruitful and timely ideas” may be found in Pope Francis’ most recent 
encyclical, Laudato Si, in which he cites commonsensical objections to the 
environmental crisis, from “practical relativism” to the “need to protect 
employment.”280  These, on Lonergan’s view, would constitute the rallying cry for 
short-term gains, presumably at the expense of long-term theoretical solutions.  If, for 
example, the problem of “climate change” turns out to be as catastrophic as some say 
– a big “if,” to be sure – then history will look back on the present period as one in 
which many sacrificed forward-thinking, theoretical solutions (electric cars, 
hydrogen, nuclear power, etc.) on the altar of immediacy and commonsense, 
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provincial thinking.  The past 50 years may be viewed as a curious admixture of 
circumspect intelligence suppressed by the social surd. 
The good news, on Lonergan’s view, is that this surd, which is at the root of 
decline, can be conquered by the triumvirate of intelligence, healing and love.  The 
central metaphor on which Lonergan relies is the differential. He writes that the 
dialectic of history involves “the concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles 
that are modified cumulatively by the unfolding.”281   For Lonergan, history is the 
product of the way in which the differentials of intelligence, bias and healing/love 
interact.  Byrne nicely characterizes the three differentials as: 1.) Intelligence 
(Reasonableness and Responsibility) 2.) Bias (or sin) and 3.) Redemption (Love as 
healing biases).  As Byrne has pointed out, we may visually represent as a heuristic 
structure Lonergan’s schema via the three differentials in a graph of a cubic 
polynomial equation.  For example, the graph of the equation y = x³ - 5x² - 2x +5, 
pictured below, might represent a city in which insights flourished until bias wreaked 
havoc for a time (the dip in the graph) before love and healing (courtesy of direct and 
inverse insights282) correct the trajectory: 
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As the graph above would indicate, the good news is that all is not lost; decline, in 
other words, is not irrevocable.  After all, X³ has a positive coefficient (1).  If the 
decline of a culture is a function of its bias, insofar as bias constitutes a departure 
from reasonableness and responsibility, the decline may be reversed through healing 
and love.  Lonergan writes, “Where hatred plods around in ever narrower vicious 
circles, love breaks the bonds of psychological and social determinisms with the 
conviction of faith and the power of hope.” A religious community, for example, takes 
for its mission the healing and love that comes from self-sacrifice in the hope of 
correcting a cycle of decline.  Thus Lonergan adds that “a religion that promotes self-
transcendence to the point, not merely of justice, but of self-sacrificing love, will have 
a redemptive role in human society inasmuch as love can undo the mischief of decline 
and restore the cumulative process of progress.”283  Incidentally, there is a sense by 
the end of Oedipus at Colonus that Oedipus will play a quasi-religious self-sacrificing 
and redemptive role for Attica. 
 
                                                        





Thebes in Decline: Miasma as Metaphor…But a Metaphor for What?  
 
We know that in Oedipus Tyrannus, Sophocles goes to great lengths to portray 
Thebes as a city in precipitous decline.  Recall that as the play opens Thebes finds 
itself befouled by miasma, or pollution.  Thebes has “plunged headlong into the depths 
of disaster” and that “desolation wastes away the harvest/Destroys our herds and 
grazing fields/Blights the women and makes them barren.” 284   On one reading, 
miasma becomes a metaphor for forces beyond our control, forces against which our 
inquiries seem fruitless, or, if fruitful at all, reveal only how little we know and, in light 
of this fact, how impotent we ultimately are in acting.  We would be especially 
impotent, or so it would seem, at restricting, as Lonergan says, “the realm of chance 
or fate or destiny.”  Miasma, on this reading, symbolizes the terrifying possibility that 
our universe may be an unfriendly one, to use Lonergan’s phrase, in which 
unintelligibility and irrationality reign.  As Charles Segal points out,  
 
Antigone and Oedipus raise questions about the power of 
Enlightenment Man and suggest that his life is still surrounded by the 
mysterious forces of the archaic worldview, forces less amenable to 
human understanding and control.  According to this older paradigm, 
nature is not merely an inert, passive object for human domination but 
an organically connected network of animate beings that stand in 
delicately balanced, mutually responsive relations to one another.  
Imbalance or violation in one area will produce some kind of 
disturbance in another; and the resultant disaster and its ramifications 
may be on a far greater scale than the original crime.285   
 
Segal is correct insofar as Sophocles provides many speeches to support, 
(especially if a reader is already inclined to such a bleak metaphysics) a reading of the 
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play that is hostile to rationality and to the possibility of finding meaning.  On that 
kind of reading, the unrestricted desire to know leads only to despair and 
hopelessness, when we perceive (but don’t understand) “mysterious forces” which 
can become, to paraphrase Shakespeare’s Banquo, “instruments of darkness” that 
lead to our demise.  
This pessimistic viewpoint was made most famous by Nietzsche, who writes, 
“Wisdom, the myth seems to whisper to us, is an unnatural abomination: whoever 
plunges nature into the abyss of destruction by what he knows must in turn 
experience the dissolution of nature in his own person. The sharp point of wisdom 
turns against the wise man; wisdom is an offence against nature.”286  Nietzsche’s 
viewpoint essentially holds that Sophocles’ tragedies only reaffirm the pessimistic 
judgment rendered by the satyr Silenus in the presence of King Midas.  After learning 
that Silenus, the teacher of Dionysus, is reputed to know the best thing to know, Midas 
vows to capture him.  When Silenus finally has “fallen into his hands,” the intrepid 
satyr still will not speak.  Finally, but only when compelled, does Silenus break “out 
in shrill laughter and says: ‘Wretched, ephemeral race, children of chance and 
tribulation, why do you force me to tell you the very thing which it would be most 
profitable for you not to hear?  The very best thing is utterly beyond your reach not 
to have been born, not to be, to be nothing.  However, the second best thing for you is: 
to die soon.”287 
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Nietzsche is of course correct that there are, admittedly, moments in Oedipus 
Tyrannus which seem to affirm Silenus’ pessimistic (virtually unconditioned?) 
judgment that ours is an unfriendly universe.  For example, in the 5th Chorus, Strophe 
A, we hear the chorus ask,  
 
Oh, what a wretched breed  
We mortals are:  
Our lives add up to nothing.   
Does anyone, anyone at all  
Harvest more of happiness  
Than a vacant image,  
And from that image fall away?   
You are my pattern,  
Your fortune is mine,  
You, Oedipus, your misery teaches me  
To call no mortal blessed (1186-1190)  
 
Later, in Oedipus at Colonus, the chorus chillingly repeats Silenus’ dictum 
almost verbatim, chanting, “The best is never to have been born/Or, once alive, die 
young/And return to oblivion” (1225-1228).  It seems clear in lines such as these that 
Sophocles is dramatically exploiting the subsequently well-explored position that 
there exists an inverse proportion between knowledge and happiness, the basic 
equation of which is that the more intelligent one becomes, the less happy one will 
be, as knowledge of “the truth of things” discloses the horrors of a universe always 
and forever conspiring to chew us up and spit us out.  This is a trope famously 
championed by the British Romantics, under the influence of Rousseau, extending 
from Wordsworth to Coleridge and reaching its pinnacle in Shelley’s Frankenstein, in 
which “the monster” becomes more and more disillusioned (and bitter) the more 
educated he becomes.  Clearly, Sophocles too encourages his audience (at the very 





dangerous if not catastrophic to their pursuer and it would therefore follow that a 
better trajectory for a human being would be to remain innocent and ignorant or, if 
Silenus is correct, dead.288  This position would imply, to invert the famous JS Mill line, 
it would be better to be a satisfied pig than a Socrates dissatisfied. 
In Wounded Heroes, McCoy uses the helpful phrase “epistemological reversal” 
to characterize this trope.  McCoy points out that throughout Oedipus there is a 
“reversal of the epistemological order, where the discovery of new knowledge 
becomes an evil and leads to misery instead of joy.”289  One might be tempted to 
construe this “reversal” as constituting a rejection of a basic premise in Lonergan’s 
work that avows the intrinsic goodness of questioning.  In fact, Sophocles seems to go 
to great lengths to subvert, as McCoy writes, the “normal experience of understanding 
wisdom or seeing the truth as a joyful experience, one that satisfies our desire to 
understand, a natural fit between what we want and the world itself.”290 
One is reminded of Macbeth’s famous lament in Act V, Scene 5 that “Life’s but 
a walking shadow, a poor player/that struts and frets his hour upon the stage/And 
then is heard no more.  It is a tale/Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,/signifying 
nothing.”291  Oedipus Tyrannus might also be said to depict the human experience as 
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fumbling in the darkness down a path believed to lead to happiness and authenticity 
but which only crumbles with our footfalls.  We cannot choose not to choose and when 
we do choose, we act with incomplete understanding.  As Blondel once wrote, “I act, 
but without even knowing what action is.” 292   This precarious human condition 
reaches its zenith, of course, in Oedipus’ killing of his own father “accidentally.”  The 
very possibility of this would have been a horrifying notion to the average Greek.  As 
McCoy points out, “Arguably, for many Ancient Greeks, the concept that one could 
accidentally kill one’s father, in ignorance, is even more upsetting than the idea of 
choosing to do so.”293   
For Bernard Knox (and Charles Segal), the prodigious fear of our best-laid 
plans crumbling beneath us, presumably without cause, may take as its model the 
person of Pericles. Knox specifically pursues this line of analysis in an effort to show 
that the Athenian audience would have recognized Pericles in Oedipus’ character.  
Further, they would have adduced the connection, one which Lonergan also draws, 
between the character of the individual and the character of the larger community of 
which they were a part to the point at which Oedipus’ biases would have appeared to 
them to be Athens’ biases.  Knox’s analysis flows from the premise that the Athenian 
community would have seen itself, warts and all, reflected in the play, as Sophocles 
intentionally wove within the narrative contemporary cultural commentary, a 
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common tactic of the tragedians.294  “Tragedy,” says Knox, “was conceived in terms of 
contemporary situations and attitudes.  Such an assumption is justified not only by 
many incidental details in this play, but also by the regular practice of Athenian tragic 
poets.”295   
As Knox points out, one of Pericles’ more famous claims, recounted in 
Thucydides, is eerily reminiscent of Oedipus’ way of proceeding throughout the play.  
As Pericles famously said, “We do not believe that discussion is an impediment to 
action.  We are unique in our combination of most courageous action with rational 
discussion of our projects, whereas others are either overcourageous from ignorance 
or made cautious by reasoning.” 296   Pericles was also reputed to have said that 
Athens’ defeat of Persia was due to “intelligence rather than chance.” 297  Knox’s 
argument culminates in a brilliant (and apt) comparison between Oedipus as a 
character and the character of Athens at the apex of its political dominance, 
summarizing the connection between both as,  
A constant will to action, grounded in experience, inspired by courage, 
expressing itself in speed and impatience but informed by intelligent 
reflection, endowed with the self-confidence, optimism, and versatility 
of the brilliant amateur, and marred by oversuspicion and occasional 
outbursts of demonic anger – this is the character of Athens and 
Oedipus alike …298 
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Given the connection between Oedipus and Pericles, Thebes and Athens, most 
terrifying to the Greek audience then was the prospect that, like Oedipus’, Athens had, 
to paraphrase Eliot, “seen the moment of its greatness flicker and, in short, was 
afraid.”  The “unforeseen catastrophe,” to use Charles Segal’s phrase, of the great 
plague that struck Athens between 429-425 may therefore have been the source for 
Sophocles use of miasma.  Segal writes, “The Oedipus is generally regarded as a 
response to events of this period.  An unexpected, supernatural-seeming disaster 
suddenly sweeps away brilliant hopes; confidence in human reason and calculation 
is shattered, and greatness swiftly turns into misery.” 299   Just as Pericles lost 
everything in the grip of the plague in spite of his greatness, Oedipus too is struck 
down, in spite of his gifts for riddle-solving and swift intelligent action.   
Pericles’ death from the plague may have inspired the theme of 
Oedipus’ fall.  Events beyond human control thwart a leaders’ victory 
for his city, as with Pericles’ careful planning for Athens’ victory over 
its enemy Sparta in the Peloponnesian War and Oedipus’ salvation of 
Thebes with his victory over the Sphinx.  The play could, then, have 
been seen by Sophocles’ contemporaries not just as a warning against 
pride or confidence but as a compassionate recognition that a great 
man’s noble enterprise can collapse because of unforeseen events, or 
simply as an objective statement of life’s uncertainties, of which 
Pericles was the most striking instance.300  
 
It should come as no surprise at this point in our analysis that Lonergan too is 
sympathetic to this worldview and, in spite of an overall sanguine view of our capacity 
for authenticity, nevertheless offers his own “compassionate recognition that a great 
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man’s noble enterprise can collapse.” In Method and Theology, he asks the following 
provocative question for judgment: “But is the universe on our side, or are we just 
gamblers and, if we are gamblers, are we not perhaps fools, individually struggling 
for authenticity and collectively endeavoring to snatch progress from the ever 
mounting welter of decline?”301  
Far from an epistemological reversal, Lonergan’s implicit answer to this 
question is woven into the unrestricted desire to know which, while leading perhaps 
to uncomfortable insights, can and does also set the conditions for insights (and 
inverse insights) into corrective measures and, therefore, redemption.   In fact, the 
upward slope of our graphic illustration of the mischief that bias (group and general) 
causes within the historical life of a community illuminates a position that stands 
opposed to the counter-position of Nietzsche and others.  It is my contention that this 
opposing position may be defended with equal zeal when Oedipus at Colonus is 
included in an analysis of Oedipus Tyrannus, as the idea of an “epistemological 
reversal” faces significant challenges.  
Further, I would argue that as an exemplar of the Athenian par excellence, 
Pericles, in spite of his untimely death, only reaffirms in his speech above Lonergan’s 
earlier claim that the progress of a community is proportional to the extent to which 
it indemnifies itself against chance – via intelligence, or, in this case, a courageous 
intelligence – and that this indemnification is what ultimately separates a flourishing 
community from a declining one which, in contrast, presumably falls victim to the 
                                                        





trappings of various biases – including, but not limited to, reasoning to a fault, the so-
called “paralysis of analysis” – which preclude intelligent, discerning action.   
The most important thread in this strand of argument holds that while it is 
true that Sophocles goes to great lengths in the opening of Oedipus Tyrannus to show 
that Thebes is a city in decline in which innocents are suffering without cause, 
Oedipus, through his questioning, does ultimately discover the cause: himself.  The 
concrete situation is not, after all, unintelligible, even though Oedipus’ existential 
situation, including questions about the value of and apparent inevitability of 
suffering may still be unintelligible to him. 
Nature has disclosed a serious problem, to be sure, but the unrestricted desire 
to know has also disclosed a solution courtesy of insight.  Further, in spite of 
numerous references to the inexorability of fate and the impotence of human agency, 
Sophocles also goes to great lengths to portray the present pollution (miasma) as the 
byproduct or cumulative effect of undiscerning human choices that have, over time, 
“worked mischief” in the cycle of progress.  Here the analogy between miasma and 
the great plague of Athens begins to break down when we, as audience, ask the 
question for intelligence, “but what is the cause of the miasma in the play?  Is it a 
random event with no etiology?  Or, is it the byproduct of human agency?”  It is hard, 
in other words, to totally accept the notion that the actual historical plague, an 
“unforeseen catastrophe” in the traditional sense, is totally analogous to the 
“unforeseen catastrophe” of Oedipus’ fall, especially when Sophocles depicts a long 
train of abuses of intelligence and responsibility (and even hatred) which 





A biological plague, in other words, is not the byproduct of accumulating bias within 
the consciousnesses of many disparate individuals but the miasma Sophocles so 
vividly depicts in Oedipus Tyrannus is.302 
Consider, first, the “differentials” of Laius and Jocasta and, then, second, 
Polybus and Merope and the way in which their behaviors cumulatively magnify the 
surd.  First, Laius and Jocasta make an immediate, almost knee-jerk decision to 
commit infanticide, a heartless and evil choice at worse; an undiscerning and 
capricious one at best.  Sophocles provides no indication that the choice to kill the 
baby Oedipus, the most vulnerable of the vulnerable, was a decision reached by an 
assiduous ethics of discernment, as if such a decision ever could be.  Jocasta merely 
says, “And our son?  He did not last three days./Laius yoked his feet and had him 
thrown away – /By other people – into a wilderness of mountains” (717-719).  We 
can only infer from this revelation that there was little questioning of the choice on 
Laius’ part and, in keeping with the group bias of patriarchy, we sense there was also 
no marital discussion about the fate of the boy.303    Was Jocasta’s a voice considered 
in the choice?  Did she consent to it?  Would her consent even matter in such a surded 
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milieu?  In the pivotal exchange just prior to his insight, Oedipus calls the choice 
callous: 
Herdsman: Your wife’s the one who’d answer best.  
Oedipus: She gave it to you? 
Herdsman: She did, sir. 
Oedipus: For what reason? 
Herdsman: So I would destroy it. 
Oedipus: Her own baby?  So callous. (Lines) 
 
We may infer that Laius no doubt abused his privileged position as monarch 
in recruiting “other people” to carry out the deed instead of getting his own hands 
dirty with the blood of an infant.304  In fact, as we see in Oedipus Tyrannus with the 
appearance of the Theban herdsman, Laius’ choice to recruit “other people” proves to 
be one which, to paraphrase Macbeth, “returns to plague its inventor.”  The network 
of other actors who aid and abet the original crime may, in fact, be more evidence of 
“group bias.”  At first glance, the Theban herdsman seems to be the exception that 
proves the rule, insofar as he disregards the royal command by handing off the baby 
Oedipus to the Corinthian shepherd.  And yet, from another angle, one might also add 
the Theban herdsmen to the growing list of individuals who suppress the truth when, 
apparently, upon returning to Thebes after handing off the baby Oedipus, he chooses 
not to disclose this fact to Laius or Jocasta.  Obviously, he has a strong motivation in 
not doing so (self-protection) but one wonders if this instinct constitutes an 
individual bias.  Needless to say, the Theban herdsman’s choice to disobey the 
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additional evidence of group bias.  We do know, however, that the Shepherd 
ultimately decides (authentically?) to disregard the command and thus may be the 
exception who proves the rule, additional evidence that group bias may be conquered 





command is grounded in pity.  When Oedipus asks him, “Then why did you give him 
to this old man?”, the Herdsman tells us, “I took pity on him, sir” (1178-1179).  As 
Byrne has pointed out, “the Shepherd’s choice to disregard the command as a result 
of his affective self, the feeling of pity, foreshadows precisely what Oedipus is unable 
to do at the end of the play: pity himself and thus disregard his own command to 
punish himself.”305 
Sophocles then doubles-down on this parental irresponsibility in describing 
the surded behavior of Corinth’s monarchs as well, Polybus and Merope, as they 
collude in their deception, hiding the truth from their son.306  Not only do they flat-
out lie to Oedipus when met with his authentic inquiry, they even feign (apparently) 
indigence at the rumor.  Oedipus tells us, 
A drunken dinner guest filled with wine 
Blurted out that I was not my father’s son. 
It was all I could do that day to control my rage. 
But on the next day, I went to my mother and father 
Seeking some explanation, and they were furious 
That anyone would speak such spurious slander. (779-784) 
 
The notion that Polybus and Merope could have been “furious” at what they 
identify to the curious adolescent Oedipus as “spurious slander” only heightens the 
severity of their sophistry.  They know well the truth and, were they more discerning 
(and therefore more intelligent and responsible) they might have come to a shared 
parental judgment, rooted in discernment, that their adolescent son deserved the 
truth.  Instead they uncritically decide to restrict the unrestricted desire to know by 
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offering their own “spurious slander” (an irony which is not lost on us) which then 
sets the conditions for Oedipus’ decision to flee Corinth and seek the Oracle.  The 
chain of events, while apparently fate-bound from one perspective, might actually be 
construed, from the perspective of Lonergan, as the cumulative effect of 
irresponsibility.   
Obviously, Polybus and Merope’s lie does not achieve the desired effect but 
instead, in typical Sophoclean fashion, achieves the opposite effect, as Oedipus tells 
us, “I was consoled, but a rumor creeps in stealth,/And soon enough it started to grate 
on my mind./I left in secret; my mother and father never knew/I went to Delphi” 
(785-787).  In these lines we see that while the unrestricted desire to know may have 
been quelled temporarily (“I was consoled, but…”) the desire could not be suppressed 
for long.  Recall our earlier discussion in Chapter 2 that “truth will out” but only 
insofar as authentic subjects “out it” through inquiry and insight.  Polybus and 
Merope’s undiscerning choice to lie sets the conditions for an emotional adolescent, 
now all alone on the road, having been deceived by those entrusted to be honest, to 
make the ultimate rash decision to slaughter a man at mysterious “place where three 
roads meet”: 
I traveled to a place where three roads meet 
And saw a herald coming toward me 
Followed by a horse-drawn carriage, 
And seated inside, a man, just as you said, 
We met, then the herald and the old man 
Ordered me out of their way, forcing ahead. 
Run off the road, I furiously struck the driver, 
The old man saw this and as his carriage passed 
He cracked his two-pronged goad down on my head 
And I swiftly smashed my walking stick square 
Across his shoulders; he spun headlong out of his carriage, 






We may now add to our accumulating list of irresponsibility that the rage-filled 
murder described above, the condition for which is adolescent confusion initiated by 
a parental lie, and which could have been but was not ameliorated, sets the conditions 
for a now King-less Thebes.  A King-less Thebes in turn sets the conditions for 
Oedipus’ role in occupying the vacant throne and, as such, his subsequent decision to 
immediately bed a woman 20 years his senior, another undiscerning choice given the 
prophecy he has just received.   
Reviewing this chain of events in this manner – that is, against the backdrop of 
inauthentic choices which cumulatively accelerate communal decline – only further 
illuminates the absurdity of Jocasta’s own worldview, one that offers almost zero 
hope in human intelligence indemnifying itself against chance.  She asks, “Why be 
afraid?  Chance governs human life,/And we can never know what is to come./Live 
day by day, as best you can” (Lines 977-980).  If chance really did govern human life, 
Jocasta, why take steps to kill your baby?  We hear in these lines the voice of a woman 
powerfully indoctrinated by a contradictory cultural superstructure that is at once 
hostile to questioning, to the point of advocating a total surrender of the power of 
human intelligence, and yet advocates taking swift action, like infanticide, to avoid 
future deleterious effects.  Yet this defeatist attitude should come as no surprise given 
that Sophocles makes the figureheads of these communities, kings and queens, go to 
the greatest lengths to restrict the unrestricted desire to know.  The trajectories of 
both Thebes and Corinth might therefore be represented by the graph below, where 
the initial plummeting of the curve is Jocasta and Laius’ decision to kill their 





which could have been fruitful, and the second plummeting of the curve Polybus and 
Merope’s inauthentic choice to shield their child from a truth to which he was entitled.  
 
 
The hostility to questioning, which precludes the curve from rising upward 
again, comes further into relief when Oedipus chastises his Theban “children” for 
neglecting the spirit of inquiry that, if embraced, would have discovered the identity 
of their king’s killer far earlier.  Recall his shouts, “Your ruler had been murdered!  
What crisis/Could have kept you from a complete investigation?” (128-129). Oedipus’ 
reopening of the investigation becomes the moment the curve turns upward again 
where it will rise until the “epistemological reversal.”  Meanwhile, the speech is 
loaded with the irony that the habit of restricting the unrestricted desire to know was 
(apparently) inculcated upon Oedipus, at least for a time, between his departure from 
the Sphinx and the present time of suppliants arriving at his palace gate. We are left 
to infer that at some point around the time he was crowned King of Thebes, even 





Thebes, apparently, has that effect on people.  And so, in spite of his reputation for 
intelligence and swift action, sustained discernment and self-appropriation are not 
among his virtues in Thebes. 
 
ἅγος and μίασμα: A Modern Retelling of the Oedipus Myth  
 
Consider the following story.  It might even make for an excellent Hollywood 
script.  Imagine the CEO of some Fortune 500 company, an industrial corporation 
perhaps.  This CEO is beloved by his underlings for having swept in years earlier and, 
through his cleverness, saving the corporation from a hostile takeover.  The CEO has 
thrived off that reputation for years and, even as an outsider, has won over the hearts 
of his employees of whom he now thinks as his children.   
But now, when we meet him in the first scene, things are in decline.  Profits are 
down and layoffs are inevitable, as rumors swirl regarding the corporation’s 
environmental responsibility.  The shareholders approach the CEO in supplication, 
asking him to take the lead on discerning the cause of the rumors which have caused 
stock shares to plummet.  He vows to conduct an internal investigation of the 
corporation’s business practices.  The CEO’s questions lead to insights that, long ago, 
in a moment of heightened emotion, he authorized policies that circumvented certain 
regulations.  It turns out that the Corporation has been polluting a small town and 
that now there is an abnormally high rate of cancer.  The CEO recognizes that the 
investigation, if continuously pursued, will provide needed healing for the town and 
possibly even save the Corporation’s reputation but, in doing so, it will also destroy 
him, as he discovers that it was his directive, long ago, which caused corners to be cut.  





ethical human being.  In the end, he chooses to expose his indiscretions, resigns and, 
maybe, he gouges out his eyes in front of the board in the final scene.   
Now, it is true that the fictitious scenario described above, if played out, would 
constitute an “epistemological reversal” of sorts.  The CEO’s unrestricted desire to 
know, is in this instance, would bring despair.  But despair for whom?  For the CEO, 
yes.  But certainly not for the community suffering from the pollution.  Instead, his 
questions and investigation would constitute the beginning of a communal healing 
process that has been too long delayed by either the CEO’s narrow self-interest 
(individual bias) or the Corporation’s narrow group interest (group bias).  In fact, a 
graph of the situation depicting the decline of the corporation might be different from 
the one depicting the fate of the polluted community.  Strangely enough, the 
“upswing” for the community might even be said to begin the moment the CEO begins 
to inquire into himself and, as such, the so-called “epistemological reversal” is, when 
viewed holistically, the beginning of the road to healing in spite of it constituting the 







Now add the following dimension to the story: in addition to the human toll, 
the outrage over the pollution that the Corporation has brought about through its 
own irresponsible policy comes from two distinct camps.  On the one hand, the 
environmental movement, which is primarily secular, sees the polluted town as an 
assault on nature itself.  On the other hand, there are the religious objectors who see 
the corporation’s actions as an irresponsible assault on a covenant made with God to 
be stewards of the world.307 
These two types of objectors, hardly foreign to us today, appear in Sophocles 
too, as he deftly uses the concept of pollution to symbolize the imbalance that has 
been caused by the unintelligent, biased or evil actions.  In Wounded Heroes, McCoy, 
citing Parker, points out that the ancient Greeks recognized two forms of pollution: 
ἅγος and μίασμα.  As McCoy notes, “While μίασμα is the idea of something being 
polluted in the sense of contaminated, the term ἅγος also means more specifically 
something directed against the gods and their rules – not only contaminated, but also 
                                                        
307 See, for example, Pope Francis’ Laudato Si, in which he calls for a dialogue 
between the two camps of environmentalists: “201. The majority of people living on 
our planet profess to be believers. This should spur religions to dialogue among 
themselves for the sake of protecting nature, defending the poor, and building 
networks of respect and fraternity. Dialogue among the various sciences is likewise 
needed, since each can tend to become enclosed in its own language, while 
specialization leads to a certain isolation and the absolutization of its own field of 
knowledge. This prevents us from confronting environmental problems effectively. 
An open and respectful dialogue is also needed between the various ecological 
movements, among which ideological conflicts are not infrequently encountered. The 
gravity of the ecological crisis demands that we all look to the common good, 
embarking on a path of dialogue which demands patience, self-discipline and 







‘unholy’.”308  Like today, there are more than a few secular environmentalists who 
treat harming the environment as an offense against nature qua nature (miasma).  
Other environmentalists, inspired by a religious injunction to be stewards of God’s 
world, treat harming the environment as an offense against nature but also as an 
unholy act against the source of nature itself (agos).   
There is a sense in which Lonergan’s distinction between bias and sin mirrors 
this dichotomy.  For Lonergan, what is a bias from the human perspective can also be 
a sin against God from God’s perspective.   Take the egoist, for example.  On the one 
hand, the egotist is guilty of individual bias and is to be chastised for the deleterious 
effect he has on his community (and possibly nature) by elevating his own good over 
the good of others and contributing to the social surd.  On the other hand, he has 
committed the sin of pride, the greatest of all sins.  From the perspective of “the gods,” 
or in this case, the Christian God, he has duplicated the choice that Lucifer makes, 
elevating himself above God.  And, like our example, the egotist might be equally 
rebuked by the secular humanist for his egotism and by the Christian for committing 
the sin of pride.  Most importantly, my modern version of the Oedipus myth above 
demonstrates in a more pronounced way that whether one prefers a secular 
perspective or a religious one, the pollution that has wreaked havoc on the 
community is ultimately a function of the inauthentic and undiscerning behavior of 
people within the community and that one person’s identity and happiness may be 
sacrificed at the altar of communal healing. 
                                                        





Further, I would argue that, in the end, the two opposed ways of reading 
miasma as metaphor – either as the byproduct of uncritical, undiscerning human 
action or, on the other hand, as pure chance – are not necessarily as mutually 
exclusive as they initially seem.  We can, as an audience, be asked to meditate on both 
possibilities in our world – on the one hand, pollution that is the byproduct of a 
natural order the machinations of which we do not yet know and may never know, 
and, on the other, pollution of the sort of which human agency is the demonstrable 
cause.   Both seem equally disconcerting, but it seems clear that when Oedipus at 
Colonus is added to the equation, Sophocles seems far less concerned with cause and 
blame but instead with the larger question of, what can human intelligence and 
compassion do in the face of such decline?  What weapons have we in our arsenal to 
ameliorate this kind of suffering?  In other words, “Colonus,” when added, seems to 
indicate that Sophocles offers ample evidence against a totally pessimistic, fatalistic 
(Nietzschean) reading.  Instead, Sophocles provides a narrative that fits the Lonergan 
paradigm of historical process.  Human beings, it seems, are adept at causing 
problems through bias and evil.  Yet they also have the wherewithal, via intelligence, 
healing and love, to correct them.  And, in spite of our inevitable failures, some 
communities seem closer to a horizon of conversion than others.  The question is: 
how? 
 
Colonus as Antidote  
 
If Knox’s view is correct that Thebes is Athens in the metaphorical sense given 
the premise that, according to Knox, “tragedy was conceived in terms of 





What did the Athenian audience see in Colonus? A new Athens?  A return to the 
promise of the old Athens?  An Athens which treats women differently than its 
present patriarchy?  An Athens which treats strangers differently than its present 
xenophobia?  A healthy Athens, devoid of plague?  A healing land?  A land of 
redemptive possibilities?   
In this section I offer a close reading of Oedipus at Colonus which endeavors to 
show that we may understand Colonus as a region that accommodates the healing of 
the mischief caused by bias.  The first piece of data to suggest this reading is, quite 
simply, its location.  Colonus is, after all, a liminal space, a trope which has never failed 
to garner mysteriousness in accommodating various reversals.  The word “liminal” 
comes from the Latin “limen” which means “of or pertaining to a threshold.” A liminal 
space is therefore neither here nor there.  It stands between two clearly defined 
boundaries.  The gloaming, for example, is neither night nor day and adopts an air of 
mystery to us because it transcends the binaries (day/night, off/on, fight/flight) our 
brain enjoys.   
Shakespeare, for example, sets the opening scene of The Tragedy of Macbeth in 
a “desert place.”  It is a place between the Scottish castles where, as Mathew Arnold 
once wrote, “ignorant armies clash by night,” and which accommodates the three 
Wyrd sisters (who have no allegiance to any monarchy) as they work their dark 
magic.  Later, the witches go to meet Macbeth “upon the heath,” another liminal space 
where, paradoxically, battles can be “lost and won” and where “fair is foul and foul is 





witches, “You should be women/And yet your beards forbid me to interpret/That you 
are so.”309 
Like Shakespeare, Sophocles too relies on and profits from the symbolism of 
the liminal.  Colonus, neither Thebes nor Athens, is a liminal threshold that 
accommodates new possibilities.  Antigone says, “Oedipus – Father, I can see the city 
walls./Off in the distance but I think this place/Must be sacred” (15-18).  When 
Oedipus asks, at line 52, “Where are we?” the local replies: “This is sacred territory, 
all of it…The ground were you tread/Is called the ‘Bronze Way’,/The Threshold of 
Athens” (54-59).  Not only is it threshold to Athens, Colonus’ physical beauty stands 
starkly opposed to the dark cloud of miasma hovering over Thebes and from which 
Oedipus, also befouled, has departed.  The Chorus proudly describes Colonus to 
Oedipus, whose haggard body with its violent wounds, stands in stark contrast to the 
beauty of the grove, a contrast which Sophocles will mirror in Oedipus’ appearance 
when compared with Theseus’: 
Stranger, this is gleaming Colonus, 
Horse country, beautiful meadows, 
Where the mournful trills of nightingales  
Haunt the shadows of green glades 
Garlanded in the gods’ ivy, 
The deep color of dark wine. 
Here intricate berry-filled briars 
Twist around lush vines, 
Never scorched by the sun 
Nor struck by storms.  (668-677) 
 
 Because Colonus can accommodate new regenerative possibilities, it 
represents, in our graphic depiction of decline and progress, a limit; a locus where the 
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line is neither plummeting nor rising.  This makes it a place of stillness and beauty, as 
the description implies.  Colonus is also symbolically important as a place not simply 
because it is sacred space and, as Woodruff says, “threatening or violating people who 
belong to the gods seems to be a characteristic transgression of Theban tyrants” (lix) 
but because it is undefined, Colonus can be inclusive of “the other.”  As McCoy notes, 
“Sophocles is innovative in his use of Colonus as the locale of Oedipus’ burial, and 
refers not to Athens, but to Attica (the countryside surrounding Athens), as if to 
emphasize the inclusion of both country and city as part of Athens’s full identity.”310  
Like Macbeth’s “desert place” and “heath,” Colonus accommodates a temporary 
reversal: a reversal of the typical patriarchal structure that has dominated Oedipus 
Tyrannus.     
As Christopher Long points out, the liminal character of Colonus sets the 
conditions for a “politics of the in between” in which the typical obstinate patriarchy 
may be infiltrated (for a short window of time at least) with another mode, a more 
authentic mode, of doing things.  Long notes that the Oedipus of Oedipus at Colonus 
must now learn in a totally different way; he must rely on touch.  Further, because he 
is now wholly dependent on another, he finds it difficult, at least initially, to fall back 
on his famous obstinate egotism.  It is obvious in the opening scenes of the play that 
not only is Oedipus deferring to Antigone’s eyes to guide his body; he is equally 
indebted to Antigone’s voice as he defers to her judgment in guiding his decisions.   
The Chorus, for example, demands Oedipus move from his seated position in 
the grove of Eumenides, saying, “Decrepit beggar./If you’ve something to say, say 
                                                        





it/But not on sacred land./Speak to us from a place,/Where words are allowed./Keep 
silent until/You have left forbidden ground.”  Upon hearing this command, Oedipus 
turns to Antigone, asking, “Antigone, what should we do?” (170). She replies with wise 
and prudent council by suggesting, as Theseus will later do, that Oedipus ought to do 
something he has become famous for failing to do: attentive listening. “Father, we 
must respect their ways/And listen to what they want” (171-172).  Moments later, 
when the Chorus has learned Oedipus’ identity, they seem to renege on their claim 
(which Oedipus has, perhaps too eagerly, taken as a promise) that, “No one will 
remove you from your refuge,/Old man, not against your will” (176-177).  Now they 
shout, “Get away!  Get out of our land!”(226). Again Antigone intervenes by offering 
an argument rooted in pity for the vulnerable.  Her rhetorical gifts are eloquent.  They 
are gifts that went unheard in Thebes, but here, in Colonus, they are allowed to 
reverberate with both a measured intelligence and a keen awareness of the 
psychology of her audience: 
Please, you are god-fearing men; 
You have heard what my father did, 
And even though he knew nothing 
You refuse to tolerate him at all. 
But at least feel sorry for me, please, 
And let me plead my father’s case. 
I am not blind; look into my eyes 
And imagine your own child begging 
For you to be treated with dignity. 
You are the only people we can turn to, 
It’s as if you were now our gods, 
Dare we hope to have your good grace? 
For the sake of everything that you love, 
Your children, wives, possessions – or the gods. 
The gods guide us all.  Can anyone 
Escape the paths they set for us? 






 Antigone’s question to the Chorus at Line 249, which is both genuine and 
rhetorical, “Dare we hope to have your good grace?,” is the first appeal to some form 
of aidos (αἰδοῦς).311  Here, Meineck translates the word as “grace” but elsewhere it is 
rendered as reverence or compassion or mercy.312  Antigone’s question to the Chorus 
here foreshadows the question Polynices will ask of Oedipus at the end of the play at 
Line 1268, when Polynices more boldly recruits the personified Mercy, the female 
deity who, like Dike (Justice), “was said to stand with Zeus as he dispensed his 
power.”313  Polynices asks Oedipus, “Who am I to dare to ask you for help?/All I know 
is that Mercy/Stands beside the throne of Zeus/And has her hand in all this work.”314  
As Woodruff and Meineck point out, “The word is a complicated one, aidos, one of 
many that introduce aspects of reverence.”315  Nevertheless, the foreshadowing and 
the irony is clear: Antigone is exhorting the Chorus (citizens of Colonus) to do for her 
and her father what her father will refuse to do at the end of the play, showcasing his 
irremovable patriarchal obstinacy.  Antigone asks the Chorus to consider her as a 
family member, “But at least feel sorry for me…I am not blind; look into my eyes/And 
imagine your own child begging/For you to be treated with dignity,” hoping they will 
                                                        
 
312 τὸν ἄθλιον αἰδοῦς κῦρσαι: ἐν ὔμμι γὰρ ὡς θεῷ κείμεθα τλάμονες. 
 
313 Sophocles, O.C., 2003, pg. 186, see the footnote for line 1267. 
 
314 The Greek is below:  
 
ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι γὰρ καὶ Ζηνὶ σύνθακος θρόνων 
Αἰδὼς ἐπ᾽ ἔργοις πᾶσι, καὶ πρὸς σοί, πάτερ, (1268) 
 





be unable to reject the call of family.  Oedipus, in contrast, will reject precisely this 
call.  As Woodruff claims, “Few ancient Greeks could have rejected the call of family, 
but Oedipus rises above it.  And in doing so, he rises above Polynices’ call for what we 
have rendered ‘mercy,’ along with most other translators (line 1268).”316  Ironically, 
at this early moment in the play, Oedipus is moved. His daughter’s powerful and 
tender exhortation seems to reinvigorate him, as he launches into a long speech 
exhorting the Chorus to accept him, even suggesting in the speech that he still believes 
his fate is the direct effect of Jocasta and Laius’ “unspeakable” actions.  Oedipus’ 
continued insistence upon his own blamelessness (a Theban attribute, perhaps) is 
now counter-balanced by Antigone’s resolve, made possible here in Colonus, in taking 
responsibility for him as not only his physical guide but voice.317 
 
Theseus and the Transcendental Precepts   
  
In his introduction to Peter Meineck’s translation, Paul Woodruff claims of 
Oedipus at Colonus that, “This could have been a play about how good Theseus is, and 
how fine Athens is in consequence.  But Oedipus at Colonus is not about Theseus, who 
is little more than a prop in this play, because nothing happens to challenge him and 
because he brings nothing to the stage that might surprise us.” 318   Woodruff’s 
assessment, however, is incorrect in light of my previous analysis.  Theseus’ behavior 
is surprising when considering him within the “surded” milieu of patriarchal 
obstinacy in which he finds himself and to which we have become accustomed by the 
                                                        
316 Sophocles, O.C., lxvi 
 





time we finish Oedipus Tyrannus.  Further, if Theseus is a “prop,” then he is a prop 
only insofar as he is a foil to Oedipus and Creon.  This may be true.  Yet his role as foil 
to the two stubborn patriarchs is critical to understanding Oedipus at Colonus as 
representative of Lonergan’s claim that healing and love may correct the social surd.   
That Oedipus’ body becomes a boon to Athenian prosperity is less about Oedipus’ 
character and more about Theseus’ free decision, rooted in discernment, to accept the 
polluted man with compassion.  Theseus is, therefore, far more than a prop. 
Theseus confidently enters the scene at Line 551, mitigating the tension and 
assuaging both Oedipus’ and the Chorus’ anxiety.  He identifies his dual motive: 
compassion and empathy.  He says, “I’ve come out of compassion/To ask what exactly 
you and your poor/Daughter want from us here in Athens” (557-559).  He then adds, 
“You should know that once I too/Was an exile and had to struggle to survive,/So how 
could I ever allow myself to ignore/The pleas of one so lost in desperation?” (563-
566). He concludes with a statement indicative of a circumspect wisdom regarding 
life’s ever-changing circumstances and the fickle nature of chance: “I know that I’m 
just a man and that tomorrow/May hold nothing more for me than you” (567-568).  
Theseus, no stranger to struggle and exile, is totally unfazed by Oedipus’ presence in 
his kingdom and makes the extraordinary gesture of sheltering a polluted man.  
Theseus, in other words, has self-appropriated his own situation and has keenly 
discerned precisely what Oedipus failed to discern in Oedipus Tyrannus – that no man 
is truly safe.  Any man can be unhorsed, irrespective of his reputation and, given this 
dire existential fact, a little compassionate empathy goes a long way despite pollution.  





stands in direct contrast to Oedipus’ rather brutal proclamation to “punish the killers 
by force” before even learning the situation and the potential extenuating 
circumstances.  As McCoy points out, “Theseus offers an alternative to wounding 
words, words of reception and hospitality. While Oedipus is convinced that the truth 
of his life will be too shocking, or his history too revolting once told, Theseus receives 
his full story in compassion, even sharing a bit of his own story in return.”319  
Structurally, Theseus’ entrance softly echoes the opening of Oedipus Tyrannus 
insofar as the tension (and plot) is rooted in a suppliant exhorting a king with a 
reputation for wisdom to fix a problem.  Yet Sophocles seems to want the audience to 
recognize some key differences, not the least of which is that Theseus, who is truly 
βασιλεύς (king)notΤύραννος (tyrant) but will soon discover that he is really boasts 
a number of important attributes Oedipus lacked.  Theseus is authentically 
compassionate, empathetic and wise and, perhaps most tellingly, maintains an 
unflinching control over the affective dimension of his character.  He has, in other 
words, appropriated all of Lonergan’s transcendental precepts:  he is attentive, 
intelligent, reasonable and responsible.  We sense immediately that these are the very 
attributes that will have the power to heal the mischief of bias which, heretofore, has 
led to the decline of Thebes.  Sophocles proceeds to amplify these precepts by 
juxtaposing Theseus against two characters who are “surded” – Oedipus and Creon – 
and whose city, Thebes, has, not surprisingly, fallen into the ultimate state of decline 
– civil war. 
                                                        





 As Woodruff notes, scholars disagree on why Theseus chooses to take such 
risks for Oedipus.  In fact, one might object that throughout these opening exchanges 
we are not required to take Theseus’ claims about his own motivation at face-value.  
Perhaps Theseus has a selfish motive he is concealing, just as Oedipus vowed to solve 
the mystery of Laius’ murder partially out of self-protection.  This viewpoint seems at 
odds, though, with Sophocles’ intentional choice to reveal the prize of receiving 
Oedipus until after Theseus’ opening speech in which he commits to the polluted man.  
Theseus, in other words, is unaware that there will be any benefit and has little 
evidence to think of Oedipus as somehow a savior for his city.  In fact, from his 
perspective at the time of his intervention, there can only be conflict in aiding 
Oedipus.  Only after this initial compassionate overture does Oedipus say, “Theseus, 
such kindness and eloquence./You know me, my family, and where I’m from,/All that 
remains is for me to explain/Why I’ve come and what it is I want” (569-572).  When 
Theseus asks for an explanation, Oedipus tells him, “I have a gift to give you:/My own 
broken body – not much to look at,/But appearances can deceive,/And it has the 
power to bring you great good” (576-579). At the end of the exchange we are made 
to believe that Theseus’ commitment to compassion and empathy for the vulnerable, 
without “counting the cost,” as the saying goes, will somehow bring about good, a 
central metaphor of the play.  Love, in other words, may have the power to correct 
the aggregate mischief that the various forms of bias depicted in Oedipus Tyrannus 
have wrought on Thebes and which now threaten Attica courtesy of the two 





When Oedipus informs Theseus of his refusal to return to Thebes, in spite of 
the new development that his family desires his return, Theseus, keeping with the 
transcendental precepts, tells Oedipus, “Be reasonable, anger only makes matters 
worse” (591).  This is the first of many lines throughout the play which indicate the 
problem of Oedipus’ rage – his rage will be alluded to by both Creon and Antigone 
later.  If we take Knox’s instruction that we should assess a character based on what 
other characters say about him, then these moments seem to indicate that Sophocles 
wants to reiterate here the problem of Oedipus’ affective self, lest it be downplayed 
or washed out by discussions of inexorable fate.  In fact, throughout Oedipus at 
Colonus, Oedipus’ rage is continually cited by multiple characters as being somehow 
opposed to attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility whereas 
Theseus is unflappable in these.   
 After Oedipus delivers his dire new prophecy about the way in which his 
presence will create enmity between Athens and Thebes (two communities which 
enjoyed an ancient friendship), Theseus shows the kind of stalwart leadership that 
Oedipus attempted to show in the opening scenes of Oedipus Tyrannus when he 
vowed to discover Laius’ killer.  Theseus tells us that he must honor Oedipus’ wishes 
for two reasons: hospitality and reverence.  He points out that xenia (guest-
friendship) requires him to do so.  As Woodruff notes, Theseus cites a “particularly 
strong form” of xenia when he “calls Oedipus doruxenos – spear-friend (line 632).  





between these two.  Theseus will defend Oedipus from Creon, and Oedipus (much 
later) will defend Theseus’ descendants from Theban invasion.”320 
Why call Oedipus a “spear-friend”321 when the two have never met prior to 
this encounter? The reason is because Theseus must also show reverence (aidos) for 
the sacred space upon which Oedipus stands.  He says, “I must show respect for such 
good intentions,/Not just for the sake of hospitality/But because he has sought 
sanctuary with the spirits./Reverence forbids me to throw away this gift;/Therefore 
I am inclined to allow him to stay/And incorporate him within our city” (631-637).  
Later, when Oedipus expresses his fear that he will be forced to leave Colonus, and 
that Theseus is unaware of the power of the Theban threats, Theseus replies in a bold 
proclamation that shows that not only is he compassionate, empathetic and wise, he 
is courageous enough to see his compassion, empathy and wisdom applied.  To use 
Aristotle’s dichotomy again, Theseus is not merely a man of deinotes but a man of 
phronêsis and andreia.  He tells Oedipus in no uncertain terms that the exiled, 
vulnerable Theban is in “his care now.”  This vow solidifies Theseus’ role as protector 
of the vulnerable.    
 
I know this: No one will take you away 
Against my will.  I don’t care for threats –  
They’re just angry, bloated boasts, 
A sound mind evaporates a threat. 
                                                        
320 Sophocles, O.C., lxiv. 
 
321 The Greek is below: 
 
 τίς δῆτ᾽ ἂν ἀνδρὸς εὐμένειαν ἐκβάλοι /  
τοιοῦδ᾽, ὅτῳ πρῶτον μὲν ἡ δορύξενος /  





These Thebans can brag and gloat 
About how they’ll come and seize you, 
But I think they’ll find their journey  
A little rougher than they imagine. 
Don’t worry; you are in my care now. (658-664) 
 
 Creon enters the scene and, like Oedipus, becomes a dual foil to Theseus, 
specifically in reference to the transcendental precepts.  He appears inattentive, 
unintelligent, unreasonable and irresponsible.  Sophocles begins to construct a 
triangular arrangement between the three patriarchs, with Oedipus and Creon at the 
base of the triangle and Theseus at the top.  Theseus’ moral superiority enlarges as 
the play continues, as Oedipus and Creon seem to grow smaller, and can only bicker 








This triangular structure is no more apparent than in the cycle of speeches beginning 
with Creon at line 728 and ending with Theseus at 1041.  Creon’s initial overture, an 





disregards Antigone’s presence and the loving bond she has forged with her father, a 
bond which has kept him alive for years.  Instead, Creon identifies himself as Oedipus’ 
only kin, saying, “I’m not here at the behest of any one man,/No, all of my citizens 
urged it,/After all, I am his nearest living relation” (737-738).  Creon’s claim here is 
loaded with irony.  He claims that he is Oedipus’ “nearest living relation” when, in 
reality, there is no one closer than Antigone, who is both sister and daughter to 
Oedipus and, as if to concretize the closeness of the relation, physically connected to 
the hapless blind man on the stage.  Creon disregards both the genetic and physical 
fact, looking right through Antigone in typical patriarchal chauvinism and in spite of 
the fact that he is actually unrelated, genetically, to Oedipus.  He continues to use the 
power of rhetorical persuasion, appealing to the idea that Thebes is Oedipus’ true 
home and that in Colonus he is but a stranger in a strange land.  Oedipus sees through 
the ruse, saying, “There’s nothing you wouldn’t sink to!/Perverting a seemingly 
honest plea/To suit your twisted schemes” (761-763). 
When Creon’s sophistry with words fails, he resorts to the ultimate act of 
patriarchal power: physical force, might over right.  He forces a woman (Antigone) 
against her will, an act resembling rape.  He shouts, “Guards!  Get the girl – if she won’t 
come/Of her own accord, use force” (826-827).  Further, removing a suppliant from 
a sanctuary by force was considered impious; the request therefore foreshadows 
Creon’s later impiety and physical brutality in Antigone.  Recall that at the end of that 
play Creon will abduct Antigone again and physically restrain her by entombing her, 
only to recognize his ignorance and irresponsibility too late, shouting, 
 





Evil-minded, death-dealing! O you who are witnesses,  
You saw those who killed and those who died,  
All in one family,  
Cry out against the sacrilege that I called strategy! 
 Oh, howl, my son, my young son, for your young death.   
Ah!  Ah!   
You were expelled from life  
By my bad judgment, never yours (1261 – 1269). 
 
 But here, in the grove of the Eumenides, Creon maintains his individual bias 
(egotism) and his role as representative of a group bias (patriarchal chauvinism) that 
preclude him making good judgment.  He then proceeds to identify, without grasping 
the irony, two attributes that he believes are Oedipus’ downfall but which are also his 
own: a lack of wisdom and rage.  On 804, he shouts, “It’s a shame.  All these years and 
still so unwise;/You’re a disgrace, even in your old age” (804-805).  Then, later, “You 
may have won your victory for now,/But one day you’ll learn that your temper/Has 
turned you against your own./Your rage has always been your downfall” (852-855).  
These comments remind us that in spite of Oedipus’ status as “a good man in a bad 
way,” as the Chorus of Colonus dubs him, Creon believes that Oedipus has failed to 
appropriate the transcendental precepts, particularly reason and responsibility.   
Oedipus is, of course, devastated by the abduction, which constitutes a 
severing of his one remaining human bond (Ismene notwithstanding).  Yet Creon 
soon raises the stakes when, in an even more brazen display of patriarchal power, he 
attempts to abduct Oedipus against his will in spite of the city’s laws.  Creon, in other 
words, begins to resemble “tyrannus” in the Platonic sense now.  This scene is 
strikingly ironic, given that Creon’s name means law and that he will be the defender 
of law in Antigone.  In fact, when the Chorus challenges Creon, asking “You think our 





voice, “When a man is right, the weak can beat the strong” (879-880).  Sophocles’ 
audience could only have interpreted this statement ironically given Creon’s 
character in Antigone which they already knew well. Further, they would no doubt 
have recognized what is fast becoming the most sobering indictment of his character: 
a lack of any philosophical consistency.  In their own ways, both Creon and Oedipus, 
through their behaviors in Colonus, become exemplars of contradiction, the great 
enemy of reason. 
 Theseus returns to the scene again and rightly expresses moral indignation at 
the kidnapping of the girls. He turns to Creon directly and says, “You’re staying right 
here, until/These girls are returned to me/And I see them with my own eyes/What 
you’ve done appalls me/And dishonors you and your country” (909-912).  In a direct 
indictment of Oedipus, he also says, “If I were to let my emotions rule,/This man 
would barely escape/With his life…” (905-907).  We recognize, importantly, that 
Theseus is by no means unemotional.  In fact, he is appalled.  Yet he will not let his 
emotion override his reason; instead his affective self works harmoniously with his 
reason.  He takes quick, intelligent action to retrieve the girls and to keep Oedipus 
safe.  He will not have a political scandal.  This is tachys (swift action) but, unlike 
Oedipus, here it is authentically and correctly applied.   He says, 
At all costs they must prevent  
These girls from leaving our territory; 
Otherwise this foreigner will 
Get the better of us all 
And make me look ridiculous (902-906). 
 
Refusing to be intimidated, Theseus then rebukes Creon for his vulgar display 





that respects/Justice and holds the law in high regard./Yet you just barge your way 
in,/Grabbing whatever you want,/Thinking you can dictate your terms/With 
barbarity and brute force!” (914-918).  Then, in keeping with his commitment to 
empathy, he asks Creon to envision the reverse scenario in the hope of pricking the 
spurs of Creon’s empathy.   He asks Creon to ask of himself a question for intelligence 
which, if pursued, would lead to an insight regarding empathy.  Theseus asks, “What 
if I came to your country,/Even if I had right on my side,/Ignored the rule of law 
there,/And simply started abducting people?/Inconceivable!  Because I know how a 
foreigner/Is supposed to behave as a guest abroad” (925-928).  Obviously the 
implication here is that Creon has asked no such questions.  Instead Creon’s various 
biases have amputated his unrestricted desire to know. 
The next scene is pivotal, as Sophocles turns to a depiction of the two “surded” 
characters, Oedipus and Creon, in a verbal battle of patriarchal stubbornness which 
only further discloses a total lack of discernment of their parts.  They are balanced 
against each other and below Theseus, who now seems to hover even higher above 
them, as he has far more closely approximated self-appropriation in his courageous 
empathy.  There is no better exchange to underscore the point that Sophocles is not 
hostile to rationality but recognizes instead that, as McCoy puts it, “the rational itself 
includes an affective element.”322  
To begin the exchange, Creon expresses astonishment that the Athenians 
would even care to be involved in Oedipus’ saga, saying “I never imagined that your 
people/Would care quite so much/For the fortunes of my hapless family” (941-943).  
                                                        





We sense, though, that this astonishment is more sophistry, as he then parlays the 
discussion of his “hapless family” into an opportunity to publically twist the knife, 
cruelly reminding the Chorus and the audience (and Oedipus) of Oedipus’ crimes, 
using lurid imagery and provocative language: “I was certain that they would 
never/Accept a man who murdered his father,/And committed incest – a foul 
pariah,/An outcast with a monstrous blood” (944-947).  Again, this speech becomes 
ironic given what the audience knows about Creon’s role in Antigone as the cold, 
sober, unemotional law-giver.  Sophocles again showcases the contradictions woven 
into Creon’s character and the lack of philosophical consistency.  
Oedipus, of course, is incensed by this public rehashing of his deeds.  He shouts, 
“This man is contemptible!  Have you no shame?” (960). Oedipus then launches into 
one of the most important speeches in the entire Oedipus cycle.  It will be the first and 
last time we hear his own thoughts on his crimes and they are, to say the least, 
surprising.  The implication is that Oedipus has only deigned to publically discuss his 
crimes because Creon has already “gone far beyond the bounds/Of decency” and, as 
such, there is no longer any incentive for Oedipus to keep quiet in the name of 
etiquette.   His willingness to broach the subject is also no doubt a function of the plot 
point that Antigone is not present in the scene to listen to the lascivious details of her 
conception through incest.     
Before listening to Oedipus’ full speech below however, we must recall that 
here is a man who has been in exile now for years and, presumably, has had the 
opportunity to take an inventory of his tragic fall from multiple angles.  In spite of this 





for his present state.  The denial of responsibility, a transcendental precept, becomes 
even more ironic given Theseus’ commitment to take responsibility, even as a 
stranger, over Oedipus, as if to say, “If you won’t own up to your situation, I will for 
you.”  I include the entire speech in its entirety to stress its importance.  
 
You rant on about taboo killings, 
Foul marriages, and vile incest. 
It was I who suffered these things 
But the gods made it so, 
Exorcising some ancient grudge 
Through my bloodline. 
I cannot be blamed for the crimes 
I inflicted on myself and my family, 
You won’t find a single reason 
Why I deserved any of it. 
How was it my fault 
That my father received 
A prediction that he would 
Be killed by his very own son? 
That happened before I was born –  
I had not even been conceived! 
But I was born, unluckily, 
And yes, I did fight and kill my father, 
But I had no idea who he was –  
I didn’t know what I was doing. 
How can you call me guilty 
When I knew nothing…nothing!  
And my mother?  How dare you 
Make me speak of that marriage. 
She was your sister – shall I go on? 
Yes, you’ve gone far beyond the bounds  
Of decency, why then should I keep quiet? 
She gave birth to me, a cursed birth, 
But she too was ignorant of it all. 
My mother also bore my children: 
It is disgusting, her everlasting shame! 
Yet you seem to delight in degrading 
Her name and defaming me. 
I don’t want to talk about it any more 
Except to say that I will not be blamed  
For that union nor the killing 





Continuing to hurl abuse at me. 
Just tell me this: if a man approached 
You right now and threatened your life, 
What’s the first thing you would do? 
Would you defend yourself from harm 
Or stop to ask if he might be your father? 
Unless you have some sort of death wish, 
I’m sure you’d meet his assault, like for like, 
Without considering the future at all. 
That was exactly my situation out on that road. 
It was all decided by the gods, and if  
My father could be brought back to life, 
He’d agree with everything I’ve said. 
However, you have no respect for Justice: 
You’ll say and do anything if it suits your  
Purpose, and you spout your filth 
At anyone who will listen to you. (963-1003) 
 
Oedipus then concludes this speech by essentially reminding Creon that he has 
chosen the worst place in all of Greece to attempt to steal a suppliant because, unlike 
Creon and his henchmen, “The Athenians respect the laws of the gods/More than any 
other people in Greece” (1006-1007).  Yet far from exonerating him, Oedipus’ speech 
has the unintended consequence of showcasing how similar he is to Creon.  The 
speech is merely a fitting testament to the way in which we so often let ourselves of 
the hook when it comes to our own moral culpability.  No one would deny that 
Oedipus was unlucky.  No one would deny the merits of the “moral luck” style of 
argument, so fashionable today, that Oedipus was born into a situation in which, 
perhaps, the odds were stacked against him.  
Nevertheless, Oedipus’ retrospective analysis displays a staggering obstinacy 
and clearly betokens a failure to question his own calamity in a circumspect, 
intelligent way.  This lack of questioning is consistent with the hostility to questioning 





once, for example, does Oedipus ask, “In retrospect, did I really need to be so rash?”  
Not once, does Oedipus ask, “Was it a good idea to marry a woman 20 years my senior 
given the prediction?”  Not once, does Oedipus ask, “Would it have been better if I had 
continued my questioning until I was in a position to make a virtually unconditioned 
judgment about the identity of my parents?”  Instead we hear a man whose voice is 
full of the same stubbornness and paternal violence that one might argue got him into 
trouble in the first place.  In fact, his speech is reminiscent of the literally question-
less speech we cited in Oedipus Tyrannus when he vows to punish the killers by force 
without entertaining even the possibility of mitigating factors.  Woodruff correctly 
notes,  
Oedipus is full of excuses: ignorance and self-defense in the case of his 
father; and, in the case of his mother, the improbable plea that the city 
of Thebes forced marriage upon him.  But, as we have seen in the case 
of stepping on sacred ground, there is no excuse for the transgression.  
He has been polluted by what he did, and he knows it very well (1131).  
His string of excuses is a kind of bad faith.  They allow him to avoid 
facing up to his failings, his savage angers, his careless feet, his jumping 
to conclusions, his passion for controlling any situation in which he 
finds himself.323   
 
Further, Oedipus’ claim above that if Laius were somehow brought back to life 
then he’d agree with his son is steeped in irony.  It is an irony that is lost on Oedipus 
– he does not question it, of course – but which might be discerned if he had self-
appropriated his own situation.  Oedipus does not seem to grasp that his decision to 
kill Laius at Phocis, “the place where the three roads meet,” was borne out of a 
rashness he inherited from his father.  It is no surprise, therefore, that were Laius 
alive he would approve of such a violent act, as he is the very man who seems to have 
                                                        





conferred this biased tendency to rage upon his son.   Like father, like son.  As Creon 
said earlier of Oedipus, “Your rage has always been your downfall” (855).  Oedipus’ 
failure to admit that he may have had at least a little something to do with his own 
downward trajectory moves us beyond the pity we feel for him at the end of Oedipus 
Tyrannus to a newfound assessment that he is simply pathetic and obstinate.  
Therefore, his role at the end of the play as a powerful gift to Athens must be less 
about his character and more about Theseus’ compassion in taking him in.   
 Even if one adopts the viewpoint that Oedipus is but a victim of an unfriendly 
universe, and that we must face this unfriendly universe (look into the abyss) is the 
ultimate point of the play, this fact in no way precludes circumspection from the hero.  
In fact, I am reminded of a poignant scene in Arthur Miller’s The Crucible, in which the 
reluctant hero-martyr, John Proctor, is facing the gallows.  His wife, Elizabeth, comes 
to him at the behest of the ecclesiastical court.  They hope she will convince him to 
save himself by signing a false confession that will wrongly indict others.  She 
consents to meet with her husband but refuses, out of principle, to tell him to sign to 
a lie.  Throughout the play Miller portrays Elizabeth as the perfect Puritan woman.  
She is “Goodwife” Proctor, the moral exemplar of the play.  Her husband has cheated 
on her with a 17 year old girl and, in doing so, has set in motion a hysterical calamity 
that has caused the death of countless innocents in Salem.   And yet, in this final 
meeting between husband and wife, in an ironic moment of healing and reconciliation 
that is the fruit of infidelity, Elizabeth, presumably through extended discernment in 
jail over three months, has come to recognize that she played a part, albeit small, in 





ELIZABETH: I have read my heart this three month, John. (Pause.) I have sins of my 
own to count. It needs a cold wife to prompt lechery. 
PROCTOR, in great pain: Enough, enough— 
ELIZABETH, now pouring out her heart: Better you should know me! 
PROCTOR: I will not hear it! I know you! 
ELIZABETH: You take my sins upon you, John— 
PROCTOR, in agony: No, I take my own, my own! 
ELIZABETH: John, I counted myself so plain, so poorly made, no honest love could 
come to me! Suspicion kissed you when I did; I never knew how I should say my love. 
It were a cold house I kept! (In fright, she swerves, as Hathorne enters.)324 
 
Elizabeth’s words are not only a startling admission of culpability; they serve 
to humanize her in a way that was lacking in the opening acts of the play.  There she 
was presented as always, almost robotically, occupying the moral high ground.  Here 
she is presented as a woman who has asked even more pertinent questions about that 
high ground only to have the (religious) insight that she too had a part in the calamity.  
Her acknowledgment that “it needs a cold wife to prompt lechery” in no way 
exculpates her husband but it does acknowledge that multiple conditions must be 
fulfilled in order for an event to occur.  This startling admission only makes Elizabeth 
seem more discerning and, therefore, more admirable.   In contrast, Oedipus 
expresses not even a modicum of self-ownership and personal responsibility.  His 
character now is, as we pointed out in Chapter 1, consistent with his character the 
end of Oedipus Tyrannus, obstinate and cocksure to the last.   
Sophocles tempers this quarrel between Creon and Oedipus with the return to 
the stage of Antigone (and, off stage, Ismene).  Antigone tells her overjoyed father 
that, “Theseus and his men/Rescued both of us” (1103-1104).  We note that Theseus 
finds Antigone, a woman, important enough to save and worth the risk whereas 
                                                        






Creon’s only acknowledgment of her presence is to abduct her.   The rescue, which 
has healed part of a fractured family, cements Theseus’ legacy as the vanguard of 
healing and champion of the vulnerable; he has lived up to his word and foiled the 
abduction without fanfare: “As for the way we won the fight/I’ve no need to gloat 
about that” (1146-1147). Oedipus is so moved by the gesture, he celebrates the new 
community he has discovered; a community which is committed to healing and 
compassion.  He tells us, “In all my wanderings, this is the only place/Where I have 
found truth, honor and justice./I am well aware of how much I stand in your 
debt,/Without your help I would have nothing at all,/Let me shake your hand, dear 
king,/And kiss your cheek in deep gratitude” (1125-1128).  Theseus’ compassion has 
opened Oedipus’ eyes (at least for the moment) to a different mode of patriarchy; it is 
authoritative but not authoritarian, firm but loving.325  McCoy eloquently points out 
that Oedipus is finally able to “see” himself through his blindness from the perspective 
of another who accepts him irrespective of his wounds and “cursed” status: 
When Theseus goes to rescue Ismene and Antigone from their uncle, he 
tells his army to go to a crossroads in order to bring them home (901). 
We might remember that the murder of Oedipus’ father also took place 
at a crossroads. This ‘second crossroads’ at which Theseus’ men act is 
representative of a turning in Oedipus’ fate. While the first crossroads 
was the site of his pollution, this second crossroads becomes the locus 
of his own acceptance. In listening to and receiving Oedipus’ story, a 
story that heretofore has only caused him shame, Theseus allows 
Oedipus to participate in a kind of self observation of himself from the 
perspective of others. While Oedipus has already learned some 
compassion for himself in the years since his exile from Thebes, this 
compassion and a kind of peace arise when he can see himself through 
Theseus’ eyes. His blindness, he learns, is not only the metaphorical 
                                                        
325 I am indebted to Boston College Professor William Kilpatrick’s distinction 
between three types of parents: authoritarian, authoritative and permissive.   I’m not 
sure if this taxonomy is his exclusively but I recall learning it in his Adolescent 





blindness he had of his own identity in the murder and incest and his 
literal, self-inflicted blindness. Oedipus has also been blind to the 
possibility of full reconciliation and acceptance into the community.326  
 
Upon extending his hand in gratitude to Theseus, Oedipus remembers his own 
pollution and recoils: “But what am I doing?/I’m a vile wretch/You must not touch 
me,/I’m stained with indelible evil!/No, you must never touch me” (1131-1135).  
Theseus shows, yet again, a circumspect empathy, having witnessed Oedipus so 
moved in the presence of his reunited children.  His actions indicate that, contrary to 
Oedipus’ proclamation, nothing is indelible; intelligent human action has the power 
to rectify the mischief of bias.  Theseus says, “It’s perfectly natural that you/Would 
indulge yourself a little/In greeting your own children./I understand, you should 
think/About them before me” (1138-1142).  Again, Theseus shows an uncanny ability 
to see the world from the perspective of the other.   This comes from asking the 
further question for intelligence, either implicitly or explicitly, “what must it be like 
to be in their shoes?” 
Despite the newfound understanding Oedipus gains in this scene, vis-à-vis the 
virtues of mercy and compassion, the understanding proves to be short-lived, as old 
biases seem to die hard. The arrival of Polynices brings into relief that while Oedipus’ 
biases have been quelled temporarily, they are far from dead.  In the final section of 
the play, as Polynices arrives upon the scene initially as a stranger, Sophocles unites 
the voices of Theseus and Antigone into a mini-chorus of practical wisdom, placing 
the protector of the vulnerable with the vulnerable one herself on the side of reason, 
wisdom and compassion.  They both encourage Oedipus not to fall victim to his own 
                                                        





imperious ways and, at least, listen to Polynices.  Again, both are presented as foils to 
Oedipus’ obstinacy, suggesting in unison that wisdom dictates that Oedipus should, 
at least, “hear him out.”  Oedipus calls Polynices an “enemy” and says, “To hear him 
would torture me” (1173-1174). Theseus replies, “Can’t you at least listen to what he 
has to say - /He can’t force you to do anything./What harm could there be in hearing 
him out?” (1175-1177).  He then reminds Oedipus that if wisdom is not enough to 
compel the hearing, sacred obligation is, “You have a sacred obligation/To a 
suppliant, that’s heaven’s law” (1179-1180).   This is the same sacred obligation to 
which Theseus deferred in giving Oedipus a hearing at the opening of the play.  
Oedipus, in typical fashion, fails to recognize the irony that in denying Polynices a 
hearing, he is undermining the very obligation that has heretofore guaranteed his 
safety in Colonus.  Further, Theseus defers to something outside himself (sacred 
space) as the source for overcoming bias. 
Antigone, ever humble in her role as woman and child, and sensing the 
opportunity for potential healing and growth, adds, “Father, I know I’m too young/To 
give you advice, but please listen/To me now.  Let the king have what he wants;/At 
least then you will do right by the gods” (1181-1183). We can only take these lines 
ironically, as Antigone is clearly old enough to give her truculent father advice and 
that a culture whose dictum is to deny the voice of young women stands on the wrong 
side of reasonableness.  Further, in yet another moment indicative of his lack of 
discernment, Oedipus fails to discern an additional irony: that, genetically speaking, 
just as Antigone is no less his daughter than his sister, Polynices is no more his son 





uphold and perpetuate the enmity between himself and Polynices, Oedipus is 
effectively doubling the fraternal quarrel that has raised his ire in the first place – 
between Polynices and Etocles.  It is yet another moment indicating the 
contradictions within Oedipus’ thinking – contradictions which would be rooted out 
if Oedipus deigned to self-appropriate. 
The scene concludes with an exchange that may be the best summation of the 
viewpoint that Colonus, in all of its liminal beauty, represents an antidote to Theban 
patriarchal obstinacy and is therefore symbolic of the healing and redemption that 
can reverse group bias.  As Oedipus, Creon and now Polynices flex their muscles and 
bloviate in anger, Antigone, with Theseus approving, says with equanimity,  
 
You are still his father, and even 
If he had committed the worst offenses 
Against you, it is simply not right 
To meet them wrong for wrong. 
Show him some kindness. 
You are not the only father 
To have had a prodigal son 
Who has provoked anger. 
Let your friends pacify you, 
Forget here and now 
And consider things past; 
Remember what you were forced 
To endure on account of your parents. 
You know very well how rage 
Only serves to breed evil. 
Your own blind eyes testify to that. 
Do this for us and don’t be so harsh, 
You have been treated so kindly here, 
Return their generosity and show compassion. (1189-1203) 
 





the only father/To have had a prodigal son.”327  For in the more famous prodigal son 
story from the Gospel of Luke, the father famously shows a supernatural compassion 
toward his retuned son.  The human – all too human – thing to do in the situation 
would be to rage against his returning son for being so profligate and irresponsible 
and yet, the father shows a grace and mercy (aidos) that it is so shocking because it 
seems beyond our essential human capacity.  But the father’s grace must be shocking 
in order to be a fitting metaphor for God’s grace.  Oedipus, in contrast to Theseus and 
Antigone, is “human, all too human.”  While he indeed consents (reluctantly) to the 
meeting with Polynices, it ends badly as his temper flares.  And while the sour note 
may seem to be an inevitability or fate-bound, now, in the light of our analysis of the 
social surd, it seems more like a byproduct of habitual bias which has shrunken the 
range of Oedipus’ effective freedom. 
As I mentioned earlier, Polynices, for his part, claims to be seeking Mercy328 
but we get the sense that, like Creon, he too acts in self-interest.  He needs his father’s 
power to win the civil war he wages against his brother.  He tells Oedipus at line 1345-
1346, “With you on my side – victory!/Without you – I am lost.”  As Long points out, 
Polynices gives Oedipus the opportunity to “reflect upon the present situation from 
an intergenerational perspective.”  Oedipus hears these words but, of course, he does 
not listen. He tells us that he has really only listened to Polynices out of respect for 
Theseus (totally neglecting Antigone’s role in persuading him, of course).  He then 
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pulls the curtain back on his son’s self-interested motives, saying, “You forced out 
your own father,/Denied him house and home,/Turned him into a tattered old 
tramp!/And now you come here/Crying your eyes out to see me/In such a state.  Are 
these tears for me – /Or your own similar predicament?” (1357-1360).  Oedipus fails 
to discern in these lines that, as Shakespeare acknowledges in Macbeth, “blood will 
have blood” or, as Antigone pointed out to him earlier, “Rage only serves to breed 
evil.”  Oedipus, in other words, in his obstinacy, resists the mantle of his privileged 
position as father to be the agent of familial healing, via grace and mercy, simply 
because he cannot see past an emotional grudge.  This failure exposes the crucial 
irony of the ending: in spite of his forthcoming role as a “supernatural” protector of 
Colonus, Oedipus misses the opportunity to act “supernaturally” in the realm of real 
life.  Instead, human all too human, he becomes like the Delphic oracle to his own son 
and can only perpetuate the cycle of patriarchal violence and bias.  His actions become 
analogous to his own father’s choice to commit infanticide long ago and his words to 
Polynices, “You have no father, just this curse” become eerily reminiscent of his own 
childhood:  
Get away from me, you bastard! 
You have no father, just this curse: 
You’ll never occupy Thebes;  
You’ll never return to Argos; 
You’ll kill your own brother; 
Your own brother will kill you” 
I curse you in the name of Tarturus, 
Father of never-ending darkness, 
In the name of the Furies and Ares 
Who infected your brain with violence. 
Go and tell that to your confederates 
And hear it echo in the streets of Thebes. 
This is the blessing that Oedipus  






Consistent with our model, Colonus ends with a tribute to love (φιλεῖν) and 
restoration imagery not unlike those found in the prophetic books of the Hebrew 
Bible (Amos and Hosea come to mind).  The Messenger, who delivers the news of 
Oedipus’ death, provides Oedipus’ final words to his daughters.  They are words of 
love. 
When Oedipus heard these mournful cries, 
He opening his arms up wide and said: 
“Children – this is the day, I have to go. 
All things come to an end, and you are now free 
From the burden of caring for me.  I know 
How difficult this is for you, 
But there is one small word that can soothe –  
And that is ‘love.’  I loved you more than 
Anyone else could ever love, but now 
Your lives must go on without me. (1610-1619)329 
 
It seems Oedipus’ tragic story will produce a supernatural good – but for 
Athens, not for surded Thebes, and only as a result of Theseus’ extraordinary if not 
supernatural overture.  Athens, like its king, will become a community rooted in the 
transcendental precepts. We do not lose sight, in the fog of Oedipus’ obstinacy, that 
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ὁ δ᾽ ὡς ἀκούει φθόγγον ἐξαίφνης πικρόν,  
πτύξας ἐπ᾽ αὐταῖς χεῖρας εἶπεν: ὦ τέκνα,  
οὐκ ἔστ᾽ ἔθ᾽ ὑμῖν τῇδ᾽ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ πατήρ.  
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1615σκληρὰν μέν, οἶδα, παῖδες: ἀλλ᾽ ἓν γὰρ μόνον  
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ἢ τοῦδε τἀνδρὸς ἔσχεθ᾽, οὗ τητώμεναι  





Theseus has been paying keen attention to the saga and remains open to the many 
insights about the human condition that have been revealed in the grove of 
Eumenides.  Long writes, the play “builds again toward a more hopeful possibility, for 
if Antigone’s voice falls upon the deaf ears of Oedipus and Polyneices, it is perhaps 
heard by Theseus, for he too was there when she offered counsel to her father and he 
shows himself compassionate and open to persuasion.”330  
Likewise, at the end of his chapter on the “human good” in Method in Theology, 
Lonergan offers the following key point: “As self-transcendence promotes progress, 
so the refusal of self-transcendence turns progress into cumulative decline.”331  This 
point aligns with the end of “Colonus,” as we witness Oedipus’ failure to achieve a level 
of self-transcendence that would have him admit to at least a modicum of culpability.  
As Woodruff notes,  
We look in vain for this play to show us what we have learned to expect 
toward the end of ancient tragic drama – a scene in which the hero 
recognizes where he has gone wrong and a scene in which the hero’s 
actions lead to a reversal of fortune.  Our Oedipus does not know 
himself any better at the end of the play than at the beginning.  On his 
last day, he has only one regret – that he did have regrets immediately 
after learning whom he had killed and whom he had married.  Now, in 
place of regrets, he has excuses.332  
 
In fact, Sophocles’ portrayal of Oedipus at the end of Colonus is quite the opposite of 
a man who has experienced the self-transcendence of, say, Lear, who, as Woodruff 
also notes, represents an opposing trajectory.  In contrast to Oedipus, “Lear loses 
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control of events as his life draws to its close, and he learns both to understand 
himself and to accept his weakness as a ‘poor forked creature.’” 333   Instead it is 
Theseus who becomes the vanguard for hope.  As McCoy has argued, it is Theseus 
who is “the true hero of Oedipus at Colonus, for he is the reversal of Oedipus, a man 
who began in exile, but ends in gentle rule…Theseus is the true possessor of wisdom 
in this dialogue, even as Oedipus is Athens guarantor of its longevity.”334  Oedipus’ 
final moments therefore, when viewed from a perspective that sees Theseus as hero 
and vanguard of redemption, present yet another challenge to the Nietzschean 
reading of Sophocles.  Given all that Nietzsche has to say about Sophocles’ apparent 
indictment of “wisdom as an offence against nature,” one wonders if he ever read 
Colonus and, if he did, how he could reconcile those words with the play?  In fact, 
Nietzsche did read “Colonus.”  In The Birth of Tragedy, he writes, about the play’s 
conclusion, 
 
We encounter this same serenity in Oedipus at Colonus, but here it is 
elevated into infinite transfiguration; in this play the old man, stricken 
with an excess of suffering, an exposed, purely as a suffering being, to 
all that affects him, is contrasted with the unearthly serenity which 
comes down from the sphere of the gods as a sign to us that in his 
purely passive behavior the hero achieves the highest form of activity, 
which has consequences reaching far beyond his own life, whereas all 
his conscious words and actions in his life hitherto have merely led to 
his passivity.  Thus the trial-knot of the story of Oedipus, which strikes 
the moral eye as inextricably tangled, is slowly unraveled – and we are 
overcome by the most profound human delight at this matching piece 
of divine dialectic.  If our explanation has done justice to the poet, the 
question remains whether the content of the myth has been exhausted 
thereby; at this point it becomes plain that the poet’s whole 
interpretation of the story is nothing other than one of those images of 
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light held out to us by healing nature after we have gazed into the 
abyss.335  
 
This reading of Colonus jibes with Nietzsche’s basic attack on stillness, passivity, 
inactivity and asceticism.  It is odd, however, that Nietzsche attributes the healing 
ending as a function of human passivity and that Oedipus’ redemptive death is, on 
Nietzsche’s view, like “light held out to us by healing nature.”  Nietzsche’s viewpoint 
neglects that it is Theseus’ freely chosen compassionate and loving gesture which sets 
the initial conditions for the possibility of the “light of healing nature.”  Thus, on my 





Theseus as Anticipating Cooperative Grace  
 
 At this juncture in my analysis I should point out that, despite the emphasis I 
have placed upon a sustained, intellectual effort which aspires to fidelity to the self-
correcting cycle of learning, bias cannot, on Lonergan’s view, be conquered by that 
sustained intellectual effort alone.  Our wills are not that strong.  We need help from 
                                                        





a source beyond us.  Lonergan was, after all, a Jesuit priest and is unequivocal in his 
claim that, ultimately, bias is conquered only by an unconditional love which is a gift 
from God.  He points out that, in the Christian tradition, it is the gift of grace – “God’s 
love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us” – that is a necessary 
precondition for correcting the mischief of bias.  This is not to say that the self-
correcting cycle becomes obsolete.  Quite the contrary.  In the language of logic, the 
sustained intellectual effort of the self-correcting cycle of learning is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition to conquer bias.  Yes, religious conversion in a person is a 
new, existential level of consciousness but, as Lonergan writes, this new orientation 
in no way, 
interferes with or weakens his devotion to the truth.  He still needs 
truth, for he must apprehend reality and real potentiality before he can 
deliberately respond to value.  The truth he needs is still the truth 
attained in accord with the exigencies of rational consciousness.  But 
now his pursuit of it is all the more secure because he has been armed 
against bias, and it is all the more meaningful and significant because it 
occurs within, and plays an essential role in, the far richer context of 
the pursuit of all values.336    
 
 Although an extended discussion of religious conversion need not detain us 
here for too long, it is still valuable to our analysis to note that Lonergan describes 
three “modalities” of self-transcendence: “Intellectual conversion is to truth attained 
by cognitional self-transcendence.  Moral conversion is to values apprehended, 
affirmed and realized by a real self-transcendence.”337  We have already seen these 
first two moments of self-transcendence in Oedipus Tyrannus, as Oedipus goes beyond 
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himself to understand and know the truth of his identity and then, when he fails, due 
to his distorted affective self, to achieve an analogous moral conversion by asking 
questions of value (see Chapter 1). 
 We have not, however, seen the third mode of self-transcendence, religious 
conversion, which, for Lonergan, is an unrestricted being in love with a “mysterious, 
uncomprehended God.”338   This unrestricted being in love constitutes a third form of 
self-transcendence and, retrospectively, will appear to be an “undertow” felt in all 
pursuits.  Lonergan claims that unrestricted being in love is “total and permanent self-
surrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations … a dynamic state that is 
prior to and principle of subsequent acts.  It is revealed in retrospect as an under-tow 
of existential consciousness, as a fated acceptance of a vocation to holiness, as 
perhaps an increasing simplicity and passivity in prayer.  It is interpreted differently 
in the context of different religious traditions.”339  
 Drawing on Augustine, Lonergan cites the distinction between operative 
grace, which is “the replacement of the heart of stone by a heart of flesh, a 
replacement beyond the horizon of the heart of stone” and the social element, 
cooperative grace, “the heart of flesh becoming effective in good works through 
human freedom.”340  If bias is to be conquered, in other words, the ultimate ground 
for that conquering will come from a liberation outside the agent’s own native 
resources.  And while unrestricted being in love is analogous to the unrestricted 
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desire to know, the analogy breaks down in relation to both its agency and its ultimate 
orientation – whether toward this world or another.  Thus, in Method and Theology, 
Lonergan writes,  
All human pursuit of the true and the good is included within and 
furthered by a cosmic context and purpose and, as well, there now 
accrues to man the power of love to enable him to accept the suffering 
involved in undoing the effects of decline.  It is not to be thought, 
however, that religious conversion means no more than a new and 
more efficacious ground for the pursuit of intellectual and moral ends.  
Religious loving is without conditions, qualifications, reservations; it is 
with all one’s heart and all one’s soul and all one’s mind and all one’s 
strength.  This lack of limitation, though it corresponds to the 
unrestricted character of human questioning, does not pertain to this 
world.341  
 
 On the one hand, this viewpoint would seem to represent a juncture at which 
Lonergan’s thought simply does not and cannot apply to a classical text, such as 
Oedipus Tyrannus or Oedipus at Colonus.  Lonergan’s notion of unrestricted being in 
love (with God) and his further distinctions of operative and cooperative grace would 
seem to be anachronistic.  
 And yet, if we recall the final line of the passage above, Lonergan claims that 
unrestricted being in love is “interpreted differently in the context of different 
religious traditions.”342  Perhaps there is a sense, then, in which Theseus’ almost 
otherworldly commitment to reverence (aidos) for the sacred space of Colonus, and 
his compassionate commitment to care for the stranger (xenia), more closely 
approximates or, at the very least, anticipates the almost supernatural dynamism of 
the authentic moral conversion Lonergan seems to have in mind.  As we have seen, 
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there are moments in which Theseus relies on the dynamism of his own native 
intelligence and others in which something beyond him seems to be at work, as if a 
precursor to the supernatural moral disposition of the father in Luke’s “Parable of the 
Prodigal Son.” 
 Now, it is true that within the secondary literature on Oedipus at Colonus there 
is a debate about Theseus’ motivations, especially given his mythical past.343   Here I 
am taking the Athenian version of Theseus.  As McCoy reminds us, “In the Athenian 
sensibility, Theseus was seen as the unifier of Athens, who brought all in Athens to 
live together (συνοικισμός) under a common ruler and a capital city, instead of being 
a number of demes or villages.”344  It is this Theseus who, although he cannot be 
situated within the Christian tradition, anticipates a human capacity for self-
transcendence that seems beyond merely a strong-willed exertion of native 
intelligence.  Further, Theseus, in his care for Oedipus and reverence for the space, 
seems to recognize that his self-transcendence may be integrated into the life of his 
city, even including Oedipus, a polluted one, in his scheme.  As McCoy points out, 
Theseus construes Oedipus’ wounds not as “mark of his necessary exclusion from 
society” but, instead, as “constitutive of his humanity.”345  Theseus, in other words, 
becomes the closest approximation to a character possessed of an individual grace 
(also, aidos) who then applies what he understands, knows and feels in a proto, 
                                                        
 343 See Woodruff and Meineck’s introduction to Oedipus at Colonus in Theban 
Plays.  Page lxvi.  Some of the scholars mentioned are Reinhardt (1947), Blundell 
(1989) and Wilson (1997).   
  
 344 McCoy, Wounded Heroes, 59. 
  





operative grace.  This description seems to fit insofar as the result of Theseus’ efforts, 
at least in Sophocles’ world, becomes a corrective antidote against bias in Athens.  
Ironically, despite being used by Theseus as an instrument of cooperative grace in 
Athens, Oedipus himself is incapable of the self-transcendence (and is even incapable, 
as we have shown, of moral transcendence) and his city, Thebes, is condemned to 
suffer decline in the next generation as bias in all its forms reigns supreme.  
 We might conclude then that while Theseus’ commitment to aidos and xenia is 
not the full unrestricted “being in love with a mysterious, uncomprehended God” that 
Lonergan describes, he is certainly a closer approximation than is Oedipus.  For in 
contrast to Theseus, as McCoy notes,  
 
The Oedipus of Colonus is an angry man, despite what his initial words 
about learning endurance might seem to indicate.  While Oedipus seeks 
pity for himself and his polluted state, he shows little compassion for 
what might have led his sons to pursue lives apart from accompanying 
him in his wanderings.  His focus on whether they are living ‘good’ lives 
centers entirely around whether their devotion to their father has been 
sufficient.  There is more than a little irony in Oedipus’ judgment of his 
sons; after all, his parricide would seem to exceed their negligence of 
him in degree of moral failure.346  
 
 
The Last Lines of Colonus and the Apparent Revocability of Fate  
 
We may now transition to Chapter 4, a discussion of human freedom, by 
drawing attention to what is said at the very end of Oedipus at Colonus vis-à-vis the 
possibility of correcting, via intelligent human agency, the cycle of decline.  Significant 
in these final lines is that Sophocles provides every indication that the tragedy 
depicted in Antigone is not a fait accompli.  In fact, Antigone’s words to her brother 
                                                        





(and to us) seem to be sobering reminders that if bias is corrected, the cycle of decline 
can and will stop and that stopping it is well within our essentially human potential.  
In light of this insight, the coming tragedy Sophocles depicts in the Antigone is, on my 
view, less about the continued family curse and more about the inability of patriarchs 
to rise above their biases and the constricting conditions they cumulatively set for 
their progeny.   
Recall that in light of the curse his father Oedipus has called down upon him, 
Polynices asks his sisters to remember him and give him proper burial rites, 
anticipating the dialectical conflict of the Antigone.  In yet another moment indicative 
of Antigone’s wisdom (and also disregarded), she sums up the ontological status of 
freedom in the play lest we forget.  She tells Polynices, “Save yourself before it’s too 
late –/Call back your forces, spare Thebes” (1416-1417).  When Polynices refuses out 
of a typical masculine pride and bravado, fearing he will lose his army’s respect, 
Antigone identifies that her brother’s flaw is her father’s (her other brother), asking 
at line 1420, “Why do you always burst into anger?” 
Antigone, who has by now established herself as a voice of insight, then sums 
up the freedom-determinism dichotomy, lines which offer us a direct insight into how 
Sophocles must have viewed the metaphysical “rules” of his created universe:  “Can’t 
you see, you are fulfilling his curse./He’s already said you are going to die!” (1424-
1425).  A few lines later, she asks, “Brother, will nothing change your mind?” (1431).  
Polynices replies with an exhortation to what is, almost paradoxically, willed fatalism, 
Nothing can stop it now. 
I see my way ahead, 
Though my father and his curses 





I just hope that Zeus will bless you 
With a happier future, especially 
If you honor me with a proper burial  
When I die.  Let me go now; 
You’ll never see me alive again. (1432-1438) 
 
Nevertheless, in spite of this fatalistic proclamation, at the very end of the play, 
Antigone says, “Send us back home to Thebes./We must try to stop the slaughter/And 
save both of our brothers” (1769-1771).  Sophocles provides zero indication here that 
Antigone is not free despite the fact that we, as audience, know in advance Antigone’s 
plans will fail.  The dark irony of these lines would not have been lost on Sophocles’ 
Greek audience who, when watching “Colonus,” would have been quite familiar with 
the The Antigone which was composed in 441 BC, roughly 40 years earlier than 
Tyrannus and Colonus.  In a point to which I will now turn in the final chapter, a 
discussion of freedom and determinism, this exchange seems to sum up the 
ontological status of human freedom vis-à-vis the concept of “fate” in the play.  
Antigone gives every indication that her brother is effectively free to choose not to 
return to Thebes and meet his so-called “fate.”  Her brother, however, so 
indoctrinated by the surded Theban milieu whence he fled, is far too biased and the 
scotoma in his thinking essentially precludes him from exercising his effective 
freedom which would enlarge the “luminous area” of choice out into what Lonergan 








The Surrounding Penumbra: Freedom, Decision, 
Moral Impotence and Liberation in the Theban Plays 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 3, I argued that Oedipus Tyrannus and Oedipus at Colonus, when 
taken together, showcase the way in which a community may be either hostile to or 
friendly toward the unrestricted desire to know of its citizenry.  Recall that not one 
but two sets of monarchs, Laius and Jocasta of Thebes and Polybus and Merope of 
Corinth, attempt to suppress Oedipus’ unrestricted desire to know which, I argued, 
set conditions for the realization of disastrous consequences.  I adduced from their 
decisions a viewpoint, consistent with Lonergan’s, that a culture generally hostile to 
questioning becomes an irresponsible and biased culture and, therefore, inevitably 
declines, as Thebes and Corinth indeed do.   
In contrast, Colonus, with its intelligent and gracious monarch, Theseus, at the 
helm, represents a community of potential; a community more open to questioning 
and one whose denizens achieve insights that set conditions for realizing new courses 
of action, specifically healing.  Within the liminal space of Colonus, Oedipus, the 
byproduct of biased Corinth and Thebes, enjoys new insights via Theseus’ grace 
which “open” his eyes to the heretofore denied possibility of real wisdom (as opposed 
to cleverness) as well as the possibility of a compassionate community.  Recall 
Oedipus’ words to Theseus: “In all my wanderings, this is the only place./Where I have 
found truth, honor and justice./I am well aware of how much I stand in your 





rightly notes, Oedipus has “been blind to the possibility of full reconciliation and 
acceptance into the community.”347   
Nevertheless, in spite of Colonus’ power to “open” his eyes to the possibility of 
self-transcendence, Oedipus, unlike Creon in The Antigone for example, remains 
obstinate and fails to actualize self-transcendence in his decisions and action, a 
comment on the way in which his Theban and Corinthian infused “scotosis” may have 
irrevocably tainted his “antecedent willingness,” an important Lonergan phrase to 
which I will return shortly. 
  At this point in my analysis one might object, asking, but can we really blame 
Oedipus for his failure to discern and take ownership of his own calamity?  After all, 
it was not his fault that he was abandoned by his parents, a pivotal decision which, in 
one sense, set all forthcoming events in motion.  Worse, if we try to lay blame on 
Oedipus, don’t we, as Dodds warns, make the same mistake as the Victorian critics, 
perverting Aristotle’s hamartia into the dubious and anachronistic concept of the 
“tragic flaw”?348  After all, Oedipus’ fortune changes, as Aristotle correctly notes, from 
good to bad “not through badness of character but on account of a great missing of 
the mark.”349  Oedipus, in other words, is a victim of perverse circumstance.  
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One may further object that there are more philosophically extravagant 
reasons for why blaming Oedipus might be a dubious enterprise.  I have already 
argued, for example, that a community hostile to questioning will invariably present 
challenges to any agent living within the so-called “cycle of decline” in his attempt to 
achieve authenticity, as he absorbs through indoctrination the perverse attitudes and 
habits of his cultural milieu, neglecting those questions that would liberate both him 
and his fellow citizens.  Recall Byrne: “Since this surd, rather than perfect authenticity, 
characterizes the lives of most people, to a lesser or greater extent, it poses the 
profound question about the possibility of living a truly good, authentic life.”350  It 
may be the case that, because we find ourselves living within the surd, we become 
irrevocably biased via indoctrination, unable to develop the habits necessary to fully 
capitalize on the freedom of which we seem ontologically capable.   And if we are 
incapable, then pinning blame to the agent may indeed be misdirected.   
For example, as we showed in Chapter 2, contrary to the Messenger’s 
suggestion that he chose freely (“The worst pain is self-chosen, deliberate” (1231)), 
Oedipus’ supposed “choice” to gouge out his own eyes did not seem at all to be 
function of rational self-consciousness, deliberation or discernment, in line with some 
of the other choices he makes, but rather an impetuous decision that we inferred was 
the byproduct of poor habits that, apparently, germinated in Corinth and were, 
apparently, allowed to flourish in Thebes. 351   Viewed from another equally 
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deterministic angle, might we argue that Oedipus’ “choice” to gouge out his eyes is yet 
another byproduct of the rage he inherited from his father, Laius?  Oedipus might 
therefore be symbolic of the human surd: he is an admixture of the rational and the 
irrational, discernment and caprice.  His failure to take any ownership of his fate may 
be yet another example of the overwhelming power of these external forces 
(environmental and genetic) and the consequent impotence of human willingness.    
These concerns, and the trajectory of this kind of analysis, leads inevitably to 
the proverbial elephant in the room: human freedom.  It is not, after all, self-evident 
that we are free to pursue authenticity.  We live in a world beset on all sides with 
obstacles, ranging from physical restraints to incomplete information to total cultural 
indoctrination.  In fact, a viewpoint that holds we are radically free (and by extension, 
blameworthy in many instances) might be deemed an extra-philosophical 
assumption, a naïve metaphysical stance.  Isn’t it the case that too many obstacles 
preclude us from achieving self-appropriation?  And if we are truly precluded from 
achieving authenticity by sundry external forces, such as a biased, declining culture 
on the one hand, or, perhaps, as more recent arguments go, our neural substrate on 
the other, then we are not free.  And if we are not free, Lonergan’s analysis becomes 
irrelevant, does it not? 
And yet, this question, of whether we truly autonomously choose the 
trajectory of our own lives is, quite explicitly, at the heart of Oedipus Tyrannus.  Was 
Oedipus fate-bound to become an incestuous parricide? Could he have chosen 
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otherwise?  Does an expectation that he will achieve some sort of intellectual 
conversion at the end of the play betoken a naïve worldview about the things we can 
control in life?  Do we even have the right to demand such a conversion?  These kinds 
of questions lead to a hermeneutical crisis of sorts; they naturally lead us away from 
and out of the text and become broader metaphysical questions that we begin to ask 
of ourselves.  Are we free?  Are we fated to do what we do?  Are the concepts of 
freedom and fate mutually exclusive?  What do we even mean by them?  That a play 
could elicit such a barrage of metaphysical questions is the hallmark of Sophocles’ 
power as a dramatist.  
In light of these questions, I follow, if only as a preliminary step, Charles Segal’s 
exhortation that in order to offer any fresh approach to Oedipus Tyrannus one must 
“remove a few layers of misconception.”352   The first misconception identified by 
Segal is this: “This is not a play about free will versus determinism.”  He later adds, 
“the issues of destiny, predetermination, and foreknowledge are raised as problems, 
not as dogma.”353  In fact, as Dodds also points out, the modern “position and counter-
position,” to use Lonergan’s terminology, which pits free will vs. determinism, would 
have been anachronistic if applied to a 5th century dramatist and his audience.  
Instead, Sophocles offers, at least implicitly, a kind of compatabilism, to use another 
anachronistic phrase; certain actions are “fate-bound” but, as Knox adds, almost as a 
warning to any would-be determinist interpreter, “Neither in Homer nor in Sophocles 
does divine foreknowledge of certain events imply that all human actions are 
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predetermined… Certain of Oedipus' past actions were fate-bound; but everything 
that [Oedipus] does on the stage from first to last he does as free agent.”354  
I will suggest here that if that if Segal’s claim is true, namely, that there is no 
metaphysical dogma to be extracted from Sophocles’ work, the unintended irony of 
the play is that it nevertheless affirms a dogma in spite of itself: that human freedom 
is enlarged by human intelligence, insofar as intelligence specifies, via practical 
insights and practical judgments of facts and values, a range of choices for the will to 
select.  It follows that ignorance, bias and moral impotence, in blocking or shrinking 
this range of choices, limit our effective freedom to the point at which we are 
incapable of fully actualizing our essential freedom. Of course, for Lonergan, this is 
more like an empirical fact than a dogma and it stands at the heart of his. Thus he 
writes, 
Now the same laws hold for the occurrence of practical insights as for 
insights generally, and so it is that the greater the development of one’s 
practical intelligence, the greater the range of possible courses of action 
one can grasp and consider.  Inversely, the less the development of 
one’s practical intelligence, the less the range of possible courses of 
action that here and now will occur to one.355  
 
And so, while I am sympathetic to the danger of claiming that the tragedians 
have a “point to make,” Sophocles’ rich exploitation of the equation between the 
expanding and contracting range of human freedom and intelligence seems 
undeniable.  Equally undeniable is that in contrast to some of the other dialectical 
tensions he exposes in his plays; in this particular case, Sophocles may be taking a 
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side.  We now ask whether, for Sophocles, freedom and intelligence are directly 
proportional and freedom and ignorance are inversely proportional? 
The controversy of accepting such an equation seems to be the corollary that 
follows from it: Sophocles is far more consistent with the philosophers of his day.356  
As Socrates says near the end of The Republic, “ephemeral souls…Virtue knows no 
master; each will possess it to a greater or less degree, depending on whether he 
values or disdains it.  The responsibility lies with the one who makes the choice; the 
god has none.”357  Might Sophocles, in spite of his apparent reverence for and belief 
in the gods, be recommending a viewpoint, shared by Lonergan and Plato, that far 
from an “epistemological reversal,” the unrestricted desire to know or “the examined 
life” opens new vistas of choice while a failure to question leads to a darkness and a 
blindness that only feels like or seems like inexorable fate?    
I would contend that Sophocles, like all provocative writers, preys upon the a 
priori metaphysical assumptions of his audience which, even if diametrically opposed 
as “dogma,” can be equally accommodated.  For example, if a reader is a card-carrying 
materialist-reductionist he will see Oedipus as determined by forces beyond his 
control.  If the reader is sympathetic to a worldview, more akin to Lonergan’s, in 
which human agency has the power to control not only the psycho-neural substrate 
but the environment in which that substrate subsists – barring, of course, psychic 
abnormalities – then he will be critical of Oedipus’ choices and look for the various 
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flaws (of intellect and character) in the chain of events that ultimately lead to the 
miasma.  In this way, the real power of the drama is the way in which Sophocles 
accommodates “position and counterposition.”   
McCoy rightly notes, Oedipus Tyrannus’ “supreme dramatic tension arises from 
a figure who somehow both acts freely and yet, in such ignorance that he seems 
incapable of genuine freedom.”358   And yet, by the time we arrive at Colonus, we 
cannot help but detect a development in Sophocles’ thought.  In Colonus, Oedipus 
seems to wield far more control over the trajectory of his life, presumably because he 
is older, wiser and, symbolized by his blindness, he understands now that genuine 
knowledge is more than just “taking a look.”  Paul Woodruff notes, Colonus is not 
about death but about life, showcasing the way a life may be controlled in its final 
moments.   
 
At the outset of the play he [Oedipus] may seem resigned to his fate, as 
would become a homeless old man who is blind and crippled and 
apparently reduced to depending entirely on the good will of strangers.  
But as the action moves forward, we see him gathering his strength 
from where he sits and employing it more and more effectively.  He will 
not be passive.  He takes his seat and refuses to move until given good 
reasons; and when he does move, he does so by choice.  When he is in 
danger, he displays a magnificent eloquence; he knows how to appeal 
to the pride that Athenians take in their reputation for virtue.  Later we 
will see that he has the power to deliver fatal curses and lifesaving 
blessings.  He knows his power, and he uses it to deadly effect.  In all 
this he knows he is fulfilling oracles, but he is still conscious of his own 
active power to persuade and ultimately to lead.359  
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Indeed, Woodruff is correct that the Oedipus of “Colonus” has developed, and is 
therefore a different man from the Oedipus of “Tyrannus.”  It would seem to follow 
from this newfound development and control, that Oedipus would become a perfect 
candidate for the sort of intellectual conversion Creon experiences.  But, as Woodruff 
neglects to consider, Oedipus’ development is not sustained.  He is unable at the end 
of the play to liberate himself, at least in the way Lonergan uses that term.  For the 
“problem of liberation,” as Lonergan calls it, is rooted in “an incapacity for sustained 
development,”360 where the operative word is “sustained.” It is not enough, in other 
words, for an agent to enjoy fresh insights and correct judgments and act on them.  He 
must also sustain this development over time to reach a degree of willingness that 
requires no need of external persuasion (as Creon receives from the Chorus and acts 
upon).  Oedipus indeed develops, and his development indeed demonstrates 
potential, but the development ultimately stalls in the end, as he is unable to conquer 
his own biases vis-à-vis the recognition of his own moral culpability.  This failure only 
further concretizes what I have argued (specifically in Chapter 2) is the most 
important tension of the play: the way in which Oedipus’ “detached, disinterested, 
unrestricted desire to know” collides with his “attached, interested and narrow 
sensitivity and intersubjectivity”361 and the way in which the former fails to conquer 
the latter.   
We must reiterate here the premise that Oedipus has control.  He is no puppet.  
He is, as Dodds notes, a “free agent.” In fact, significant in both McCoy and Woodruff’s 
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analyses is the way in which the freedom to control one’s life (and death) does not 
necessarily contradict the concept of prophecy or fate (moira).  Prophecy and freely 
chosen, “willed” decisions are, in other words, not mutually exclusive.  Instead, 
Sophocles describes the human experience as Lonergan does: a curious admixture of 
irrationality and rationality and thus, as a result, a mixture of human agents who are 
both bound by bias and liberated by insights, fated and free.  In Insight, Lonergan 
writes, “The challenge of history is for man progressively to restrict the realm of 
chance or fate or destiny and progressively to enlarge the realm of conscious grasp 
and deliberate choice.”362    
Obviously, there are events over which human agents have no control and 
against which no amount of intelligence could contend.  Obviously, there are events 
over which human agents have very little control and for which intelligence tries its 
level best against insurmountable odds.  Obviously, there are events over which 
human agents have a good deal of control and wherein intelligence saves the day.  
There are also events over which we have control but for which, often as a function 
of ignorance, bias or moral impotence, we claim we lack the control we actually had.  
Further, we must ask whether in those events in which he had no control, how do our 
choices afterward regain control or mitigate damage in an intelligent way?   
We may come to understand this erroneous judgment in retrospect provided 
we are willing to ask further questions.  But often we neglect to.  The play therefore 
reminds us that one of the most pernicious human tendencies is our uncanny ability 
to let ourselves off the hook, blaming abstractions like “fate,” a faceless bogeyman 
                                                        





who is merely the incarnation of our previous unintelligent schemes.  This analysis 
leads to the key question.  It seems like Oedipus would be a worthy candidate for 
intellectual conversion and yet his speech at the end of “Colonus” tell us that he would 
prefer to let himself off the hook.  Why?  What is Sophocles up to?   
In this final chapter I apply to the play Lonergan’s rich and highly technical 
discussion of human freedom to validate the direct proportion (cited above) 
Lonergan adduces between freedom and intelligence.  This reading construes “fate-
bound” actions as actions for which prior unintelligent schemes have set conditions 
that make choosing alternatives low probability events or, at the very least, beyond 
what a biased person has become “effectively free” to achieve.   
Contrary to viewpoints which juxtapose Sophocles as somehow in tension 
with rationality, I will argue that he provides us with a very commonsense viewpoint.  
The man who unintelligently chooses to continue to smoke cigarettes every day, for 
example, might ultimately see his lung cancer as “fate bound.”  In retrospect, every 
cigarette will appear to him as “freely chosen” and yet, the end result (cancer) will 
seem to him inevitable, as if each freely chosen cigarette set more and more mounting 
conditions which made it nearly impossible to quit and which therefore necessitated 
an inevitable outcome.   As Dodds notes, this commonsense viewpoint, “may not 
satisfy the analytical philosopher, but it seems to have satisfied the ordinary man at 
all periods. Bernard Knox aptly quotes the prophecy of Jesus to St. Peter, 'Before the 





that Peter's subsequent action was 'fate-bound' in the sense that he could not have 
chosen otherwise.”363 
Sophocles too exploits this phenomenon: the way past decisions (either by 
family members or members of the community) seem be interconnected with the 
present trajectory of a life vis-à-vis an agent’s antecedent willingness to choose either 
intelligent or unintelligent action.  Recall Charles Segal’s claim that Oedipus invokes 
the “older paradigm” which suggests, “life is still surrounded by the mysterious forces 
of the archaic worldview, forces less amenable to human understanding and control” 
and that “Imbalance or violation in one area will produce some kind of disturbance in 
another.”364  At this point in my analysis it should seem somewhat ironic that Segal 
describes as an “older paradigm” the viewpoint of nature as “an organically connected 
network of animate beings that stand in delicately balanced, mutually responsive 
relations to one another.”  Is not this view of nature a widely accepted one?  Don’t 
many of the lessons of recent scientific inquiry show, sometimes painfully, that 
human decisions and subsequent actions often have unintended consequences in 
different, unexpected quadrants?  Or, that human decisions and actions often set 
conditions which make certain trajectories for future generations (almost) 
impossible to choose, something akin to fate-bound? 
The danger in this kind of analysis is, apparently, that one risks being indicted 
as a “moralist” or “traditionalist” critic, seeking a flaw in Oedipus’ character when 
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Sophocles provides no real evidence that there is one, at least insofar as no one on the 
stage ever points one out.  Consider Dodds: 
'Ah,' says the traditionalist critic, 'but Oedipus' behaviour on the stage 
reveals the man he always was: he was punished for his basically 
unsound character.' In that case, however, someone on the stage ought 
to tell us so: Oedipus should repent, as Creon repents in the Antigone; 
or else another speaker should draw the moral. To ask about a 
character in fiction 'Was he a good man?' is to ask a strictly meaningless 
question: since Oedipus never lived we can answer neither 'Yes' nor 
'No'. The legitimate question is 'Did Sophocles intend us to think of 
Oedipus as a good man?' This can be answered-not by applying some 
ethical yardstick of our own, but by looking at what the characters in 
the play say about him. And by that test the answer is 'Yes.’365 
 
First, with respect to Dodds’ “meaningless question,” I would argue that asking 
questions about Oedipus’ character is legitimate enterprise here, within in a 
philosophy of classics.  Unlike the classicist, we are merely exploring a philosophical 
problem using Oedipus as a case study, not assessing the text vis-à-vis its time-period 
or social context.  Second, it also seems that we may respect Dodds’ basic point, and 
concede with him that Oedipus is generally a “a good man in a bad way” (Line 76), as 
the “Local” from Colonus initially describes him, while also pointing out the 
opportunities he misses to enlarge his consciousness, the pinnacle of which is his 
failure to take any ownership or reach any kind of self-appropriation or liberation at 
the end of the Theban Plays.  In other words, it seems quite fair, and far from 
illegitimate, to ask why Oedipus does not repent as, say, Creon does?  In this case, the 
question is not: is Oedipus free?  The question is: why is Oedipus seemingly incapable 
of the essential freedom that is the condition of the possibility of liberation, especially 
when Creon is the prima facie evidence that Sophocles found such conversion to be 
                                                        





within our potential, at least ontologically, as human beings? As I will show, Oedipus’ 
character exposes the “problem of liberation,” insofar as the contraction of his 
effective freedom reveals the need for something transcendent, beyond his native 
resources, to free himself from the shackles of moral impotence.  
Lonergan introduces eight key terms that we may recruit to shed light on the 
action of the play vis-à-vis these key questions: will, willingness, willing, essential 
freedom, effective freedom, decision, moral impotence and liberation.  I will 
focus on the last five. In Lonergan’s lexicon, our essential freedom is a function of our 
radical capacity for choice the cause of which is nothing but itself.  Our effective 
freedom, in contrast, is the extent to which we are actually capable of exploiting that 
over which we are, ontologically, capable.  A decision, for Lonergan, is an “enlarging 
transformation of consciousness” which, like a judgment’s “yes” or “no,” selects in 
action from a “pair of contradictories,” consent or refuse.  Lonergan then uses the 
phrase “moral impotence” to describe the gulf between one’s essential freedom and 
one’s effective freedom in making decisions.  Lonergan soon builds to the definition 
that, “Freedom, then, is a special kind of contingence.  It is contingence that arises, not 
from the empirical residue that grounds materiality and the nonsystematic, but in the 
order of spirit, of intelligent grasp, rational reflection, and morally guided will.”366 By 
“order of spirit” Lonergan simply means that contrary to modern psychoneural 
reductionism, the act of willing is not caused by anything material or by intelligence 
or rational reflection.  It is caused by nothing other than itself. 
                                                        





Liberation, for Lonergan, is liberation from moral impotence; it is liberation 
that makes it really possible to move toward the goal line toward which the 
intelligent, reasonable and willing person strives.  As I mentioned above, “liberation” 
is a “problem” because of the tension between the disinterested, unrestricted desire 
to know and bias plus moral impotence.367  The problem vanishes, as Lonergan notes, 
“if one supposes man’s intelligence, reasonableness, and willingness not to be 
potentialities in process of development but already in possession of the insights that 
make learning superfluous, of the reasonableness that makes judgments correct, of 
the willingness that makes persuasion unnecessary.”368  
Clearly, the way in which Lonergan arrives at his definition of freedom and his 
correlative use of these specific terms will require further elucidation.  In the next 
section I discuss the metaphysical background of Lonergan’s claims about human 
freedom while recognizing that a complete discussion will lead us too far afield.  The 
reason for this sort of extended analysis is that the very possibility of liberation, our 
eighth and most important term, is contingent upon the premise that agents can 
indeed freely decide.  We therefore need to show why we have good reason to believe 
that human beings are indeed ontologically free to decide and act even though, at 
times, they are effectively not. 
Finally, I will argue that Sophocles gives us good reason to believe that agents 
can and do experience not only intellectual conversions, but liberations of the will 
(Theseus and Creon) while others (Oedipus) falter.369 In fact, one of the strategies I 
                                                        
 






will employ in this section is a comparison of Oedipus’ final speech in Oedipus 
Tyrannus, in which he (unconvincingly, to us, and to himself) asserts his moral 
blamelessness and Creon’s final speech in The Antigone, which marks that ruler’s 
development into a man moved (finally) by persuasion.  By comparing the two men I 
attempt to push against the assertion that we must not look for flaws in Oedipus’ 
character, with all due respect to critics like Dodds.  After all, a breakdown in 
intelligence and moral responsibility is a character flaw, as Aristotle also thought.  In 
the person of Creon we see that within Sophocles’ dramatic world, intellectual 
conversion is possible, and often in the teeth of prohibitive biases that die hard.  
Witnessing Oedipus’ correlative failure to take any ownership should therefore allow 
us to offer some indictment, albeit small, of his character.  Oedipus is no monster.  But 
he could have been more intelligent (and therefore more effectively free) with himself 
and others.  After all, who among us couldn’t be?     
 
Lonergan on Freedom and its Metaphysical Assumptions  
 
In Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, Murellus chastises the commoners waiting to 
“rejoice” in Caesar’s “triumph.”  An indignant Murellus shouts at them, famously, “you 
blocks, you stones, you worse than senseless things.”370   The import of Murellus’ 
remark is that the common folk, in their blind and uncritical allegiance to Caesar, have 
degraded what is essentially human about them – namely, their senses and 
intelligence (empirical and intelligent consciousness) – to a level “below” even 
“blocks and stones.”  Blocks and stones, presumably, do not sense anything and are 
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certainly not intelligent.371  Human beings, on the other hand, are different kinds of 
“things.”   
That human beings are different kinds of “things” is intimately connected to 
two premises central to Lonergan’s thought from which he deduces his analysis of 
human freedom: emergent probability and proportionate being.  While a robust 
discussion of these two concepts would go well beyond the scope of this essay, we 
may summarize them briefly.   
On the ontological side, our world consists of “events” and “things” which 
emerge according to schedules of probabilities and in degrees of higher and higher 
complexity.372  We see all around us, in other words, sequences of events of various 
kinds as well as blocks, stones, and, to change the line, sensitive things, like us.  The 
spectrum of being runs then from subatomic particles, atoms, molecules, proteins, 
prokaryotes, eukaryotes, amoebae, tse-tse flies, spiders, mice, rats, bats, 
chimpanzees, dolphins and human beings, just to name a few.   
On the side of the thinking subject, therefore, “higher viewpoints” are required 
to “explain” these various strata of being.  Were they not, the “schemes of recurrence” 
or, in this case “recurrent events,” another important Lonergan phrase, on the “lower 
levels” would be merely coincidental with the higher.  Again, although a full 
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discussion of precisely what Lonergan means here would take us too far afield, we 
may briefly elucidate his viewpoint by referring to a scheme of recurrence, the Kreb’s 
Cycle, in biochemistry.  
The image below depicts the intricacies of the familiar citric acid cycle, or 
Krebs Cycle, whereby aerobic organisms oxidize acetate from proteins, fats and 
carbohydrates into water and 𝐶𝑂2  in order to generate energy.  This is a classic 
example of what Lonergan calls a “scheme of recurrence,” in which each chemical 
reaction event of the cycle is contingent upon the previous reaction event as fulfilling 
conditions such that the last event in the cycle constitutes the fulfilling conditions of 
the first and the cycle begins again.  The nitrogen cycle could be used to illustrate the 
same point.  Once any recurrent scheme is operative, as Lonergan says, “the 
probability of [its] survival is the probability of the nonoccurrence of any of the events 
that would disrupt the scheme.”373   
But there is a far subtler point in Lonergan’s overall discussion of schemes of 
recurrence: the way in which, in general, a “downward causation” occurs when the 
biological level appropriates the chemical level to its advantage.  In other words, there 
is nothing necessary about the Krebs Cycle.  There could have been – and, in fact, still 
are – rival alternatives to the Krebs Cycle, but biological organisms quickly 
appropriated the chemical scheme of the Krebs Cycle as an efficient scheme, just as 
human beings not only appropriate various schemes to their advantage but also 
become the source of efficient schemes themselves – a function of precisely what 
distinguishes them from lesser things: intelligent consciousness. 
                                                        








Most importantly, schemes of recurrence demonstrate that while the initial 
conditions of the scheme’s emergence are set and bound by the laws of physics – 
insofar as no physical laws are violated in the scheme – its recurrence is not explained 
by merely appealing to the laws and the relations of conjugates of the lower level 
alone.374  In fact, its systematic recurrence can only be viewed as merely coincidental 
from the viewpoint of the lower level, as the physicist cannot answer the question, 
“yes, but why did the cycle restart again?” without appealing to chemistry.  If he did 
not appeal to chemistry, then the restarting of the cycle would be merely 
“coincidental.”  Lonergan writes, “Proportionate being, then, involves a number of 
explanatory genera, so that there is a series of levels of operation with each higher 
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level making systematic what otherwise would have been merely coincidental on the 
previous level.”375  
Lonergan’s general aim here is to demonstrate that when the known laws or, 
as he calls them, “conditioned correlations,” of things and their conjugates on the 
lower level – say, the laws of subatomic physics, provided they are the correct laws – 
fail to explain the emergence of new data, we are justified in affirming the existence 
of new unity-identity-wholes (things) with new explanatory conjugates (properties) 
and new conditioned correlations (laws).  Consider the full explanation below:   
Consider…a genus of things 𝑇𝑖 , with explanatory conjugates 𝐶𝑖 , and 
consider a consequent list of possible schemes of recurrence 𝑆𝑖 .  
Suppose there occurs an aggregate of events 𝐸𝑖𝑗 , that is merely 
coincidental when considered in the light of the laws of things 𝑇𝑖 and 
all of their possible schemes of recurrence 𝑆𝑖.  Then, if the aggregate of 
events 𝐸𝑖𝑗  occur regularly, it is necessary to advance to the higher 
viewpoint of some genus of things 𝑇𝑗 , with conjugates 𝐶𝑖  and 𝐶𝑗 , and 
with schemes of recurrence 𝑆𝑗 .  The lower viewpoint is insufficient, for 
it has to regard as merely coincidental what in fact is regular.  The 
higher viewpoint is justified, for the conjugates 𝐶𝑗 , and the schemes 𝑆𝑗  
constitute a higher system that makes regular what otherwise would 
be merely coincidental.376 
  
We may apply the description above to the Krebs Cycle.  Fumarate, for 
example, must be considered a thing itself – a unity, identity, whole – and not a mere 
aggregate of aggregates (C4H4O4) if one is to explain why, at a certain juncture in the 
Krebs Cycle, fumerate converts to malate on the condition of the presence of the 
enzyme fumerase.  The laws of subatomic physics, as conditioned correlations, offer 
no explanation of the cause of this physical event because the laws of subatomic 
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physics alone cannot anticipate fumerate as a thing itself, only an aggregate of smaller 
things.  Only by moving to a “higher viewpoint” and by postulating a correlative 
“higher genera of things” with their own explanatory conjugates is the data explained 
which, in this instance, is not merely the individual events of the scheme as events 
with causes, but the very regularity of the scheme itself. 
Specifically, a complete explanation of the Krebs Cycle pictured above (as a 
heuristic aid) must appeal to the explanatory conjugates of each of the chemical 
compounds involved in each chemical reaction event.  A chemist, for example, cannot 
reduce a molecule of pentacene to an aggregate of aggregates (C22H14) if he desires to 
preserve the explanatory conjugates to which he must advert in order to offer 
explanations of pentacene’s “behavior” – its role as an organic semiconductor, for 
example.  Likewise, the recurrent scheme of the Krebs Cycle and higher genera of 
things involved are irreducible vis-à-vis the explanatory power of subatomic physics.   
What does this analysis have to do with a discussion of human freedom?  The 
short answer is that to offer a causal explanation of human behavior one must 
likewise advert to human beings as higher things possessed of different conjugates, 
such as “intelligence” and “will” since the laws of physics, chemistry and biology will 
be insufficient in anticipating them as such.   
In one of the most challenging sections of Insight, Lonergan discusses what he 
calls “higher viewpoints” and their correlative “higher level of genera” implicit in his 
earlier account of emergent probability, Lonergan’s basic metaphysical commitment.   
Here we are offered a clue that, on Lonergan’s view, and as we mentioned briefly in 





downwardly “organizes and controls” neural (physical) systems akin to the way 
biological organisms organize and control chemical schemes to their advantage.  In 
other words, if human beings are different and “higher” things than “blocks and 
stones and worse than senseless things,” explanatory practice will be motivated to 
appeal to the higher viewpoint (the psychic, the intellectual and the volitional) in 
order to explain some human action, just as it is motivated to appeal to the higher 
viewpoint of chemistry in order to explain a physical scheme of recurrence, like the 
Krebs Cycle for example, and why, in the negative, it is justifiably unmotivated to 
appeal to the psychic (or intellectual or volitional) in explaining the movements of 
“blocks and stones and worse than senseless things.”  It follows from these premises 
that any discussion of human freedom will need to advert to human properties, 
specifically intellect and will, lest the spiritual aspect of human behavior escape 
analysis. 
In his forthcoming essay on the philosopher Edith Stein, Patrick H. Byrne 
offers an excellent illustration of the way in which the explanatory laws of the “lower 
level” are impotent in explaining the meaning of a basic but uniquely human 
transaction: the act of getting change at a cash register. 
think of a cashier who returns correct change to a customer during a 
commercial transaction. Why did the cashier perform this action in 
response to the action of receiving payment? Stein (and Lonergan) 
would argue this procession of one human act from another cannot be 
properly understood by laws of physics, chemistry, biology, or the 
psyche alone. Stein goes on to say that even if one also adds “empathic 
comprehension of psychic contexts,” something about the spiritual act 
still escapes analysis.377  
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Likewise, for Lonergan, intelligent consciousness, as opposed to mere 
biological extroversion, is precisely what makes human beings at once, explanatory 
genus and explanatory species.  The intelligent systems we create for ourselves and 
our communities are prima facie data of the psychogenic as immanent and operative 
and why, therefore, an appeal to the psychic level is required for their explanation.  
The intelligent construction of hydroelectric dam to provide power for a remote 
region, for example, represents the triumph of the psychic, intellectual and volitional 
over the physical.  For as Lonergan indicates, human beings “represent a higher 
system beyond sensibility.  But that genus is coincident with species, for it is not just 
a higher system but a source of higher systems.  In [humans] there occurs the 
transition from intelligible to the intelligent.”378     
Treating human beings as different kinds of “things” than blocks and stones is 
what allows Lonergan to build to the definition of freedom cited above.  He wants to 
show that human beings, because they are ontologically capable of potential acts of 
intelligence and will, are radically different than, say, molecules and, say, spiders, 
albeit less radically.  He writes,  
It follows that there is a radical difference between the contingence of 
the act of willing and the general contingence of existence and 
occurrence in the rest of the domain of proportionate being.  The latter 
contingence falls short of strict intelligible necessity, not because it is 
free, but because it is involved in the nonsystematic character of 
material multiplicity, continuity, and frequency.  But the contingence of 
the act of will, so far from resulting from the nonsystematic, arises in 
the imposition of further intelligible order upon otherwise merely 
coincidental manifolds.379 
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Note in this passage the way in which Lonergan not only frees human action 
from the shackles of a determinism; he also strips determinism from the activity of 
blocks and stones, albeit for other reasons.380  Accordingly, Lonergan advises that any 
account of human freedom must turn away from mere psycho-neural reductionism 
to a study of intellect and will, two “conjugates” of human “things.”  Just as the 
physicist cannot explain the behavior of fumerate by a mere analysis of its constituent 
elements, we cannot explain or elucidate human behavior without treating human 
beings as different ontological entities.  Thus, Lonergan writes, “In the coincidental 
manifolds of sensible presentations, practical insights grasp possible courses of 
action that are examined by reflection, decided by acts of willing, and thereby either 
are or are not realized in the underlying sensitive flow.  In this process there is to be 
discerned the emergence of elements of higher integration.”381  This schema will later 
underpin Lonergan’s discussion of “liberation” and the “higher integration” of human 
living such liberation requires. 
 
Decision as an “Enlarging Transformation of Consciousness”  
 
Having briefly elucidated the metaphysical preliminaries, Lonergan’s claim 
should now be clearer that, “Freedom, then, is a special kind of contingence.  It is 
contingence that arises, not from the empirical residue that grounds materiality and 
the nonsystematic, but in the order of spirit, of intelligent grasp, rational reflection, 
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and morally guided will.”382   Further, we are now in a position to appreciate the 
analogy operative in his definition.  The material world is radically contingent but for 
different reasons than the human world of human actors is.  Whereas the material 
world is contingent because of schemes of recurrence, the human world is contingent 
because humans are intelligibilities who are also intelligent and capable of 
autonomous choice.  Human agents, in other words, are contingent in the material 
sense, since they are partly material, but also contingent in the spiritual sense, since 
they are possessed of intellect and will.  Thus, Lonergan writes, “It has the twofold 
basis that its object is merely a possibility and that its agent is contingent not only in 
his existence but also in the extension of his rational consciousness into rational self-
consciousness.”383  
Note the way Lonergan concludes the previous passage with a comment on 
the distinctly human “extension” or, to use a more familiar word, “enlargement,” of 
consciousness from rational consciousness to rational self-consciousness (as I 
elucidated in Chapter 1).  This human potential to enlarge one’s consciousness leads 
Lonergan to his analysis of human decisions which, on his view, are special junctures 
in which the conscious operations move from one level to a higher one.   
What, then, is a decision, and how does decision align with human freedom?  
Lonergan explains the concept of “decision” first by drawing an analogy between the 
similarity between decision and judgment.  He writes, “Decision, then, resembles 
judgment inasmuch as both select one member of a pair of contradictories; as 
                                                        







judgment either affirms or denies, so decision either consents or refuses.”384  He then 
establishes a key difference between the two vis-à-vis levels of consciousness: a 
judgment is an act of rational consciousness and a decision is an act of rational self-
consciousness.  “Both judgment and decision,” says Lonergan, “are concerned with 
actuality; but judgment merely acknowledges an actuality that already exists; while 
decision confers actuality upon a course of action that otherwise is merely 
possible.”385   
 As such, judgment and decisions occur in different patterns of knowing – 
judgments grasp what is (already); decisions bestow actuality on potential courses of 
action which, presumably and hopefully, will be consistent with what one knows.   
Thus, Lonergan adds, “The rationality of judgment emerges in the unfolding of the 
detached and disinterested desire to know in the process towards knowledge of the 
universe of being.  But the rationality of decision emerges in the demand of the 
rationally conscious subject for consistency between his knowing and his deciding 
and doing.”386 
Lonergan then moves to an analysis of the concept of “obligation” in terms of 
the human person’s understanding of either a consistency or inconsistency between 
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his judgments (rational consciousness) and his doing (rational self-consciousness).   
The full passage is below:   
The rational subject as imposing an obligation upon himself is just a 
knower, and his rationality consists radically in not allowing other 
desire to interfere with the unfolding of the detached and disinterested 
desire to know.  But the rational subject as carrying out an obligation is 
not just a knower but also a doer, and his rationality consists not merely 
in excluding interference with cognitional process but also in extending 
the rationality of his knowing into the field of doing.  But that extension 
does not occur simply by knowing one’s obligations.  It occurs just 
inasmuch as one wills to meet one’s obligations.387  
 
By adverting to the human property of “will,” a function of a higher viewpoint, 
Lonergan is building here toward a rejection of the Socratic position that to know the 
good is to will the good which, on Lonergan’s view, contains a logical fallacy insofar 
as it “begs the question.”388  Lonergan exposes this fallacy by noting the discrepancy 
between “necessity” as a matter of logic and “necessity” as a matter of action, denying 
the latter.  He explains that it is possible for a person to judge a “proposed course of 
action is obligatory, that either I decide in favor of the proposal or else I surrender 
consistency between my knowing and my doing… that I cannot both be reasonable 
and act otherwise, then my reasonableness is bound to the act by a link of necessity.  
Such is the meaning of obligation.”389  
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388 Lonergan is also incidentally refuting, in broad strokes, a major premise 
found in Kant.  After all, human history is replete with unintelligent and disastrous 
schemes wrought by men and women of “good will.”  We may then ask, what good is 
a good will without correct insights? 
 





What, exactly, does Lonergan mean by this?  Consider the following example.  
Imagine that a particularly zealous steak-lover, through his persistent questions, has 
the insight (intelligent consciousness) that to use animals for food is to use them as 
means to an end only, an unethical action.  He might soon come to the virtually 
unconditioned judgment (rational consciousness), therefore, that continuing to eat 
porterhouses at the Capital Grille is wrong.  He might also grasp in an insight 
(intelligent consciousness) that if he is to continue eating meat while simultaneously 
affirming the judgment that such an action is wrong, he will “surrender consistency” 
between his knowing and his doing and, as such, become a lived contradiction.  
Obligation, for him, is the understanding of the necessity between reasonableness and 
acting against it.  
The problem, of course, is that it is quite possible to grasp this necessity (as a 
matter of logic and contradiction) and yet still decide to act in contradiction with one’s 
knowing.  And thus, the steak-lover continues to eat his porterhouse (rational self-
consciousness) while understanding (rational consciousness) he ought not to.  
Lonergan therefore notes that,  
One should note the fallacy in every argument from determinate 
knowing to determinate willing.  For every argument of that type must 
postulate a conformity between knowing and willing.  But such 
conformity exists only when in fact willing actually is reasonable.  
Hence, to deduce the determinate act of will one must postulate the 
conformity; and to verify the postulate one must already have the 
determinate willing that one is out demonstrate.390  
 
Lonergan’s point here is that all claims the form of which are ultimately the 
Socratic, “to know the good is to do the good,” ultimately makes the logical fallacy of 
                                                        





“begging the question.”391  The claim begs the question because it verifies a fitness 
between knowing and willing which, if verified, would already have that fitness.  
Instead, as Lonergan points out, one can fail to fulfill one’s obligation since, as he so 
eloquently puts it, and as our steak-lover indicates, “the iron link of necessity can 
prove to be a wisp of straw.”392   
We may now ask, along with Lonergan (and anticipating Oedipus’ failure to act 
in fidelity to what he understands) “how can this be?”  The short answer is, again, the 
will.  As we noted above, it is will (and intellect) that are the conjugates of the human 
“thing” that separates us from blocks and stones.  But it is the human will that, 
according to Lonergan, “(1) marks the shift from rational consciousness to rational 
self-consciousness, and (2) changes what is rational necessity in the field of knowing 
into rational exigence in the larger field of both knowing and doing.”393  As a result, as 
Lonergan writes, “one can be a rational knower without an act of willing, and one 
cannot be a rational doer without an act of willing.”   
 Lonergan’s treatment of “decision” illuminates a number of the key junctures 
in the Theban plays.  Although I argued earlier a general viewpoint that Sophocles 
depicts a series of questions asked and unasked, it is also possible to present an 
alternative and complimentary general perspective, namely that the Oedipus cycle is 
a dramatic depiction of decisions – and decisions, we should note, that stand in 
contradiction to the chooser’s understanding – and their consequences.  We 
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sometimes lose sight of this focus on cumulative decisions because of the non-linear 
narrative.  But if the Oedipus cycle began with Laius and Jocasta’s initial choice to kill 
their child, in spite of their understanding that it was wrong, followed by Oedipus’ 
encounter with Polybus and Merope, in which they conceal the truth (and assuming 
they feel some compunction about doing so), followed by the Sphinx, the plague, 
Oedipus’ insight, “Colonus” and Antigone, we would see with more clarity the tension 
between being a “rational knower” without correlative acts of willing the good. 
 
Freedom and its Forms  
 
 The metaphysical foundation for Lonergan’s definition of freedom, described 
in detail above, allows Lonergan to subdivide freedom (“a special form of 
contingency”) into two types: essential freedom and effective freedom.  Effective 
freedom is contingent upon essential freedom and, as Lonergan points out, “a 
consideration of effective freedom is meaningless, unless essential freedom exists.”394   
 So, what is the difference between the two types?  Our discussion above, which 
included a taxonomy of different types of “things” in the world, offers a clue.  First, 
consider two different things: humans and spiders.  Next, consider the difference 
between a man deciding upon whether to quit smoking and a spider “deciding” on 
whether to “quit” spinning webs.  Clearly, the latter instance is impossible (note the 
air quotes on the action verbs) given what we may now call the spider’s lack of 
essential freedom.  Because a spider lacks intelligence and will it is not essentially free 
in the strict sense.  And because it is not essentially free, it is not effectively free to 
                                                        





quit spinning webs.  A claim, therefore, that a spider is “free” to quit spinning webs 
would be a failure of explanatory genera.  It would be an oversight on the side of the 
knower of extending to a “lower” level what is only operative in an instance of higher 
integration – namely, creatures with intellect and will.  Thus, Lonergan writes,  
 
The difference between essential and effective freedom is the 
difference between a dynamic structure and its operational range.  Man 
is free essentially inasmuch as possible courses of action are grasped 
by practical insight, motivated by reflection, and executed by decision.  
But man is free effectively to a greater or less extent inasmuch as this 
dynamic structure is open to grasping, motivating, and executing a 
broad or a narrow range of otherwise possible courses of action.  Thus, 
one may be essentially but not effectively free to give up smoking.395  
 
 Now consider a frustrated man attempting to quit smoking.  He may claim that 
he is not free to give up smoking.  He may claim that he is determined by various 
external forces to continue (or that it was Apollo’s fault he’s an incestuous parricide!).  
He may even claim that to quit smoking, for him, would be like a spider quitting web-
spinning.  But this would be inaccurate.  The smoker’s inability to quit is really a 
commentary on the “difference between a dynamic structure and its operational 
range,” or effective freedom.  Other human beings who have quit smoking are 
sobering reminders to the poor man who desires to quit that it is quite within the 
operational range of a human being to quit but, for whatever specific reason, the man 
is unable to effectively actualize a possible course of action (quitting).   The inability 
to broaden the range of one’s effective freedom so that it more closely and perfectly 
approximates one’s essential freedom is what Lonergan calls “moral impotence.” 
                                                        





To elucidate this “range,” Lonergan offers what I take to be one of the most 
provocative images in all of Insight: the penumbra.  For laypersons, The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines “penumbra” as, “The partially shaded region around the shadow of 
an opaque body, when the light source is larger than a point source and only part of 
its light is cut off (contrasted with the full shadow or umbra); (esp. in Astron.) The 
term that of the shadow cast by the moon on the earth in a solar eclipse, or by the 
earth on the moon in a lunar eclipse, resulting in an area that experiences only a 
partial eclipse.”  For Lonergan, the image of the penumbra symbolizes the tension 
between effective freedom and essential freedom and, by extension, resignation and 
self-transcendence, enslavement to bias and liberation from it.   I include the full 
passage in its entirety to stress its importance and elegance.  I also include beneath it 
a visual diagram of the metaphor as a heuristic aid: 
Further, these areas are not fixed; as he develops, the penumbra 
penetrates into the shadow and the luminous area into the penumbra 
while, inversely, moral decline is a contraction of the luminous area and 
of the penumbra.  Finally, this consciousness of moral impotence not 
only heightens the tension between limitation and transcendence but 
also can provide ambivalent materials for reflection; correctly 
interpreted, it brings home to man the fact that his living is a 
developing, that he is not to be discouraged by his failures, that rather 
he is to profit by them both as lessons on his personal weaknesses and 
as a stimulus to greater efforts; but the same data can also be regarded 
as evidence that there is no use trying, that moral codes ask the 
impossible, that one has to be content with oneself as one is.396 
  
 
                                                        







The image of the penumbra above is a particularly apt metaphor for moral impotence 
because, more so than other images, the image captures the dynamic expansion and 
the contraction of willingness, effective freedom.   As Lonergan says, the areas are 
“not fixed.”   
 
The Problem of Liberation  
 
We may now apply the image of the penumbra above and Lonergan’s complex 
discussion of freedom to the Theban Plays.   We may ask, is liberation from bias and 
subsequent intellectual conversion possible when intellectual conversion is 
contingent first upon liberation of the will?  Or, are we determined by forces beyond 
our control to remain in our narrow routines?   Does the self-correcting cycle of 
inquiry aspire to heights beyond the forces of indoctrination?  Or is it fated to stall out 
in the face of those forces? 
 We may begin by considering two speeches, the first delivered by Oedipus at 
the end of Colonus and the second delivered by Creon at the end of The Antigone.  The 
goal of this juxtaposition will be to showcase the way in which consciousness of moral 
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impotence offers “ambivalent materials for reflection” which, as I argue, Oedipus 
incorrectly interprets that “one has to be content with oneself as one is” while Creon 
profits from personal weakness as a “stimulus to greater efforts.”  The juxtaposition 
of the two men demonstrates Lonergan’s basic picture of human freedom as a 
function of intelligence and the enslavement of bias a function of ignorance.  Further, 
it demonstrates that Sophocles affirms the viewpoint that liberation is a condition of 
the possibility of insight conquering bias.  But, if Sophocles saw liberation as within 
the range of human potential, it would follow that Oedipus’ failure to achieve 
liberation at the end of the play gives us a flaw in his character.  
I argue that the Theban Plays provide striking instances of both enslavement 
to bias and liberation from it, both radical self-denial and radical self-ownership.  
These stances toward intellectual liberation are well-articulated by the final speeches 
of Oedipus and Creon, respectively.   
Further, that the former, Oedipus, remains obstinate about his own mistakes 
and his own moral culpability affirms that view that, contrary to Dodds, we can and 
do find a character flaw in Oedipus.  That flaw is a lack of questioning; a lack of fidelity 
to the self-correcting cycle.398  This lack of fidelity to the self-correcting cycle is no 
surprise.  We’ve seen it before.  It is, in fact, the same flaw I discussed in Chapter 2, 
when Oedipus departs the Oracle at Delphi with his basic questions unanswered (“I 
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went to Delphi.  But there, Apollo shunned me,/Denied my questions and sent me 
away” (Lines 788-789)) and yet he decides, unintelligently, to act under the 
assumption that those questions have been answered.  His questioning spirit then 
takes a long hiatus.  As I pointed out in that chapter, Oedipus’ failure to ask additional 
questions only heightens the irony of the play, given that he is reputed to be a man of 
inquiry and insight.   
In contrast, in The Antigone, Sophocles presents Creon as initially questionless.  
He is obstinate and cocksure.  As Woodruff notes, “Creon’s name means ‘ruler.’  His 
devotion to rational order and even-handed justice grows darker as his suspicions of 
conspiracy grow: We see him looking more and more like a tyrant as the play 
progresses.”399  And yet, by the end of the play, Creon is no longer convinced of his 
own ethical superiority and he experiences a radical turnaround.  He is possessed of 
an antecedent willingness that newly attunes him to the wise persuasion of others (in 
this case, the Chorus) and he races to Antigone’s cave in a tragic and futile attempt to 
“undo the mischief” his bias has caused.   
First, let us listen to Oedipus.  In Oedipus Tyrannus, he speaks words that 
betoken insights and judgments about his blamelessness.  Here, Oedipus’ wounds 
(both physical and emotional) are still fresh and there has been little time for what 
Byrne calls an “ethics of discernment.”  We may even be tempted to give Oedipus a 
pass in this speech and attribute the judgments below as a function of the exigencies 
of his dire situation.  He has not yet had time for the sort of self-appropriation 
                                                        





liberation requires and his knee-jerk scapegoating is therefore, perhaps, 
psychologically intelligible: 
 
But the gods made it so, 
Exorcising some ancient grudge 
Through my bloodline. 
I cannot be blamed for the crimes 
I inflicted on myself and my family.  (967-971) 
 
But now, let us compare this speech to the one Oedipus delivers later in his life, in 
Oedipus Colonus, a pivotal moment in which Creon and Theseus confront each other 
over the rights to Oedipus’ body.  Recall that Oedipus offers these words in an effort 
to rebuke Creon’s indictment of him as an incestuous parricide.  Before we hear them, 
let us frame the words with this question: if Oedipus has truly developed, in the way 
Woodruff, for example, suggests, shouldn’t we expect a bit more circumspection in 
these words vis-à-vis his moral culpability?  In other words, given all that Oedipus has 
learned about the dangers of making judgments with incomplete information, and the 
way in which all we claim to know can crumble beneath our feet in as instant, one 
wonders why, if he had truly developed, he would not be more philosophically 
parsimonious in his pronouncements of blamelessness.  Instead, he shouts this: 
 
You rant on about taboo killings, 
Foul marriages, and vile incest. 
It was I who suffered these things 
But the gods made it so, 
Exorcising some ancient grudge 
Through my bloodline. 
I cannot be blamed for the crimes 
I inflicted on myself and my family, 
You won’t find a single reason 
Why I deserved any of it. 
How was it my fault 





A prediction that he would  
Be killed by his very own son? 
That happened before I was born -  
I had not even been conceived! 
But I was born, unluckily, 
And yes, I did fight and kill my father, 
But I had no idea who he was – 
I didn’t know what I was doing. 
How can you call me guilty 
When I knew nothing…nothing! (Lines 963 – 977. 
 
It is no coincidence that in the last two lines of this second speech, Oedipus unites in 
one sentiment the concepts of guilt (“How can you call me guilty?”) and knowledge 
(“I knew nothing”).  Oedipus, in other words, correctly understands that blame (for 
which one would feel guilt) and knowledge are co-principles vis-à-vis assigning moral 
culpability and, conversely, innocence and ignorance are co-principles vis-à-vis moral 
blamelessness.  This is a point Aristotle stresses in the Nicomachean Ethics and it is at 
the heart of all debates regarding the dubious phrase, “tragic flaw.”   
Recall that in Poetics, Aristotle uses the term hamartia (the word attributed to 
the phrase “tragic flaw”) in reference to a “mistake made in ignorance of some 
material fact.”  As Greek students know well, the word comes from the verb 
hamartano which means “to aim and miss” or “to miss the mark,” as in archery.  For 
Aristotle, hamartia is a kind of “missing the mark,” and he uses the word in the same 
way in the Nichomachean Ethics.  In that text, Aristotle’s distinction between 
hamartêmata¹ proper, which he then subdivides into atuchêmata (accidents) and 
hamartêmata² (acts of negligence) before juxtaposing both against adikêmata 
(wrongs/injustices).  Notice that for Aristotle, “mistakes” are a function of ignorance; 
accidents involve harm that results contrary to what might be reasonably supposed; 





without malice.  Wrongs or injustices are further distinguished by whether they 
spring from “spiritedness” or from “deliberation.” 400   Only if the latter, is a man 
vicious in the truly Aristotelian sense.    
Oedipus, therefore, correctly diagnoses the connection between knowledge 
and blame and ignorance and innocence.   Yet the mere recognition of this correlation 
fails to fully absolve Oedipus of moral culpability, a fact which he would have 
discerned had he been, well, more discerning.  In other words, the higher-level 
question for Oedipus to ask, within an ethics of discernment, would be whether he is 
morally culpable for his lack of understanding.  As we have shown, there are plenty 
of junctures in which Oedipus fails to actualize potential decisions which would have 
enlarged his consciousness in order to achieve a new horizon or higher integration.  
From this new horizon Oedipus should and would recognize various biases that, 
heretofore, have precluded him from affirming at least a modicum of culpability.  
Instead, Oedipus reduces, in that hyperbolic way that has become typical of modern 
scientific reductionism, his behavior to antecedent factors beyond his control: “It was 
Apollo…” and “But the gods made it so,/Exorcising some ancient grudge/Through my 
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then, the harm results contrary to what might reasonably be supposed, it is an 
accident, but when it is not contrary to what might reasonably be supposed, but is 
without malice, it is an act of negligence (for whenever the source of responsbility is 
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accident.)  But whenever one acts knowingly but not deliberately, it is a wrong, as are 
all those acts of injustice that are done out of spiritedness or all the passions that are 
necessary or natural attributes of human beings, for in doing harm and being in the 
wrong in these ways people do injustice, and the deeds are acts of injustice, but they 
are not on that account unjust or vicious people, for the harm does not come from 





bloodline” (965-967) and "But I was born, unluckily…” (972) and “It was all decided 
by the gods” (997). 
Further, one wonders if Oedipus really believes what he is saying about 
himself.  Or, are his claims above a function of a waning bravado, posturing?  Is it 
really possible that an otherwise intelligent man – a “good man in a bad way” – could 
shout so confidently, “I cannot be blamed for the crimes/I inflicted on myself and my 
family,/You won’t find a single reason/Why I deserved any of it.”  I have always read 
these lines with the suspicion that Oedipus does not wholly believe them himself.  His 
words seem too emphatic and too certain.  If ever I were to direct “Oedipus” on the 
stage, I would advise the actor playing Oedipus to deliver the lines not unlike a man 
who neither grasps his moral impotence with total clarity nor is it totally unconscious.  
Good luck to that actor! 
Does Oedipus think he is guilty?  No.  But does he think he is totally blameless?  
No.  In this speech we find Oedipus in the undesirable state of a man who knows he 
has, as Elizabeth Proctor says, “sins of his own to count,” and yet will not consciously 
acknowledge them.  This dichotomous stance is not a surprise.  As Lonergan writes, 
“moral impotence” in a subject is neither “grasped with perfect clarity nor totally 
unconscious.”401  Further, as I have attempted to show above, the tendency to reduce 
human action to a casual determinism by appealing to antecedent causes, aside from 
the non-trivial problem of infinite regress, is also to make a grave category mistake 
about the kinds of things human beings are.  We may add to the list, then, that not 
                                                        





only does Oedipus make various errors in judgment, he makes a basic metaphysical 
error in his judgment about the kind of thing he is.402  A tragic flaw indeed. 
Now, let us listen to Creon.  In contrast to Oedipus, at the end of The Antigone, 
Creon has the insight that he may have made a prior error in judgment – sadly, it is 
the image of his dead son, Haemon, that triggers the insight – and Creon experiences, 
quite dramatically, the rush of intellectual conversion and liberation, as he makes the 
decision (an enlargement of his consciousness) to act.  In this case, the action that 
follows on the heels of his insight, judgment and decision is rushing to the cave in 
which he has imprisoned Antigone to die.  He shouts,  
Creon:  Oh, howl for the sins of a stubborn mind,  
Evil-minded, death-dealing!  
O you who are witnesses,  
You saw those who killed and those who died,  
all in one family,  
Cry out against the sacrilege that I called strategy!  
Oh, howl, my son, my young son, 
for your young death.   
Ah!  Ah!  You were expelled from life  
By my bad judgment, never yours. 
 
Chorus: Yes, it is late, but you have seen where justice lies.403 (Lines 1261-1270) 
 
                                                        
402 I am reminded here of the climax of the excellent film “A Few Good Men,” 
in which the younger defendant, Private Downey, is perplexed by the military court’s 
findings that he and his codefendant are guilty.  To his repeated claims, “we did 
nothing wrong,” the other defendant, the wiser Private Dawson, recognizing the part 
he has played in the death of a fellow Marine, replies, “Yeah we did.  We were 
supposed to fight for people who couldn't fight for themselves.” 
 





Note Creon’s use of the phrase “bad judgment” (δυσβουλίαις).404   Note, also, 
the chorus’ reply to an admission of bad judgment with the verb “seen” ( ἰδεῖν) to 
describe Creon’s newfound understanding.  As we have done in earlier sections, we 
may, in the tradition of Lonergan, replace the verb “seen” with “understand.”  The 
chorus is saying, “Yes, it is late, but you have [understood] where justice lies.”  Creon, 
in other words, understands that his behavior has been obstinate and unyielding.  
Both he and the Chorus recognize that the refusal to bend, the refusal to adopt an 
antecedent willingness to pursue questions to which one has been heretofore closed 
off, has been a tragic decision rooted in entrenched bias that has led to a personal 
tragedy for which he is ethically culpable.   Further, it is the selfsame conquering of 
bias that now allows Creon to see/understand that he is ethically culpable. 
Unlike Oedipus, Creon will now decide to actualize the potential avenue that 
leads toward healing.  Tragically, as in Oedipus Tyannus, Creon’s insight comes too 
late but, at least, he recognizes that it is still within his power and within the domain 
of his will (and intellect) to try to expand upon his effective freedom.  He is willing, in 
other words, to run to the cave in an attempt, albeit futile, to realize the possibility of 
healing.  Now, it is true that Creon’s change of mind (and will) are still the byproduct 
of persuasion.405  There is nothing wrong with persuasion, especially when others 
have good and valuable things to tell us. Yet total liberation would imply an 
antecedent willingness that would make persuasion to do a good and valuable thing 
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redundant.  Nevertheless, in the case of my analysis here, there is a “medal for trying,” 
which Creon deserves, and which Oedipus does not.   
In stark contrast, Oedipus’ speech is merely a recapitulation of his own 
assessment years earlier in Thebes: “Apollo!  It was Apollo, my friends./Agony after 
agony, he brought them on” (1330-1331).  Unlike Creon, it seems as if Oedipus’ 
confident self-assessment of his own moral culpability has remained unabashedly 
static in spite of considerable time and, as a blind man alone with his own 
consciousness, considerable opportunity for discernment and self-appropriation.   
Most importantly, though, juxtaposing Oedipus’ speech with Creon’s speech 
underscores the important point that Sophocles in no way rules out (at least within 
the world of his dramas) the possibility of intellectual conversion as an act within the 
range of human potential.  In fact, the Chorus’ reply to Creon that “it is late” stresses 
the pragmatic importance of intellectual conversion vis-à-vis time.  The implication 
here is that if conversion does not occur by a particular time, conditions may mount 
to the point where an event, while still a probability, is more likely to be such a high 
probability that it has become, to use the common parlance, a fait accompli.  In short, 
Creon’s speech makes Oedipus’ lament harder to take seriously and, as such, makes 
harder to take seriously the more general metaphysical objections of determinism.406   
                                                        
406  As McCoy notes: It is true that Antigone was written first and that, 
technically speaking, the plays are not a true trilogy for that reason.  That the third 
play (“Colonus”) seems to reject the liberation and conversion that appears in the first 
may signal a change in Sophocles’ thought.  It could be the case that the older the poet 
became, the less sanguine he was about the possibility of liberation.  Leopards don’t 





Returning to Lonergan’s passage about the “surrounding penumbra,” Oedipus’ 
lament at the end of “Colonus” indicates that he believes that the data of his experience 
suggests, as Lonergan says, “there is no use trying.”  Clearly, Oedipus has a legitimate 
gripe about the “bad hand” he was dealt from birth, perhaps more so than most.  The 
question, though, is whether he is being fair and authentic in his own assessment of 
the prohibitive power of this “bad hand” (antecedent conditions) or whether he is 
unconvincingly (to us and to him) parlaying them to escape a portion of blame?  
Asking this question is not, as Dodds warns, to make the mistake of treating Oedipus 
as if he were a real man.  We are assessing him on his own terms and on the 
authenticity of the choices he makes and then comparing those choices to the choices 
of other kings within Sophocles’ dramatic world. 
Further, we might add that, in fairness to him, Oedipus is not wrong in his 
instinct to survey his past and make judgments about various extenuating and 
potentially mitigating circumstances.  After all, an authentic appraisal of antecedent 
conditions is the fruit of the unrestricted desire to know and such an appraisal clearly 
matters when asking questions about moral impotence.  Lonergan takes them 
seriously too.  As he notes, in order for a human agent to even exploit his effective 
freedom, a number of antecedent conditions (on the biological, chemical and physical 
level) must be fulfilled.  Clearly, the fulfillment of those conditions may indeed be 
beyond the agent’s control or, in some cases, impossible to fulfill.    
Specifically, Lonergan addresses four conditions that must be fulfilled for 
moral impotence to even obtain.  First, as Lonergan notes, the subject must be free of 





free to ride a camel and a person with damage to his pre-frontal cortex might not be 
free to solve a calculus equation.  Second, the agent must be “sensitive,” but his 
sensitivity may lack “a perfect adjustment [between intellectual and psycho-neural 
development].”  Lonergan adds, “scotosis can result in a conflict between the 
operators of intellectual and of psycho-neural development; and then the sensitive 
subject is invaded by anxiety, by obsessions, and by other neurotic phenomena that 
restrict is capacity for effective deliberation and choice.”407 Thirdly, the subject must 
be intelligent.  Lonergan writes, “so it is that the greater the development of one’s 
practical intelligence, the greater the range of possible course of action one can grasp 
and consider.  Inversely, the less development of one’s practical intelligence, the less 
the range of possible courses of action that here and now will occur to one.”408  
Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, the agent must be what Lonergan 
calls “antecedently willing.” 409   The concept of “antecedent willingness” is best 
illustrated by Lonergan’s analogy that:   
the capacity to learn: what is learned :: willingness: willing, the act of deciding  
To underscore this analogy, Lonergan offers the following crucial point: 
So it is that a person, caught as it were unawares, may be ready for any 
scheme or exploit but, on the second thoughts of rational self-
consciousness, settles back into the narrow routine defined by his 
antecedent willingness.  For unless one’s antecedent willingness has 
the height and breadth and depth of the unrestricted desire to know, 
the emergence of rational self-consciousness involves the addition of a 
restriction upon one’s effective freedom.410  
 
                                                        
407 Lonergan, Insight, 645. 
 







It seems that for Lonergan, the goal for a human being is to reach a universal 
willingness that “matches the unrestricted desire to know.”  But this goal discloses a 
paradox: how is one to be persuaded to open oneself up to persuasion, when one is 
not open to persuasion?  Consider again, for example, the monarchs of Corinth, 
Polybus and Merope, now in the light of Lonergan’s concept of antecedent 
willingness.  At the moment of a crucial existential choice, they seem to act in that 
“narrow routine” defined by an antecedent willingness that lacks the “height and 
breadth” of the unrestricted desire to know.  They are unwilling to disclose the truth 
to their son given, presumably, the headaches it will cause for them.  Disclosing the 
truth will, in other words, force them beyond their narrow routine into unknown 
territory. 
Likewise, Oedipus’ antecedent willingness also seems to lack, in those 
moments, the height and breadth and depth of his unrestricted desire to know.  To 
recruit the image of the penumbra, instead of developing into the light, Oedipus’ 
world contracts into the darkness of ignorance.  Lonergan offers a perfect metaphor 
to describe this enlarging and contracting.  In a nice summation, he says,  
The elements in the problem are basically simple.  Man’s intelligence, 
reasonableness, and willingness (1) proceed from a detached, 
disinterested, unrestricted desire to know, (2) are potentialities in 
process of development towards a full effective freedom, (3) supply the 
higher integration for otherwise coincidental manifolds on 
successively underlying psychic, organic, chemical, and physical levels, 
(4) stand in opposition and tension with sensitive and intersubjective 
attachment, interest and exclusiveness, and (5) suffer from that tension 
a cumulative bias that increasingly distorts immanent development, its 
outward products, and the outer conditions under which the immanent 
development occurs.411  
 
                                                        





Oedipus’ two speeches above, delivered at two different times in his life, seem 
to demonstrate vividly the way in which Oedipus falls into the taxonomy above.  His 
consciousness is not enlarging or developing, as Woodruff suggests, but shrinking and 
contracting.  He asks questions, yes, but, before long, he seems unwilling to pursue 
them any further.  The evolution of his questioning is one of punctuated equilibrium.  
While he hits peaks of unrestricted questioning, they are followed by troughs of bias.  
The end of “Colonus” finds him in a trough.  Yes, his unrestricted desire to know 
conditions his departure from Corinth.  But, ultimately, his bias precludes him from 
asking additional questions, restricting the unrestricted desire to know which, as a 
result, fails to disclose potentialities that would allow him to develop toward full 
effective freedom which, if achieved, would supply the higher integration.   
Thus, while Creon understands himself in a new way (as truculent, obstinate, 
unyielding, unintelligent, irresponsible and unreasonable) Oedipus fails to recognize 
himself and his culpability.  Is this a surprise?  It should not be.  After all, his failure to 
understand himself is consistent with the initial irony of the riddle of the Sphinx – the 
answer to the riddle is you!  For all the lip service paid then to Oedipus solving the 
riddle of his own identity, by the end of Colonus, he still knows nothing.412   
 
Final Thoughts: The Specter of Reductionism  
 
                                                        
 
 412 One might point out here that there is a sense in which Oedipus was willing 
to be received by Theseus and, through his death, become an instrument of Theseus’ 
cooperative grace for Athens.  And while this willingness might be evidence of an 
emerging moral conversion, Oedipus’ unwillingness to bury the hatchet with his sons 





Oedipus’ “argument” above – if we may call his speech an “argument” – 
attributes his catastrophic fate to natural and genetic forces far beyond his control.  
Many critics take his speech as an articulation of one of Sophocles’ main themes or, at 
the very least, an attempt by Sophocles to “enlarge our sensibility” vis-à-vis the idea 
of the impotence of rationality against archaic forces of darkness beyond the 
understanding.  Yet, despite Segal’s suggestion that Sophocles is invoking an “older 
paradigm,” Oedipus’ argument anticipates a position (and a metaphysic) we see 
today: modern scientific reductionism and its many deterministic corollaries.   
Recent studies in cognitive science and experimental philosophy, for example, 
have explored the connection between the brain and morality and, by extension, 
whether praise and blame are categories that may need to be eliminated.413  Further, 
the research program known as “eliminative reductionism,” championed by Paul and 
Patricia Churchland, suggests that even certain concepts, such as “the will,” for 
example, ought to be jettisoned from our thinking.  It would be more accurate, says 
the eliminativist, to use the term “frontal” to describe those who, heretofore, would 
have been described as weak-willed, since decisions and judgments are not a matter 
of will but, as (f)MRI’s indicate, are tokened in the pre-frontal cortex.  Eliminative 
reductionists, in other words, have “looked” for “the will” in the brain and since they 
                                                        
413  See, for example, https://uwaterloo.ca/news/news/people-attribute-
moral-obligation-and-blame-regardless.  In fact, the neuroscientist David Eagleman 
and Boston College’s own Liane Young have become leading voices exploring this 
position.  In this sense, the determinism Sophocles was exploring then, not as dogma 






cannot find it (for theirs is an empirical verification criterion of meaning) they 
eliminate it.   
Nevertheless, despite this reductionism, in spite of Oedipus’ attempt to invoke 
it, and in spite of the viewpoint that suggests that Sophocles takes Oedipus’ 
reductionist claims as legitimate mitigating factors in his moral culpability, I have 
made the case, thus far, that Oedipus’ still makes a number of different errors in 
judgment which at least make him partially blameworthy.  Given these errors, I have 
asked the basic question: might Oedipus Tyrannus, at its heart, suggest the Socratic 
point that prudence, for the most part, leads to happiness and imprudence misery?  
That the only legitimate limit to our freedom is our questioning and insights?   
The viewpoint may seem uncontroversial enough; and yet it runs contrary to 
one of the play’s most influential commentaries.  My analysis, therefore, would be 
incomplete without engaging that commentary: E.R. Dodd’s “On Misunderstanding 
Oedipus Rex.”  In that essay, renowned classicist E.R. Dodds rejects my basic premise, 
claiming that it would fall into one of three interpretive heresies.  It makes sense to 
see if my analysis has fallen into those heresies.  For Dodds, the first heresy is the 
claim that Oedipus is somehow guilty and deserves what he got.  The second heresy 
is that Oedipus is a puppet and has zero control over his actions.  The third heresy is 
the belief that Sophocles has no religious or moral axe to grind.  For Dodds, the three 
heresies are connected to a general misunderstanding of the play and the Greek 
worldview in general.   
It was quite possible, according to Dodds, for a typical ancient Greek watching 





puppet and yet does not deserve what he got.  Why?  Because in the Greek world, the 
gods are not necessarily just, the third heresy.  As Dodds notes, it is only the Judeo-
Christian premise of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God (which so many 
Christianized commentators smuggle into their analysis) that makes the first two 
claims difficult to reconcile.  In fact, Dodds says that our own prudence allows us to 
assert two things only about Sophocles 1.) he did not believe that the gods are, in the 
human sense, just.  2.) he did believe that the gods exist and that man should revere 
them.  These views are compatible, on Dodds’ view, because we should not view the 
play through a Christian lens.  As Dodds says, “to the Christian it is a necessary part 
of piety to believe that God is just…but the older world saw no such necessity.”414 He 
then adds, pointedly, 
If you doubt this, take down the Iliad and read Achilles’ opinion of what 
divine justice amounts to (xxiv. 525-33); or take down the Bible and 
read the Book of Job.  Disbelief in divine justice as measured by human 
yardsticks can perfectly well be associated with deep religious feeling.  
‘Men,’ said Heraclitus, ‘find some things unjust, other things just; but in 
the eyes of God all things are beautiful and good and just.’  I think that 
Sophocles would have agreed.  For him, as for Heraclitus, there is an 
objective world-order which man must respect but which he cannot 
hope fully to understand.415  
 
The question remains, though, as to whether accepting this position on Sophocles’ 
religiosity requires us to simply ignore the laundry list of moments in which Oedipus 
is dizzyingly imprudent even to a Greek sensibility.  Would taking Oedipus to task for 
imprudence constitute a Christian bias?  Or would it be to measure Oedipus by the 
yardsticks offered by his own viewing audience, the Greeks?  In other words, if we 
                                                        







claim that Oedipus is morally impotent by being intellectually impotent, have we 
made some sort of anachronistic error?  I think not. 
 As I alluded to above, the answer to this question leads, as many roads do, to 
Aristotle.  The bulk of Dodds’ claims are rooted in his parsing of the Greek term 
hamartia from which we get “flaw” and from which we have received from literary 
history the concept of the “tragic flaw.”  In the Poetics, Aristotle uses the term 
hamartia in reference to a “mistake made in ignorance of some material fact.”  As I 
mentioned earlier, the word comes from the verb hamartano which means “to miss 
the mark,” as in archery.  For Aristotle, hamartia is a kind of “missing the mark,” and 
the word is used in the same way as in the Nichomachean Ethics.   Dodds’ assertion is 
that the idea that a “tragic law” (a phrase Aristotle does not use) ought to be a moral 
one, or a flaw in character, is a decidedly Christian invention, proffered primarily by 
the Victorians.  In other words, it’s fine to indict Macbeth for moral impotence but not 
Oedipus.   
As I have also mentioned, for Lonergan, determining “moral impotence” first 
requires our previous discussion of freedom and then, ultimately, determining 
whether a subject is effectively free by eliminating from the equation: 1.) external 
circumstance.  2.) psychic abnormality.  In this sense we can agree that the proverbial 
man with the gun to his head or the man with the brain tumor pressing on his pre-
frontal cortex may not have a choice to do X, Y and Z.  The legal system recognizes this 
fact and offers punitive and rehabilitative punishments accordingly.  
But moral impotence, for Lonergan, is at least partially intellectual. In Insight, 





is restricted, not in the superficial fashion that results from external circumstance or 
psychic abnormality, but in the profound fashion that follows from incomplete 
intellectual and volitional development.” 416   In other words, Lonergan is merely 
affirming what Dodds notes about the ancient Greeks, that when it comes to a 
distinction between intellectual and moral flaws, the average Greek made no such 
distinction.   
Dodds agrees with the viewpoint that Sophocles is comparing Oedipus’ life to 
our own.  For the most part, this interpretation holds that the play teaches us that the 
“last riddle” is that life is not happy.  This is the viewpoint offered by Nietzsche and 
his connecting of the play to the “Silence of Silenus.” Yet we must be cautious, says 
Dodds, not to take this viewpoint as some didactic “message” but an “enlargement of 
sensibility.”  For Dodds, it follows from this “enlargement of sensibility,” that we are 
not allowed to question whether Oedipus could have or should have acted more 
prudently in an effort to avoid his fate.   This approach is off limits to readers since, 
on Dodds’ view, Sophocles offers no evidence that Oedipus should have compiled 
what Waldock once called “a handlist of all the things he must not do.”  This is a 
legalistic reading of the play and, as Dodds mentions in his footnote, either Sophocles 
has given us a “botched compromise” or “the common sense of the law-courts is not 
after all the best yardstick by which to measure myth.”417  
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The premise on which Dodds’ attack of a “law-court” reading of the play is that 
we cannot attribute to Oedipus a lack of prudence primarily because the predictions 
of the oracle are unconditional.  There is, to borrow from Dodds, “no saving clause.”418 
(41).  It is important to note here that, as Dodds points out, Aeschylus’ trilogy 
depicting the House of Laius, of which only the Septem survives, the “oracle given to 
Laius was conditional: ‘Do not beget a child; for if you do, that child will kill you.’”419  
Dodds suggests that because there is no mention of this hereditary curse in Sophocles, 
“the critic must not assume what the poet has abstained from suggesting.”420 That 
said, Oedipus’ audience would have been well-aware of the hereditary curse which is 
mentioned in both The Antigone (583 ff) and Colonus (964 ff).  Further, they would 
have been well aware of Sophocles’ authorial choice to omit the heightened elements 
of inevitability in Aeschylus, a deliberate shift away from Aeschylus conception of the 
tragic.  This deliberate shift away from the inevitability of the curse constitutes an 
additional challenge to Dodds.  
And yet, if we affirm that Oedipus is neither bound by external circumstance 
nor suffering from a psychic abnormality, we should be free to indict his character.  
Dodds, in other words, fails to recognize that one can agree with “the great majority 
of contemporary scholars” on the “essential moral innocence of Oedipus” and still 
suggest a lack of prudence.  One can be, in other words, imprudent and, for the most 
part, morally innocent.  My analysis, in other words, has attempted to thread a needle.  










We may grant, along with Dodds, that Oedipus’ calamity is not the result of a character 
flaw per se, in the sense of viciousness, but we may also add that it is a character flaw 
to eschew responsibility in the way the speeches indicate.   We can find this viewpoint 
in Aristotle as much as it appears in Lonergan. 
 In fact, statements such as these would amount to little more than “cop-outs” 
when we accept a metaphysical worldview like emergent probability and 
proportionate being.  Instead, when Lonergan’s metaphysics is accepted as a premise, 
one cannot avoid deducing the conclusion, as Lonergan does, that “the will’s decision 
is not determined by its antecedents. For the remote antecedents lie on the levels of 
physics, chemistry, biology, and sensitive psychology; and the events on such lower 
levels determine merely the materials that admit a manifold of alternative higher 
systematizations.” 421   In this sense, in a point to which I will now turn in the 
“Epilogue,” Oedipus’ claim that “It was Apollo, my friends” becomes analogous to 
modern legal defenses which attempt to pin blame on reductionist forces beyond the 
agent’s control.  Far from an “older paradigm,” the play articulates the real enemy to 
rationalism; an enemy that is not a religious sensibility but the poison of 
reductionism.   
  
                                                        







Why Should I Dance in an Unfriendly Universe? 
 
In Act One of Shakespeare’s The Tragedy of Macbeth, three witches make three 
statements to the ill-fated titular character.  The witches are aptly named the Wyrd 
sisters; their name is derived from the Old English “wyrd,” meaning “fate,” from which 
we get our modern English word, “weird.”  These Wyrd sisters seem to have 
supernatural powers.  Macbeth and Banquo are immediately enraptured by the 
prospect that these “supernatural solicitors” may have the power to “look into the 
seeds of time/And say which grain will grow and which will not” (I.i.58-59).  The 
Wyrd sisters tell Macbeth that he is “Thane of Glamis,” second that he is “Thane of 
Cawdor,” third that he will be “king hereafter” (I.i.49-51). 
Although they are often called predictions, technically speaking, the first two 
statements are not predictions at all.  They are statements of facts of which Macbeth 
is unaware.  He is Thane of Glamis and, prior to the scene, unbeknownst to him, has 
been promoted to Thane of Cawdor.  Only the third statement, that he shall be “king 
hereafter,” predicts a future event.  This statement plants a seed in Macbeth’s 
consciousness and, with the help of the infamous Lady Macbeth, he grows it, to 
inevitable, tragic consequences. 
Like Oedipus, Macbeth commits regicide on the heels of an “oracular” 
prediction.  In the case of Oedipus, this regicide is also parricide.  For Macbeth, the 
regicide is a figurative parricide and a figurative deicide, as Duncan has been a father 
figure to Macbeth and a symbol of an almost divine, even-handed justice.  Macbeth 





understand the ephemerality of his own identity.  As both plays hasten to their end, 
it is hard not to become awash in a viewpoint that all human striving is ultimately 
futile and meaningless.  The only certainty in human life is suffering and that “All our 
yesterdays have lighted fools the way to dusty death,” as Macbeth will later say 
(V.v.22-23).   
It is no coincidence that this bleak existential perspective emerges against a 
metaphysical canvas of a deterministic fatalism – the viewpoint that holds that human 
will is impotent in the face of external forces. We are but cogs in a machine.  In both 
plays, a fated offence against nature is magnified when the offence proves to be so 
irrevocable that not even nature can wash it clean.  In Oedipus, the chorus exclaims, “I 
tell you neither the waters of the Danube nor the Nile can wash this palace clean.  Such 
things it hides…” (lines 1227-31).  Likewise, in a line that I have always suspected is 
an homage to Sophocles, Macbeth asks, “Will all great Neptune’s ocean wash this 
blood from my hand?  No, this my hand will rather the multitudinous seas 
incarnadine, making the green one red” (II.2 Lines 64-67).  
Despite this shared backdrop of deterministic fatalism, the intervening 
Christian tradition that separates the plays by 2,000 years may explain the differences 
between the audience’s response to the two titular characters vis-à-vis moral 
impotence.  In other words, the relative pity we feel for Oedipus and Macbeth may be 
contingent upon our own philosophical or religious commitments.  The Socratic 
intellectualist, for example, may have no trouble pitying Oedipus given the 
extenuating circumstances; but he may struggle to pity Macbeth, who acts with malice 





while the Christian may pity Oedipus for his horrible fate, he may, ironically, pity 
Macbeth more, because he sees in Macbeth man’s fallen nature and his susceptibility 
to sin.  As the theologian James Kugel has argued, Macbeth’s mind is symbolic of the 
fallen human mind.  Kugel uses the helpful phrase “semipermeable,” to describe the 
human consciousness’ susceptibility to outside powers, to receive God’s instructions, 
yes, but also, presumably, to powers of dark persuasion.422   
Nevertheless, despite these differences vis-à-vis pity, both Oedipus Tyrannus 
and Macbeth may, in an important way, have far more in common than difference.  
Both Sophocles and Shakespeare seem to recognize that from a metaphysical 
worldview like determinism there follows, seemingly of necessity, an existential 
stance toward the universe: nihilism.  In fact, it is this specter of nihilism, more so 
than fatalism, that becomes the principle antagonist in both plays.  In Strophe A of the 
5th Chorus of Oedipus Tyrannus, the chorus laments,  
 
Oh, what a wretched breed we mortals are:  
our lives add up to nothing.   
Does anyone, anyone at all  
harvest more of happiness than a vacant image,  
And from that image fall away?   
You are my pattern, your fortune is mine,  
You, Oedipus, your misery teaches me to call no mortal blessed. (1186 – 1196) 
 
Likewise, upon hearing his wife is dead in Act V, Scene v, Macbeth famously laments, 
 
She should have died hereafter; 
There would have been time for such a word. 
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow 
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day 
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To the last syllable of recorded time, 
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools  
The way to dusty death.  Out, out, brief candle! 
Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player 
That struts and frets his is hour upon the stage 
And then is heard no more.  It is a tale  
told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,  
signifying nothing. (V.v.17-28) 
 
 Of note in these two eerily parallel speeches is the word “nothing.”  In Oedipus 
Tyrannus, the chorus reminds us that “our lives add up to nothing.”  Macbeth likewise 
tells us that life is the tale of an incompetent storyteller which, in the end, signifies 
“nothing.”   
 In the 20th century, one is also reminded of the Hemingway short story, “A 
Clean, Well Lighted Place,” in which an older waiter, suffering from insomnia, also 
realizes the meaninglessness of human striving.  To symbolize the impotence of 
religion in answering the nihilist objection, Hemingway subversively takes the “Our 
Father” and interpolates into it the Spanish word nada, meaning “nothing.” 
"Good night," the other said. Turning off the electric light he continued 
the conversation with himself. It is the light of course but it is necessary 
that the place be clean and pleasant. You do not want music. Certainly 
you do not want music. Nor can you stand before a bar with dignity 
although that is all that is provided for these hours. What did he fear? 
It was not fear or dread.  It was a nothing that he knew too well. It was 
all nothing and a man was nothing too. It was only that and light was all 
it needed and certain cleanness and order. Some lived in it and never 
felt it but he knew it all was nada y pues nada y nada y pues nada. Our 
nada who art in nada, nada be thy name thy kingdom nada thy will be 
nada in nada as it is in nada. Give us this nada our daily nada and nada 
us our nada as we nada our nadas and nada us not into nada but deliver 
us from nada; pues nada. Hail nothing full of nothing, nothing is with 
thee.423 
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The association of nihilism with Oedipus Tyrannus is most famously connected 
to Nietzsche.  In The Birth of Tragedy, he writes, “Wisdom, the [Oedipus] myth seems 
to whisper to us, is an unnatural abomination: whoever plunges nature into the abyss 
of destruction by what he knows must in turn experience the dissolution of nature in 
his own person. The sharp point of wisdom turns against the wise man; wisdom is an 
offence against nature.” 424    Nietzsche’s position is that Sophocles has merely 
disclosed the brutal irony of our condition as knowers: our questions, in our dogged 
pursuit to remain in fidelity to the self-correcting cycle of learning, will only 
ultimately reveal life’s meaninglessness.  Nietzsche offers his interpretation through 
the image and voice of Silenus, the Satyr who raised Dionysius.  When King Midas asks 
Silenus what the answer is to the ultimate question, the Satyr cackles a chilling reply: 
“Oh, wretched ephemeral race … why do you compel me to tell you what it would be 
most expedient for you not to hear? What is best of all is utterly beyond your reach: 
not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best for you is….to die soon.”   
Clearly, Nietzsche is on to something.  For in Colonus we read precisely the 
same sentiment, as Sophocles makes his Chorus say, “The best is never to have been 
born/Or, once alive, die young/And return to oblivion” (1225-1228).  
 
A False Dichotomy?  
 
We often describe modernity as the byproduct of two great traditions: the 
Judeo-Christian and the Greco-Roman.  We set up corresponding tensions between 
Athens and Jerusalem, Reason and Faith.  And yet given the specter of nihilism 
                                                        





described above, an elongated shadow which runs from antiquity (Sophocles) to the 
Elizabethan age (Shakespeare) to the modern era (Hemingway), one wonders if we 
would be better served by uniting Athens and Jerusalem together against this 
common foe: nihilism.   
This would not be a radical exhortation.  As Yoram Hazony has pointed out in 
his fascinating book The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture, “nothing in the principal 
Hebrew texts suggests that the prophets and scholars of ancient Israel were familiar 
with such an opposition between God’s word and the pronouncements of human 
reason when it is working as it should.”425  Recognizing the origin of this Athens-
Jerusalem dichotomy in Tertullian and others, Hazony defines the assumptions: 
i.) “Faith” and “reason” name distinct and opposed aspects of mankind’s 
mental endowment; and that 
ii.) The tradition of thought found in the Bible represents and encourages 
the first of these, whereas Greek philosophy embraces the second.426 
 
Hazony then adds, “I do not believe the dichotomy between faith and reason is very 
helpful in understanding the diversity of human intellectual orientations.”427   
 I concur.  I would point out that the typical Athens-Jerusalem dichotomy, while 
perhaps a helpful pedagogical or organizational tool in the classroom, clouds this 
diversity of intellectual orientations and tends to obfuscate the facts.  For example, to 
the Biblical authors, as Hazony adds, “it is obvious that the wisdom presented by the 
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prophets as the word of God is precisely the wisdom that is sought by human beings 
for the present, human world.”428 
 Clearly, there are other arrangements.  We might, if we were so inclined, 
choose to describe not two but three intellectual orientations, a trichotomy.  Let’s give 
them three names: Philosopher, Saint, Messenger.  
  The philosopher is Plato.  In the end of his Republic, in section 617d, Socrates, 
Plato’s mouthpiece, says, “Ephemeral souls…Virtue knows no master; each will 
possess it to a greater or less degree, depending on whether he values or disdains it.  
The responsibility lies with the one who makes the choice; the god has none” (617d).  
 The saint is Augustine.  In Book 8 of his Confessions, he asks us, as Lady 
Continence asks him, in a terrific chiasmastic line, “Why are you relying on yourself, 
only to find yourself unreliable?  Cast yourself upon [Christ], do not be afraid.  He will 
not withdraw himself so that you fall.  Make the leap without anxiety; he will catch 
you and heal you” (8.XII.26).  The messenger is from Sophocles’ Antigone.  He says, 
“The course of our lives never stops; it runs past good or ill.  I’ll never declare success 
or failure for anyone.  It’s only chance that keeps your boat upright, And chance that 
sinks you – good luck or bad is all you have” (1155-1171).429   
 We can understand each worldview in terms of fluid hydrostatics.  Socrates’ 
position is simple: be less dense than the environment in which you find yourself and 
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you won’t sink.  Augustine disagrees.  You are sunken from the start; and thus always 
more dense than your surroundings.  If you find yourself floating; it is only insofar as 
God has buoyed you up.  Against these two, Sophocles’ messenger says you can’t 
control your destiny because…well…you don’t control your density.  In the seething 
flux of a totally indifferent universe, you may suddenly weigh more than you displace, 
through no fault of your own.  You control nada. 
 
Lonergan’s Dichotomy   
 
 Given this “diversity of human intellectual positions,” to borrow Hazony’s 
helpful phrase, it is unclear to me as to whether couching Athens as somehow 
opposed to Jerusalem is good pedagogical practice.  In a similar mode, equally unclear 
to me is whether couching Sophocles as somehow opposed to Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle is good practice.  Yes, contradistinction has its pedagogical merits, but it can 
also wash away nuance.   
 I would therefore suggest, by way of a conclusion to this book, that if we must 
have a dichotomy, a better alternative, even pedagogically speaking, may be to use 
Lonergan’s dichotomy of the friendly or unfriendly universe. For ultimately, we are 
faced with one existential question: is our universe a friendly one?   
 In Method in Theology, Lonergan asks, poignantly: 
Is moral enterprise consonant with this world?...is the universe on our 
side, or are we just gamblers and, if we are gamblers, are we not 
perhaps fools, individually struggling for authenticity and collectively 
endeavoring to snatch progress from the ever mounting welter of 
decline?  The questions arise and, clearly, our attitudes and our 
resoluteness may be profoundly affected by the answers.  Does there 
or does there not necessarily exists a transcendent, intelligent ground 
of the universe?  Is that ground or are we the primary instance of moral 





process basically cognate to us as moral beings or are they different and 
so alien to us?430  
 
 The phrase “friendly universe” comes a bit later in the text, when Lonergan 
adds, “Faith places human efforts in a friendly universe; it reveals an ultimate 
significance in human achievement; it strengthens new undertakings with 
confidence” (117, my italics).  Notice the connection Lonergan adduces between 
religious conversion, or the unrestricted being in love with God, as the ground of the 
friendly universe.  And yet, as I mentioned in an earlier section on Theseus, this 
unrestricted being in love is, as Lonergan points out, “interpreted differently in the 
context of different religious traditions.”  After all, Socrates was no Christian; but he 
did believe the universe was friendly.   
Given the parameters of this paper, I could not do justice in these final 
concluding thoughts to the arguments Lonergan mounts in Insight and other texts to 
challenge our present culture’s extra-scientific assumptions which, typically, lead 
(erroneously) to the conclusion that our universe is an unfriendly one.431  It will be 
sufficient here to simply cite Byrne’s excellent summation that “Lonergan’s radical 
reinterpretation of the methods of science and the meaningfulness of the natural 
universe known by their means rebut the pervasive and corrosive extra-scientific 
climate of opinion that the universe is itself meaningless and that human ethical 
endeavor is a quaint but ultimately futile exercise.”432  In fact, Byrne goes so far as to 
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say that Insight, from one perspective, is an extended response to the assumption that 
modern science has somehow confirmed our universe is hostile to human striving.  
To the contrary, Byrne explains that Lonergan shows “it is not the scientific methods 
or scientific results in or of themselves that lead to despair about the worth of ethical 
authenticity. Rather, in Lonergan’s view it is their fellow travelers, the unexamined 
opinions about what the sciences reveal, which lead to conclusions that undermine 
confidence about moral endeavor.” 
Nowadays, the metaphysical doctrine of reductionism or eliminative 
reductionism has led to a determinism remarkably like the one Sophocles explores in 
Oedipus Tyrannus.   Recently, the neuroscientist David Eagleman has made the case 
that our moral flaws are really determined by neurophysiological factors beyond our 
control.  Our moral failings, while still perhaps punishable legally, are not our fault.  
But if praise and blame are null categories in a deterministic universe, what 
really is the point of human endeavors?  How can such a metaphysic ultimately not 
lead to a kind of nihilism?  I am reminded of one of my favorite passages from the late 
American philosopher and cognitive scientist, Jerry Fodor.  When considering the 
psycho-neural identity theory, a viewpoint which holds that our consciousness states 
are identical with physical states, the brute firing of neurons, Fodor exclaimed,  
I’m not really convinced that it matters very much whether the mental 
is physical; still less that it matters very much whether we can prove 
that it is.  Whereas if it isn’t literally true that my wanting is causally 
responsible for my reaching, and my itching is causally responsible for 
my scratching, and my believing is causally responsible for my saying…, 
                                                        





if none of that is literally true, then practically everything I believe 
about anything is false and it’s the end of the world.433 
 
Here Fodor humorously acknowledges the very point I have been trying to 
stress.  Our metaphysical commitments cannot help but ground our existential stance 
toward the world.  We want to know that our actions matter.  We want a ground 
beneath our striving.  As Nietzsche once said, one of the “most vital questions for 
philosophy appears to be to what extent the character of the world is unalterable: so 
as, once this question has been answered, to set about improving that part of it 
recognized as alterable with the most ruthless courage.”434  What is there but despair 
when we find, to paraphrase Shakespeare, a universe that does not alter when it 
alteration finds and does not bend with the remover to remove?  
 
Why Should I Dance? 
 
Ironically, in my analysis of the many questions asked and answered in 
Oedipus Tyrannus, I have delayed, until now, what might be the single most important 
one.  It is not Oedipus who asks it, but the Chorus.  And, unlike many of the questions 
that lead to insights and judgments of facts, this question goes unanswered.  
Sophocles’ audience no doubt left the theater of Dionysius with the question still on 
their minds and on their lips and in their hearts. 
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As Oedipus sends for the exiled Theban herdsman, in whom his fleeting hope 
rests, the Chorus asks, at line 896, “Why should I dance in prayer and praise?”  The 
entire Strophe B of this 3rd chorus is structured as a modus ponens: if the hubristic 
and unjust man prospers in his wickedness with no consequence or punishment, then 
there is no point in reverence for the gods and “everything divine departs.”  As 
Bernard Knox puts it, “If irreverent action is to be respected and profitable, why 
should I dance?”435 
 
[Strophe B]  
 
If a man moves in lofty pride 
His hands or tongue  
Fearless of injustice –  
No reverence for holy places –  
I pray he meet an evil fate 
To pay for his miserable excesses. 
If he piles wealth on wealth, without justice, 
If he does not shrink from fighting reverence 
And puts his hand to what may not be touched, 
Then may his effort be wasted, 
And may there be no shield  
To save his mind from blows. 
But if gods give honor to a life like his, 




No longer will I go in reverence  
To the sacred navel of the world –  
Not to Delphi, not to Abai, 
Or the temple at Olympia, 
If the oracles do not come true 
For all humanity to see. 
Ruler of all, O Zeus our lord, 
If that be your name, do not let this escape 
Your notice or your undying power: 
Apollo’s word to Laius long ago 
                                                        





Is fading, it is already lost. 
Now Apollo’s fame and honor die away, 
And everything divine departs. (Lines 883 – 910, my italics) 
   
 The existential question, “Why should I dance?” becomes the Chorus’ potential 
indictment of the ground of meaning in their universe and, no trivial corollary, the 
veracity and legitimacy of prophecy, or those who seek to understand the divine 
order and, presumably, those who might call that order amenable to human 
striving.436  Historically speaking, the chorus is voicing here the terms of a percolating 
debate in late Periclean Athens involving a position (prophecy is a legitimate 
enterprise) and counter-position (prophecy is the work of degenerate charlatans).  
Not surprisingly, it is a dialectic that plays out today, as modern science continues to 
undercut or even shout down religious voices.  
In one sense, this question is the culmination of a strand of inquiry that runs 
throughout the play.  Here and there are pointed references to the quackery of 
soothsaying and prophecy and divination.  For example, when Jocasta learns that 
Oedipus’ quarrel with Creon is the result of Tiresias’ claims, she says,  
A soothsayer?  Then you should dismiss all charges. 
Listen.  I’ll tell you why you can’t rely 
On any merely human soothsayers. 
Here, in brief, is my evidence: 
An oracle came to Laius once – I won’t say 
“From Apollo”; it came from priests – 
That “Laius would die at the hands of a son 
That would be born to him and me.” 
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But Laius was killed by strangers 
At a place where three roads meet.   
That’s the story. 
And our son?  He did not last three days. 
Laius yoked his feet and had him thrown away – 
By other people – into a wilderness of mountains. 
So Apollo did not make the tale come true: 
The boy never came to murder his father; 
The father had nothing to fear from his son. 
That’s the way a soothsayer charts the truth! 
Don’t trust them.  The god knows what’s needed: 
The god himself will speak when he sees fit. (707-725) 
 
 
Oedipus later says: “Why?  Why, dear wife, should we observe the oracle/At 
Delphi, or strain to see signs from birds screeching/In the sky?  They led me to believe 
that I would kill/My father, yet he’s dead and buried deep in the earth./And here I am, 
who never raised a hand against him,/Unless my absence made him die 
brokenhearted./Then, I suppose, I could be called his killer,/But not the kind 
contained within those worthless oracles/Polybus has taken those with him to 
Hades” (Lines 964-972).   Jocasta replies to this, “Exactly what I said in the beginning” 
(973). 
We must not forget, however, that prophecy and soothsaying are, in the end, 
vindicated in Sophocles’ universe.  We find even Jocasta, the character who has been 
most vociferous in her denial of prophecy, supplicating the gods with gifts at the altar: 
“Apollo, nearest god, to you I pray:/I have come with offerings,/I entreat you for relief, 
light out of darkness./The captain of our ship has lost his wits/And we are all so very 
afraid” (Lines 919-923).  Clearly the jury on soothsaying is still out.   So what are we 






Final (Final) Thoughts  
 
It is here that we should pause and recall Charles Segal’s words that Sophocles 
raises these issues “as problems, not as dogma.”437   And so, while there are indeed 
many moments that hint at the unfriendliness of the universe, there are also junctures 
that hint at friendship, both with each other and with the universe at large.  Sophocles 
offers much more nuance than a simple nihilistic rejection of the world, especially, as 
I have endeavored to show, when Colonus is factored into the equation.  As McCoy has 
argued, Colonus may in many respects be the antidote to Tyrannus.  She writes, “While 
Thebes had suffered because of Oedipus’ pollution, Athens will prosper because of its 
reception of Oedipus in his pollution and in his misery.  Whole Oedipus’ family will 
suffer greatly because of his fate, and because of his reaction to that Fate, the families 
in the audience of the plays, in Athens, are assured of the benevolent protection of the 
city because of Theseus’ care for the exiled and polluted one.”438   
 I close by citing below Matthew Arnold’s beautiful poem, “Dover Beach,” 
penned in 1867.  
 
The sea is calm to-night 
The tide is full, the moon lies fair 
Upon the straits;--on the French coast the light  
Gleams and is gone; the cliffs of England stand,  
Glimmering and vast, out in the tranquil bay.  
Come to the window, sweet is the night-air!  
Only, from the long line of spray  
Where the sea meets the moon-blanch'd land,  
Listen! you hear the grating roar  
Of pebbles which the waves draw back, and fling,  
At their return, up the high strand,  
                                                        
437 Ibid., 54. 





Begin, and cease, and then again begin,  
With tremulous cadence slow, and bring  
The eternal note of sadness in.  
  
Sophocles long ago  
Heard it on the Ægean, and it brought  
Into his mind the turbid ebb and flow  
Of human misery; we  
Find also in the sound a thought,  
Hearing it by this distant northern sea.  
  
The Sea of Faith  
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore  
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furl'd. 
But now I only hear  
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,   
Retreating, to the breath  
Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear   
And naked shingles of the world.  
Ah, love, let us be true  
To one another! for the world, which seems  
To lie before us like a land of dreams,  
So various, so beautiful, so new,  
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,  
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;  
And we are here as on a darkling plain  
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight 
Where ignorant armies clash by night. 
 
 As Arnold’s persona gazes out upon the austere cliffs of Dover, the English 
Channel and the flickering lights of the French coastline beyond, he hears in the 
perpetual roar “of pebbles which the waves draw back, and fling,” an “eternal note of 
sadness.” The persona then tells us that despite a separation of 2,000 years, 
“Sophocles long ago/ Heard it on the Ægean, and it brought/Into his mind the turbid 
ebb and flow/Of human misery.”  Arnold’s speaker believes that Sophocles also 
recognized that our universe, which once seemed friendly, and lying “before us like a 
land of dreams,/So various, so beautiful, so new” is, in actuality, an unfriendly one.  





light,/Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain.”  Arnold then closes with one of the 
more haunting images in English poetry: “And we are here as on a darkling plain.”  
The image evokes loneliness, alienation, despair.  Arnold’s universe is about as 
unfriendly as it gets.   
 But, while it is certainly true that Sophocles certainly heard that “eternal note 
of sadness on the Aegean” in Oedipus, he seems to have heard in Colonus a note of 
compassion and wisdom and love and the hope for a construction of a community in 
which human striving is not in vain.  As Oedipus tells his daughters,  
But there is one small word that can soothe –  
And that is ‘love.’  I loved you more than 
Anyone else could ever love, but now 
Your lives must go on without me. (1610-1619)439 
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